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Abstract
This dissertation represents an investigation into the determinants of capital flows to emerg-
ing markets. It argues that the existing literature can be enriched by explicitly recognising
the monetary nature of capital flows, which can be eﬀectively drawn out on the basis of post-
Keynesian monetary theory, and recognising the importance of institutional investors as key
actors in today’s financial markets. As such, the current cycle of capital flows to emerg-
ing markets can be understood as the demand for emerging markets assets by institutional
investors.
The determinants of such a demand are therefore the key focus of this dissertation. Two
factors, alongside many others already considered by the literature, stand out. Firstly, in line
with post-Keyensian theories of exchange rates, currency liquidity plays an important role.
Emerging markets currencies are structurally less liquid and thus subordinated to advanced
countries currecncies, but the extent of their subordination is mitigated by context-specific
“fundamentals”. This dissertation argues that the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves
is a primary factor in these respects.
Secondly, this dissertation points out that liabilities play a key role in the institutional in-
vestors’ portfolio choice mechanism. Rather than mechanically optimising over the risk/return
tradeoﬀ, the asset allocation of institutional investors is primarily driven by the goal of achiev-
ing suﬃcient returns to face their obligations. In the post-crisis environment, institutional
investors’ balance sheet condititions have deteriorated, and - due to low interest rates and
low financial market returns on safe assets - traditional asset classes cannot be relied upon to
generate suﬃcient returns to cover liabilities. Institutional investors are therefore induced to
look for alternative assets that can promise higher returns and allocate a growing part of their
assets to emerging markets assets as part of this strategy.
This dissertation uses both qualitative and quantitative methods to support these argu-
ments. It uses advanced macro-panel econometrics techniques to estimate assets demand
equations for emerging markets equities and bonds. The econometric results confirm the
macro-level significance of the hypothesised relationships, suggesting that higher level of for-
eign exchange reserves and weaker balance sheet conditions - proxied by lower pension funding
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ratios - increase allocations to emerging markets.
Qualitative methods, in the form of semi-structured interviews, shed further light on the
processes that lead to such results. In particular they highlight the complexity of the rela-
tionship between the “fundamentals” and their eﬀect on asset allocation, and the interaction
between regulation and the way through which liabilities aﬀect investors’ behaviour.
Finally the macroeconomics implications of these findings are analysed through a Stock-
Flow Consistent model. It is shown that institutional investors may have a pro-cyclical or
counter-cyclical impact on the system. Crucially, this is determined by how the dynamics of
the model aﬀect institutional investors’ balance sheet conditions.
Overall, this dissertation warrants caution about the present situation of emerging markets.
Institutional investors may be less panic-prone, but ultimately their interest in emerging mar-
kets seems to be caused more by their weaker balance sheets, as low returns make it impossible
for assets to match their growing liabilities, rather than “fundamentals”.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Japan’s Government Pension Investment Fund, the world’s biggest institu-
tional investor, has confirmed a shift into emerging market equities, as it seeks
higher returns amid rising payouts and persistently low bond yields.” (Financial
Times, 2 June 2012)
The integration of emerging markets into the global financial system has been a prime example
of the financial instability of modern global capitalism. Despite a secular upward trend in
cross-border financial claims and flows, emerging markets have experienced cyclical periods
of capital inflows, interrupted by sudden capital outflows and financial crises. Arguably, the
most renowned boom-bust cycle was the surge of private capital flows to emerging markets
during the 1990’s that ended with a succession of crises, starting with Mexico in 1995 and
then touching East Asian countries in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999, Argentina
and Turkey in 2001. The following boom to emerging markets during the 2000’s was again
interrupted by a sudden reversal of capital flows during the global financial crisis following the
Lehmann Brothers collapse in 2008. Since 2009 capital flows to emerging markets have been
expanding again, although signs of an upcoming generalised retreat are evident, as testified in
the summer of 2013 and 2015.
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What is behind these waves of inflows and outflows? Although many culprits have been
blamed over the sequence of these crises, a single answer is yet to be found. There is never-
theless agreement, as it will be shown, that this is not simply the fault of emerging markets’
wrong policies, which was the consensus in the late 1990’s. In particular, today much attention
is given to the role of global monetary policy, and especially the Federal Reserve’s decisions
about the future path of interest rates.
This dissertation represents an investigation around the answers to this question. It sit-
uates the current cycle of cross-border financial investments to emerging markets within the
operations of institutional investors from advanced countries. In particular, it will be argued
that, in order to explain today’s patterns of capital flows to emerging markets, it is crucial
to understand which factors lead institutional investors - and in particular pension funds - to
allocate a part of their portfolio to emerging markets assets.
The rest of this introductory chapter is divided into three parts. In the next section the
key research objectives and main contributions will be discussed. In section 1.2 the research
questions and hypothesis will be discussed. Section 1.3 makes some observation as to the
methodological background of this dissertation. In the final section the structure of the dis-
sertation will be outlined.
1.1 Dissertation objectives and contributions
This dissertation’s objectives and contribution are of empirical, theoretical and method-
ological nature.
On the empirical side, the thesis’ main contribution is to provide evidence on the portfolio
allocation mechanism of institutional investors. In particular it will show which factors are
relevant in determining allocation to emerging market assets. While much of macroeconomic
analysis and financial theory tends to focus on risk/return tradeoﬀs, and more recently global
risk-appetite cycles, this dissertation shows that a key determinant of institutional investors’
behaviour is the condition of their liabilities. “Liability-driven investment” is in fact a paradigm
of portfolio choice adopted by many pension funds and insurance companies, which has im-
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portant implications for their asset allocation. This dissertation also provides evidence about
which macro-level factors aﬀect investors’ views about emerging markets, highlighting the
importance of macro-financial stability, and the role of foreign exchange reserves in particular.
The theoretical contribution of this dissertation is to provide a framework of analysis for
the analysis of capital flows to emerging markets that is consistent with post-Keynesian mon-
etary and financial theory. A key tenet of post-Keynesian theory - as well as other heterodox
traditions in economics - is that modern capitalist economies are fundamentally ‘monetary’.
This dissertation argues that although conventional macroeconomic theory has put forward
very important contributions for the understanding of capital flows to emerging markets, its
theoretical background for the analysis of the open-economy remains rooted in a ‘real’ under-
standing of the economy. This dissertation argues that our understanding can be enriched by
referring to post-Keynesian monetary theory, which sees capital flows as flow of funds rather
than real resources. Particularly important in these respects are post-Keynesian contributions
on the theory of the exchange rates, currency hierarchy and liquidity cycles (Harvey, 2010;
Andrade and Prates, 2013; Kaltenbrunner, 2015). Capital flows are therefore understood as
international asset demand by foreign investors.
This dissertation also contends that it is important to apply this framework in conjunc-
tion with the empirical reality of contemporary finance. Institutional and political economy
analysis, such as Minsky’s conceptualisation of money manager capitalism Minsky (1988b)
and Toporowski’s (2002) theory of capital market inflation, have pointed to the rise of in-
stitutional investors as a key process in the history of modern capitalism. This dissertation
therefore argues that assessing institutional investors’ portfolio choice mechanism is crucial
to understand the patterns of capital flows to emerging markets. A framework proposing the
various channels through which institutional investors make their asset allocation choice, with
reference to the emerging market context, is developed. Crucial elements in these respects
are first, the consideration of currency liquidity stemming from post-Keynesian theory and its
implications for relevant macroeconomic variables, and second the centrality of institutional
investors’ liabilities in the overall decision framework.
Finally, the implications of this theoretical framework and its empirical relevance are also
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analysed in an open-economy Stock-Flow Consistent model. This model’s main innovative
feature is the addition of an institutional investors sector and the analysis of its impacts on
the system, particularly exchange rates. It will be shown that institutional investors’ impact
could be pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical depending on the nature of the shock that induces
them to invest in emerging markets, and how this is determined by the liability-driven nature
of their portfolio choice.
On the methodological level, this dissertation makes two contributions. Firstly, it uses a
mixed-method approach combining qualitative with quantitative research methods, in the form
of macro-panel econometrics and semi-structured interviews with pension funds investors and
managers. Although mixed-methods have been used for research in macro-financial issues (e.g.
Kaltenbrunner, 2011), this dissertation is original in explicitly tackling the issue of institutional
investors and their asset allocation framework with respect to emerging markets assets. The
addition of qualitative insights, in the form of semi-structured interviews, adds both as a second
source of confirmatory evidence of the dissertation hypothesis and uncovers the processes and
structures that macro-level econometric evidence inevitably conceals.
Secondly, this dissertation aims to provide innovative elements in its analysis of asset de-
mand equations and Stock-Flow Consistent models. It applies advanced macro-panel econo-
metrics to the asset demand equation approach of Brainard and Tobin (1968), showing how,
the empirical estimation of these models can produce interesting insights for the analysis of
contemporary questions. Moreover this econometric exercise, combined with the qualitative
evidence, serves to provide empirical evidence for the relationships that constitute the novel
elements of Stock-Flow Consistent model developed in this dissertation. Although the model
itself is not fully empirical, the evidence upon which it is based is therefore more robust than
simple stylised facts, which are often the basis of empirically-inspired Stock-Flow Consistent
models (Caverzasi and Godin, 2015).
1.2 Research questions and hypotheses
In analysing the issue of capital flows to emerging markets, this dissertation is based upon
the following research questions (RQ) and hypotheses (RH).
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RQ1 How can we characterise the phenomenon of capital flows to emerging markets in
today’s economy?
RH1.1 In today’s financially interconnected world capital flows mostly derive from the
international portfolio decisions and transactions of economic units.
RH1.2 The rise of institutional investors as key institutions in today’s economy makes
capital flows highly dependent on the behaviour of these institutions.
RH1.2.1 As emerging markets are subordinate in the global financial system
capital flows to and from these countries are mostly a product of the
demand (or lack thereof) for their assets by institutional investors in
advanced economies.
The second research question stems directly from the first one, and has a more empirical
nature.
RQ2 What leads institutional investors from advanced countries to invest in emerging
markets assets?
RH2.1 Institutional investors’ portfolio choice depends crucially on the conditions of their
liabilities.
RH2.2 The liquidity of emerging markets currencies is crucial in determining the attrac-
tiveness of the emerging markets asset class.
The final question assesses the implications of the first two.
RQ3 What are the implications on capital flows when institutional investors are the
main actors?
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RH3 Despite their long-term orientation, foreign institutional investors may not be a
stabilising force for emerging markets.
1.3 Methodological considerations
Although this dissertation does not attempt to directly contribute to the debates about
the methodology and epistemology of economics, some considerations are in order with re-
spect to its adherence to the methodology generally adopted in post-Keynesian and heterodox
economics, and its underlying ontological and epistemological issues.
At the broadest level, it has been claimed heterodox economics traditions diﬀer from their
orthodox counterpart at the ontological level. As famously stated by Lawson (2015, p. 43),
“the set of principles currently collected together and systematised as heterodox economics is,
in the first instance, an orientation in ontology”. Heterodox and post-Keynesian economics is
therefore considered to adhere to an “open-system” ontological stance, where the boundaries of
reality are at least partially determined by human action (Dow, 1998; Kaltenbrunner, 2011).
The boundaries of the system are influenced by social reality, which by definition is dynamic
and does not always oﬀer definite closures Lawson (2015, p. 40).
Open-system ontology is indeed often associated with social constructivist epistemological
stance. These imply that “while reality may be independent of human thought, meaning or
knowledge is always a human construction. Thus, the knower and unknown are inseparable.
This also implies that general laws and time and context free generalisations are not possible
and that it is impossible to distinguish causes from eﬀects” Kaltenbrunner (2011, p. 185).
However, proponents of open-system ontology tend to agree that while the lack of event reg-
ularities characterises observable reality, some partial and context-specific regularities can be
found, but these are likely to be constantly changing due to the continuous interaction be-
tween human agency and the structure of the system itself (King, 2015; Kaltenbrunner, 2011;
Lawson, 2015).
Closely associated with the concept of open-system ontology is that of realism. Proponents
of the open-system ontology stance often propose the concept of “critical realism”, which is
20
eﬀectively a middle-ground position between determinism and social constructivism, but re-
mains grounded in an open-system ontology (Kaltenbrunner, 2011, p. 185). Critical realists
see reality as dynamic and interconnected, and its properties as emerging out of social inter-
actions, but maintain that these properties are irreducible to social interactions, as they will
in turn aﬀect their causes (Lawson, 2015, pp. 40-41). Moreover, “the deep social structures
and causal mechanisms are not directly observable ... but can only be inferred from observed
reality” (King, 2015, p. 52). Because of reality’s hidden and constantly changing nature,
epistemologically this implies that it is impossible to give definitive answers in any absolute
sense: researchers should strive to uncover the deep structures of reality, bearing in mind their
knowledge will be by definition fallible and incomplete (Kaltenbrunner, 2010, p. 186). Knowl-
edge is therefore acquired through a process of “retroduction”, where the process is neither
purely inductive or purely deductive: hypotheses can be made, and together with empirical
observation, updated in a cumulative fashion, such that eventually an understanding of the
deeper structures of reality is built (Kaltenbrunner, 2011, p. 191).
The centrality of the open-system ontology view has been criticised by other authors.
Mearman (2006) argues that the dualistic treatment of “open” versus “closed” systems is of
very little usefulness in practice: “practically, there is no prospect that either perfect openness
or perfect closure exists. Between the two theoretical extremes lies everything of practical
interest. Nevertheless, the language of [critical realism] has in general, particularly in its
earlier work, focused on the extreme cases (p. 64)”. This dualistic treatment leads to a
rejection or acceptance of methodologies, ignoring the fact that “if systems are open to diﬀering
degrees, then it is likely that methods are too” (p. 68). Similarly, Lavoie (2011, p. 14) argues
that acceptance of the open-system paradigm has often led scholars to misleading conclusions
about economic concepts on the basis that they were based on closed-system arguments.
Davidson (2003) argues that adherence to open-system ontology, with its implications about
the lack of causality, is akin to permitting “anything goes” in economics, and should therefore
be abandoned if post-Keynesian economics is to be taken seriously by the profession.
A much less controversial concept, though perhaps less philosophically deep, is that of
“realisticness”. Lavoie (2014, pp. 12-13) argues that the key contentious point distinguishing
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heterodox and mainstream economics is not about “realism” but is in fact about “realisticness”,
i.e. the generation of economic theory on the basis observable reality:
“Although it is recognized that assumptions are always abstractions and sim-
plifications, and hence means to avoid cluttering a model with insignificant details.
However, one should not start from assumptions that are descriptively false. The
structure of a model cannot be built on foundations describing an imaginary or
idealized economy.” (Lavoie 2014, p. 13).
This is in stark contrast with “instrumentalism”, the belief that the logical consistency and
predictive power of the premises are more important than their realisticness, upon which much
of mainstream economic theory is based.
The approach taken in this dissertation is very much in line with the principle of realis-
ticness. This is particularly evident in the broad criticism that is made to the conventional
theories of capital flows, which are said to fundamentally lack realisticness in that they of-
ten assume away, or do not include from the start, the idea of a monetary economy. As
Minsky (1992a, p. 2) puts it, the starting point of economic analysis should be “a capitalist
economy with expensive capital assets and a complex, sophisticated financial system”, where
the most important transaction is “the exchange of money today for money later” (Minsky,
1975, p. 12). This is fundamentally diﬀerent from the neoclassical “village-fair” paradigm,
according to which the economy is essentially a pure-exchange economy that is further “com-
plicated” by introducing features, such as money as a means of exchange and production for
the market, which makes the analysis more realistic (Bellofiore, 2012). A modern economy is
essentially monetary, and therefore money along with any additional forms of finance, need
to be integrated into the analysis since the onset as structural elements, as opposed to being
“attachments” to an exchange-economy.
A second way in which realisticness - and possibly critical realism too - permeates the de-
velopment of this dissertation is the importance given to rooting economic analysis in historical
time. Capitalism, in the spirit of Marx and Schumpeter, is seen as a historically determined
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social and economic structure, distinct to other types of society. Moreover it is a dynamic
system, as it constantly changes itself through space and time. The view of the economy taken
in this dissertation is one where historically-rooted institutions determine the economy and are
in turn shaped by its dynamics. The integration of emerging markets into the global financial
system and the rise of institutional investors represent the key historical developments that are
necessary to realistically discuss the position of emerging markets in the international context.
The role of historical time and historically-rooted institutions is also related to the idea
of reasonable rationality, considered by Lavoie (2011) as a key proposition of post-Keynesian
economics. Since the importance of institutional investors in contemporary capitalism comes
from their historical emergence, so their beheaviour is a product of historical and institu-
tional arrangements, rather than the optmisation of some objective function. In this sense
the rationality of institutional investors’ portfolio choice is procedural, but clearly aﬀected by
fundamental uncertainty, just like the (real) investment process.
Beside realisticness, another key methodological contention is about the level of analysis. It
is generally agreed that methodological individualism and atomism are a defining characteristic
of mainstream economics (Lavoie, 2011; Lawson, 2015). Heterodox economists generally reject
this approach as a valid way to conduct economic analysis. As Brancaccio (2010, p. 153)
puts it: “not only does the economic system exists before and independently from the single
individual, but also the individual himself is in turn aﬀected by the system as a result of the
role and the functions he plays within it.” In such an ‘holistic’ view of the economy, clearly,
the economic and social dynamics are far from being the necessary consequences of optimising
behaviour, and rather, individual choices and behaviour can be sources of disequilibrium and
paradoxes or even conflict.
Within this dissertation, the element of organicism comes into the analysis of the portfolio
choice mechanism of institutional investors. Institutional investors, far from being the result
of imperfections that occur in the otherwise perfect “state of nature”, have come to have
a functionally important role in the economy. And indeed the push to generate suﬃcient
returns to fulfill their role in modern economies, i.e. providing income for their beneficiaries,
is one of the primary determinants of their financial behaviour.
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This view of a capitalist economy as an organic system also relates to the potentially
contentious issue between the macro and micro-level analysis. By rejecting methodological
individualism, and especially the paradigm of neoclassical concepts of rational maximising
agents, heterodox economists reject the micro-foundations paradigm that dominates main-
stream macroeconomic theory. By doing so however, the question of the relationship between
the micro and the macro remains open. Some authors believe that, although macroeconomic
phenomena cannot be reduced to the sum of microeconomic decisions, “rather than dispensing
altogether with micro-foundations, it is necessary to identify the source of agency appropriate
to the society being examined” (Toporowski, 2016, p. 97). Other authors, on the other hand,
see Keynesian economic theory more consistent with “macro-foundations” of microeconomics
(Kregel, 1985; Colander, 1993). Other authors reject both the ideas of micro-foundations and
macro-foundations, suggesting that although micro and macro-level analysis influence each
other, neither constitute the foundation for the other (King, 2015).
This dissertation does not take a fully explicit stance on this matter, but relates to it in
two ways. Firstly, its motivation and the significance of its contributions are primarily at the
macro-level. The issue of capital flows, their determinants and their theoretical and empirical
underpinnings, are considered to be a relevant macroeconomic issue for emerging markets and
the international financial system. Secondly, the focus of this dissertation, i.e. institutional
investors, has been chosen by narrowing down the specificness from the fully aggregate system,
i.e. the balance-of-payment phenomenon of capital flows, to a level in which the analysis
becomes meaningful from an organic point of view, i.e. the sector of institutional investors.
There is therefore no explicit micro nor macro-foundations, but a concern that the behaviour
at the sectoral level must be coherent both in its macro-level empirical manifestation, and at
the micro-level of individual institutions behavioural mechanism.
The research methods used in this dissertation are consistent with the considerations made
thus far. The thesis first develops the theoretical framework and formulates hypotheses about
the object of research: the phenomenon of capital flows to emerging markets and its determi-
nants located in the operations of institutional investors. Empirical evidence is then gathered
and assessed for the purpose of both “testing” the hypothesised relationship and to uncover
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deeper mechanisms behind such relationships.
This dissertation can in this sense be understood as adopting a mixed-methods approach1.
Econometric analysis is used to explore synthetically the evidence about the research hy-
potheses. In line with the proposition of realisticness and the crucial role of historical and
institutional forces in shaping behaviour, these are not supposed to have absolute validity, but
a meaningful way to organise empirical evidence. As Lavoie (2014, p. 37) puts it:
“post-Keynesians are keenly aware that a limited number of econometric results
is robust and can be replicated, [...] and fully aware of the diﬃculties involved in
using past econometric results to provide good predictions. [...] Econometric anal-
ysis, as a subset of empirical analysis, gives further ammunition in the heterodox
quest for explanation and causal mechanisms”
Qualitative methods have in this sense a crucial dual purpose of reinforcing the validity of
econometric evidence, as well as uncovering some of its underlying processes2. Furthermore,
qualitative methods also have the function of characterising relationships at the micro-level,
therefore serving to establish coherence between diﬀerent levels of analysis, which as discussed,
is an important concern of this dissertation.
Finally, the theoretical and empirical propositions of this dissertation will be synthesised
in a Stock-Flow Consistent model. The use of mathematics is also highly contentious in
heterodox economics. For example, Lawson (2015) claims the use of mathematical methods
in mainstream economics is an ideological feature, and indeed “the primary explanation of
the numerous, long lived and continuing failings of modern academic economics” (p. 162).
However, the use of modeling is diﬀerent than what it is usually done in mainstream economics.
Rather than using purely deductive logic in deriving consequences from logical premises, the
model development is simply an exploration of the implications of the empirical evidence of
the dissertation at the macroeconomic level. The principles of realisticness and organicism
1This is consistent with “retroduction” as Downward and Mearman (2007) consider
2This feature of mixed-methods research is denominated “triangulation”, is seen as an appropriate guideline
to heterodox economic research (Downward and Mearman, 2007; Kaltenbrunner, 2010).
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are respected in drawing the behaviour and interactions of the model’s components, in a way
that is consistent with historical and institutional developments, e.g by adding institutional
investors as a sector in the economy. As pioneers of the Stock-Flow Consistent approach
Godley and Cripps (1983, p. 44) put it:
“we do not ask the reader to believe that the way economies work can be
discovered by deductive reasoning. We take the contrary view. The evolution of
whole economies is a highly contingent historical process. We do not believe it is
possible to establish precise behavioral relationships ... by techniques of statistical
inference. Few laws of economics will hold good across decades and or between
countries. On the other hand, we must exploit logic so far as we possibly can.
. . . The aim here is to show how logic can help to organize information in a way
that enables us to learn as much from it as possible. That is what we mean by
macroeconomic theory (...)”
1.4 Dissertation structure
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters, beside this introduction.
Chapter 2 explores the literature on the determinants of capital flows. This literature, has
historically been focused on the empirical exploration of competing macro-level variables - cru-
cially dividing between “push” and “pull” factors -, and on the microeconomic portfolio choice
mechanisms, particularly their bias in the context of emerging markets. Recently, the litera-
ture has increasingly focused on global risk-aversion and liquidity provision, with an empirical
focus on gross rather than net capital flows. The chapter concludes by summarising these
determinants into two broad categories: fundamentals - combined with market imperfections
- and investors’ risk appetite, and by pointing out some limitations of this literature.
Chapter 3 develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of capital flows to emerging
markets. Based on a review of post-Keynesian monetary theory, the chapter posits that cap-
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ital flows need to be understood as inherently monetary rather than flows of real resources,
and as such pertain to the analysis of monetary and financial decisions. Capital flows are
thereby understood as demand for emerging market assets by foreign investors. The emer-
gence of institutional investors is seen as a major historical development for the contemporary
global financial system, and their portfolio choice is therefore a key variable of interest for the
analysis of capital flows. In addition to the issues that the conventional literature discusses,
insights from post-Keynesian theory suggest that two important determinants of institutional
investors’ portfolio decisions are their liabilities, and the liquidity of emerging market assets
as determined by these countries’ currency.
Chapter 4 presents descriptive empirical evidence on the research hypotheses and theoret-
ical framework of this dissertation. The characteristics of the integration of emerging markets
in the global financial system show how their position in the global financial system remains
subordinate and that foreign institutional investors’ presence in these countries has increased.
At the same time, institutional investors in advanced countries, for structural, regulatory, and
financial markets reasons, are under pressure to generate returns to cover their liabilities. As
a result it is now common for these institutions to adopt a liability-driven investment strategy,
whereby asset allocation is essentially driven by the imperative to cover and maintain cover-
age of investors’ liabilities. Emerging markets, given their potential for high growth and their
improved “fundamentals” - particularly from a macro-financial stability point of view with the
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves - can provide a way for institutional investors to
achieve these returns.
Chapter 5 evaluates econometrically the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Based
on Tobin’s asset demand approach (Brainard and Tobin, 1968), two asset demand equations
for emerging markets bonds and emerging markets equities are estimated. The models use
recent innovations in macro-panel techniques, with an autoregressive distributed lag-model
that takes into account cross-sectional dependence. The results broadly confirm the predictions
that institutional investors liabilities - proxied by pension funds’ funding ratios - and the level
of foreign exchange reserves, serving as the key indicator measuring the enhanced liquidity
of emerging markets currencies, are important determinants of demand for emerging markets
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assets.
Chapter 6 presents the results of semi-structured interviews. These interviews, conducted
with European pension funds, confirm the central importance of the relationship between
liabilities and the portfolio choice of institutional investors, but also allow for a deeper un-
derstanding of the actual processes behind this relationship, pointing out the importance of
country-specific regulation in shaping it. Furthermore, in line with the theoretical framework
developed in chapter 3, emerging markets “fundamentals” matter for the determination the
risk/return profile of their financial assets, but they do so in a complex, rather than mechanic
way. Crucial importance in the future prospects of emerging markets are the interrelation-
ship between global monetary conditions and emerging markets’ external financial fragility,
as well as economic growth and political stability. The chapter therefore largely confirms
the validity of the results of the previous chapters, and adds important insights as to how
these macro-level results are generated in the actual decision mechanisms of European pension
funds, highlighting the conditions upon which these are based and their potential changes in
the future.
Chapter 7 develops a two-country Stock-Flow Consistent model, representing the relation-
ship between advanced and emerging countries. The primary novelty of this model is the
introduction of an institutional investor sector, located in the advanced country, investing
domestically and internationally. By contrast, emerging markets only invest abroad through
foreign exchange reserves, leading to an asymmetric situation between the two countries. Insti-
tutional investors follow a liability-driven investment strategy, which determines the way they
respond to shocks aﬀecting their asset allocation. The key message of the model is that, due
to this mechanism, institutional investors have a counter-cyclical role, when portfolio flows are
“pulled” to emerging markets, but pro-cyclical when these are “pushed” by low interest rates
in advanced countries. This suggests that the current situation, which more closely resembles
the latter case, is particularly risky for emerging countries.
Chapter 8 concludes by pointing out the implications of the findings of this dissertation,
in terms of policies and potential for future research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: The
Determinants of Capital Flows
Introduction
The primary motivation of this dissertation is understanding the determinants of capital flows.
This chapter explores the existing literature on the determinants of capital flows to emerging
markets. It starts, in section 2.1, by exploring the “push-pull” factors framework, which empir-
ically assesses the causes of capital flows by distinguishing between local and global variables.
Although this framework was originally developed in the early 1990’s, it has been enriched
over-time as events unfolded and remains an influential starting point for any empirical as-
sessment of capital flows.
In section 2.2, the chapter discusses the how the issue of capital flows has been addressed by
finance literature on asset prices and portfolio choice, and the subsequent general equilibrium
literature emphasising the role of informational asymmetries and other market imperfections.
Section 2.3 deals with the recent, mainly post-crisis, literature on investors’ risk appetite
and global liquidity as a determinant of capital flows to emerging markets. The final section
syntehesises all the reviewed literature, and points out some of its limitations.
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2.1 The fundamentals: push and pull factors
The empirical assessment of the determinants of capital flows to emerging markets started
in the early 1990’s. During the 1980’s emerging markets had limited access to the global cap-
ital markets, after the third-world debt crisis undermined their creditworthiness in the first
half of the decade. In the early 1990’s however there was a generalised resurgence of capital
flows, especially in the form private portfolio flows, to both Latin American and Asian coun-
tries. This new trend was subject of a literature concerned with understanding the underlying
determinants of the renewed capital mobility.
The seminal paper in this literature is Calvo et al. (1993). The authors argue that the
resurgence of capital flows to Latin American countries was at least partially explained by
conditions external to the region, especially US interest rates. They substantiate such a claim
on the basis of a structural VAR model, which shows that international reserves - which
they use as a proxy for capital flows - respond positively to external factors shocks. This
view is reinforced in a later paper (Calvo et al., 1996), where the authors review the various
arguments related to the causes, consequences and policy implications of capital flows. Insofar
as capital flows are mainly “pushed” by either low interest rates or generally unfavorable
macroeconomic conditions in advanced countries, emerging markets’ vulnerability to a sudden
reversal is relatively unaﬀected by their policy choices. On the other hand, if capital is more
attracted by domestic conditions, such as sound macroeconomic fundamentals and policies
inducing more capital flows (e.g. liberalisation of the capital account), then there is a greater
scope for direct emerging markets policy to manage the process.
The “push vs pull” factors debate has been carried forward by other authors throughout the
1990’s. Chuhan et al. (1998) employ a panel-data approach to empirically assess the domestic
and global causes of capital flows. They use a vast array of indicators, both domestic - credit
rating, secondary market prices of debt and price/earnings and rates of return to equity -
global - US interest rates and industrial production - to proxy expected risk and returns to
investments in emerging markets. Their results confirm the idea that US interest rates play
an important role in driving capital flows, but show that domestic factors, at least in Asian
countries, seem to be equally important. This seems to provide more space for the “pull view”.
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Their work has been however criticised by Fernández-Arias (1996) on the basis that “seem-
ingly obvious assumption that country creditworthiness indicators reflect domestic factors as
opposed to external factors, needed for the interpretation given to the empirical observation,
is unwarranted.” (p. 391). He therefore works out an analytical model that accounts for both
push and pull factors. The structure of the model is based, similarly to Chuhan et al. (1998),
on investors’ portfolio allocation, where the key equation is a non-arbitrage condition between
an expected return in an advanced country R and a return in a developing country D ad-
justed by a factor C, which represents the country’s creditworthiness3. The key non-arbitrage
equation is Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1996):
D(dt, Ft)C(ct, St 1 + Ft) = Rt
where d represents the domestic investment climate, F represents capital flows c is the
country’s ability to repay its liabilities and S is the stock of cumulated liabilities. It is assumed
thatD depends positively on d and negatively on Ft4. C depends positively on c and negatively
on S. Rearranging the equation for Ft gives:
Ft = F (dt, ct, Rt, St 1)
According to this equation capital flows depend positively on the domestic investment
climate and the country ability to repay, and negatively on advanced countries returns and
the country’s stock of liabilities. Finally the model suggests that the parameter c is a function
of the country’s economic growth rate g and national income Y such that:
c =
Y
R  g
The underlying idea is that a country’s ability to repay its liabilities is the expected present
value of future resources, which should therefore discounted by some rate R. In this way
Fernández-Arias (1996, p. 398) formalises the contention that push factors aﬀect directly a
3For advanced countries this value is equal to 1.
4On the basis of a diminishing marginal productivity argument
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country’s creditworthiness. This model is able to predict an average of 86% of the inflows in
the 1989-1993 period. This clearly supports the “push” over the “pull” view. This viewpoint is
also shared by Dooley et al. (1996). In their study they show how secondary market prices for
developing countries debt, which they consider an important “barometer” of financial strength,
is almost entirely dependent on external factors. An increase in US interest rates would bring
down such prices, which would result in “a halt of recent capital inflows, rapid declines in
international reserves, and exchange rate depreciation” (p. 47).
The “push” view was however challenged by Hernández and Rudolph (1995). They contend
that scholars overlook the uneven distribution of capital flows across and within regions and
excluded many countries that were not aﬀected by the surge of capital flows from their analysis,
producing a biased result. By using a larger sample that includes all countries for which data
are available in the 1986-1993 period, they put forward an empirical case for the “pull” story.
Firstly, they divide countries in two groups, high capital inflow recipients (HCIR) and low
capital inflow recipients (LCIR), and show that the formers fared better in all the typical
domestic factors5. Secondly, they employed a panel-data methodology and found a large
role for domestic “pull” factors and an insignificant role for US interest rates. The authors
however included long-term capital flows in their considerations, which may partially explain
the increased role for domestic factors. This is tackled by Taylor and Sarno (1997), who
distinguish between long and short term capital flows. They find that except from short-term
bond flows, which are caused primarily by “push” factors, short-term equity and long-term
bond and equity flows are equally dependent on push and pull factors.
The “push vs pull” factors literature of the 1990’s seems to reach a point of consensus
with the recognition that both types of factors play a role in driving capital inflows, with
the formers determining the “timing and magnitude” and latter “necessary to explain the
geographic distribution” of capital flows (Montiel and Reinhart, 1999, p. 623). Fernández-
Arias and Montiel (1996, p 62) summarise this view:
5They saved and invested more, had sounder fiscal balances, lower and more stable inflation, lower net debt
(debt minus foreign exchange reserves) stocks to GDP, less volatile real exchange rates and did better in terms
of perceived political risks.
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“The combination of low interest rates and recession forced low rates of return on
industrial-country assets (particularly in the United States), creating an incipient
capital outflow as investors in these countries sought higher-yielding assets for their
portfolios. The restoration of perceived creditworthiness was necessary for potential
debtor countries to have access to these funds, and thus capital flowed initially to
those countries whose creditworthiness was not severely impaired during the 1980s-
largely the rapidly growing countries in East Asia that never suﬀered a debt crisis.
The Brady Plan, announced in mid-1989, broadened the geographic scope for such
inflows to include the heavily indebted countries in Latin America, in part by
writing down the face value of debt, in part by supporting policy adjustments,
and in part by providing information externalities, leading to bandwagon eﬀects.
Where none of these factors have come into play - that is, in most of Sub-Saharan
Africa - capital inflows have not materialized”
Beside this theoretical agreement, that concedes that there is no compelling argument nor
evidence to discard either view, external events imposed a turn on the literature on capital
flows. The crises that savaged many emerging markets’ economies in the late 90’s and early
2000’s (Mexico in 1995, East Asian countries in 1997-1998, Russia in 1998, Brazil in 1999,
Turkey in 2001, Argentina in 2002 and Uruguay in 2002 among the major ones) pushed many
scholars towards investigating the causes and dynamics of balance of payment financial crises6.
A part of this literature is closely related to the “push” vs “pull” debate - not least for its
participants -, by focusing more specifically on the mechanics of capital flows in the context
of a crisis.
Typical of this literature are the two concepts of “current account reversals” and “sudden
stops”. The first concept, which has been elaborated by Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000), iden-
tifies sharp reductions in current account deficits, which needs to fulfill certain requirements
in terms of their persistence and magnitude as to capture only the relevant large movements,
as the key mechanism of a financial crisis. The authors then use a probit model to investigate
6See, for instance, Dornbusch (2001) for a wide ranging “primer” on emerging markets crises.
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the impact of several factors on the probability of a financial crisis: they find that both “push”
(among others US interest rates) and “pull” factors seem to predict a crisis.
The concept of “sudden stops” was originally formulated by Calvo (1998). He suggests
that a common factor among emerging markets crises is the sharp and unexpected decrease
of capital inflows, which brings about “bankruptcies, and destruction of human capital and
local credit channels” (p. 47), irrespectively of the composition of the flows. Other later works
(Calvo et al., 2004, 2008) empirically define these “sudden stops” and explore their dynamics:
the logic is that the lower is the domestic supply of tradable goods (net of factor transfers)
relative to domestic absorption of tradable goods - in other words the higher is a country’s
current account deficit with respect to its total expenditures in tradable goods - the higher
the necessary rise in the real exchange rate to compensate a fall in the current account deficit
as a result of a “sudden stop”. Given this framework, they find that both such a “leveraged”
consumption of tradable goods and domestic liability dollarisation, as well as global financial
integration, increase the probability of a sudden stop. Liability dollarisation, it is argued, is
primarily a result “badly managed fiscal and monetary policies” (Calvo et al., 2008, p. 30).
This conclusion seem thus to favor country-specific factors as determinants of a capital-
account induced crisis, but nevertheless recognise that the initial “triggers” are exogenous.
Other theories however seem to be in contrast to this view: according to the “original sin
hypothesis”, liability dollarisation in emerging markets is the result of their inability to borrow
internationally and sometimes even domestically in their own currencies, due to incompleteness
of the global capital markets, which favors assets denominated in a very restricted group
of currencies (Eichengreen and Hausmann, 1999; Eichengreen et al., 2003). “Sudden stops”
episodes are therefore arguably both pulled and pushed.
The conceptualisation of “sudden stops” marked the beginning of the analysis of “extreme
capital movements”. With the resumption of capital flows to emerging markets after 2002,
interest moved back from crisis to capital inflows. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) provide a
systematic study of historical episodes of “bonanzas” and study some their causes and conse-
quences over a wide range countries. They find that global factors are important causes of
these episodes. Moreover, they find the overall capital flows “bonanzas” have an important
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pro-cyclical component, very often ending with a “sudden stop” and preceding some sort of
economic/financial crisis. Once again, pro-cyclical fiscal policy is seen as one of the primary
culprit of the negative eﬀects of capital flows, a result that has been more directly tackled
along with pro-cyclical monetary policy by Kaminsky et al. (2004b)7.
Other papers have analysed the “bonanzas” phenomenon. One of the last pre-crisis paper
(Cardarelli et al., 2009), broadly confirms this pro-cyclical nature of capital flows. The con-
clusions point to policy advices for fiscal restraint, less intervention in the foreign exchange
market to curb exchange rate appreciation and the ineﬀectiveness of capital controls. Caballero
(2012) confirms the finding that surges increase the probability of a crisis, with the interesting
additional result that portfolio equity flows, which traditionally have been considered safe,
at least compared to debt flows, increase the probability of a crisis, even in the absence of a
lending boom. Finally, Ghosh et al. (2014), analysing surges episodes, find the occurrence of
surges being largely determined by global factors, but the magnitude of such episodes being
determined mostly by country specific factors. This clearly echoes the debates the twenty
years old conclusions of Fernández-Arias and Montiel (1996).
In sum, the vast literature on the empirical determinants of capital flows does not reach
a unique conclusion. The “push-pull” factors framework has the merit of pointing out that
global factors can play a role in determining both capital inflows and outflows, and has been
very influential in shaping the evolution of the literature to these days.
Nevertheless the literature has some limitations. The issue is only addressed by means of
econometric evidence, which are supposed to give validity to either one or the other view (or
both), according to their statistical significance. Such findings are however contingent on the
usage of data, econometric methodology and choice of variables, which gives rise to highly
heterogenous results. The literature, in other words, raises awareness on the importance of an
issue - the competing factors in determining capital flows -, but lacks a coherent theoretical
framework to assess the causes and processes that lie behind it.
Moreover, the literature confines the causes of capital flows to factors that aﬀect emerging
markets assets. “Push” factors are external to emerging markets insofar as they cannot be
7They dub this positive relationship between macroeconomic policy and capital flows with the expression
“when it rains, it pours”, to indicate the negative role played by such policies in amplifying crises situations.
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controlled by emerging markets’ domestic policies, but both have an impact on the return and
risk of emerging markets assets. What is missing from such a picture is the role the “investor”
that is supposed to respond to these factors.
Finally the literature largely focuses on net capital flows rather than gross capital flows.
However, arguably gross capital flows are what matters in terms of building up of financial
positions and potential imbalances, as it will be argued throughout this dissertation.
All these issues have been tackled by subsequent developments in the literature. The more
recent papers are informed by a burgeoning theoretical and empirical literature on interna-
tional portfolio allocation, at the micro-economic and general equilibrium level. Forbes and
Warnock (2012) for example mention a vast amount of theoretical and empirical literature on
the portfolio choice determinants of capital flows, for which they provide empirical insights.
Additionally, much of the now focus on the importance of global risk-aversion and its relation-
ship with monetary policy as a factor driving capital flows. Finally many papers now tackle
gross rather than net flows. The next two sections provide an overview of these developments.
2.2 Portfolio choice: the role of market imperfections
The process of financial globalisation since the 90’s was characterised by a remarkable ex-
pansion of portfolio flows aside from cross-border lending. As a result, international finance
scholars sought to assess the dynamics of such flows within a portfolio choice framework. Es-
sentially, the idea is to understand the micro-determinants that drive international investors’
behavior in order to predict the macro-phenomenon of capital flows and portfolio holdings.
Most of this literature is moreover concerned in explaining some puzzling features of inter-
national portfolio choice. This section reviews these theoretical developments: section sub-
section 2.2.1 deals with portfolio home bias, section 2.2.2 tackles various ‘puzzling’ aspects
of emerging markets, section 2.2.3 reviews the burgeoning literature that frames international
portfolio choice into general equilibrium models.
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2.2.1 Portfolio home bias
A key contention of the theory of international finance is that international portfolio di-
versification is beneficial. Securities from diﬀerent countries show low levels of correlations
between each other and therefore, according to “modern portfolio theory”, investing in foreign
assets improves the eﬃciency of a portfolio, by reducing its overall variance. This argument
is almost as old as the “modern portfolio theory” approach itself (Grubel, 1968; Levy and
Sarnat, 1970). Extending the results of the “capital asset pricing model” (CAPM)8 to the
international context implies that, all portfolios in the world should be expected to converge
to a single global market portfolio. Such a portfolio would include assets from all countries in
proportion to their value, since “if a country is not included, its share prices would fall (and
rates of return rise) to levels where it would be included in the optimal portfolio” (Levy and
Sarnat, 1970, p. 675).
Investors’ portfolios however tend to be heavily biased towards domestic assets. Such a
tendency, the so-called equity home bias phenomenon, was already acknowledged by the early
literature in the late 60’s, when international capital flows were restricted by regulations such
as capital controls but gained prominence in the literature after the work by French and
Poterba (1991): in their paper, they show that home bias was still a relevant phenomenon at
the time of their writing, and that institutional constraints, such as direct limits on foreign
asset holdings or taxes, were an insuﬃcient explanation for the empirically observed biased
allocations. The origins of home bias should therefore be found in the behavior of investors.
Economists have tried to explain the home-bias phenomenon in several ways9. A first set of
explanations focused on the hedging properties of domestic assets vis-à-vis foreign assets. The
argument is that since agents bear risks that are specific to their home country - e.g. inflation
or the real exchange rate -, their portfolios will be biased towards domestic assets, since these
provide better insurance against those risks. This is for example the argument of Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2000), who explain portfolio home bias on the basis of trade costs in the goods
8The key implication of the CAPM is that market portfolio - the portfolio that holds every type of asset
available in proportion to its presence in the market - is the most eﬃcient portfolio, since it diversifies away
any specific risk and it is thus only subject to systematic undiversifiable risk.
9The literature on the topic is vast and what follows will be just a synthetic overview. For more compre-
hensive literature reviews see Lewis (1999); Sercu and Vanpee (2007)
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markets: international trade is costly10 and therefore people’s consumption is biased towards
national goods. As a result, since domestic assets provide a better hedge against domestic
consumption volatility, portfolios will be home-biased. However this interpretation seems to
be questionable empirically, as shown by van Wincoop and Warnock (2006).
Other explanations focus on direct costs in the financial markets. For example, Faruqee
et al. (2004) show that transaction costs such as phone costs do in fact play a role in determining
portfolio home bias. This line of argument was however dismissed by one of the seminal papers
of this literature: Tesar and Werner (1995) argue that transaction costs cannot be a suﬃcient
explanation for the lack of international diversification, since, if they were a real constraint to
international investment, then we would expect also to find lower turnover of foreign assets by
international investors, while in fact they find the opposite is true.
A third line of explanations focuses on informational asymmetries. “Classic” papers (Kang
and Stulz, 1995; Brennan and Cao, 1997) show that the home bias phenomenon can arise
when local investors have an informational advantage over foreign investors. In this way, it is
either too costly to gather information - making the informational asymmetry essentially an
“implicit” transaction cost problem - or simply impossible for foreign investors to adequately
price a security, thus increasing the risk of holding it, which generate home bias. This type of
analysis has been tested empirically: Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that investors portfolio
are locally biased, suggesting that they exploit informational advantages on local securities to
manage their portfolio; Edison and Warnock (2004) show that stocks of emerging markets
firms that are cross-listed on US stock markets are included in US portfolios in a way that is
consistent with standard portfolio theory, which they explain by suggesting that cross-listing
helps overcoming the informational asymmetry arising from the lack of knowledge of foreign
investor regulations; Faruqee et al. (2004) find significant roles for several diﬀerent types of
informational asymmetries such as language and cultural diﬀerences, size of GDP and asset
markets, and geographical distance.
Informational asymmetries in the financial markets seem therefore to be the most plausible
explanation for the home-bias phenomenon. A “gravity model” - that is a model that explains
10Indeed the authors consider trade costs in goods markets as a potential explanation to all of what they
consider the “six major puzzles in international macroeconomics”, which include the equity home bias phe-
nomenon.
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a variable as a direct function of size and inverse function of distance between two economies -
was found a powerful tool approximate international portfolio holdings (Aviat and Coeurdacier,
2007; Faruqee et al., 2004; Bhamra et al., 2014). The “gravity model” is in fact a stylised way
to represent informational asymmetries, with distance and size being proxies that measure the
access to information.
However, some empirical facts, related financial globalisation question the relevance of
home bias. Firstly, home-bias itself, at least in advanced countries, has reduced considerably
as a result of the increase in cross-border flows and holdings, as documented among others
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008). Secondly, the relevance of home-bias depends on the
relevance of the diversification argument implied by standard financial models: the concept
of a “bias” relies on the validity of the argument that the low correlations between diﬀerent
national financial markets returns provide a scope for diversification gains. However this is
at least questionable at a time of increasing financial integration: the more financial markets
are integrated, the smaller the diversification gains that can be obtained. This point has been
made by Goetzmann et al. (2005) and, more recently by Quinn and Voth (2010) who conclude
their paper by arguing:
“During much of the postwar period, capital flows between advanced capitalist
countries were anything but free. Correlations were low, but this did not indicate
unexploited investment opportunities. Few investors were allowed to move funds
from one jurisdiction to another. Our analysis suggests that capital controls did
not just stand in the way of exploiting diversification opportunities. To a large
extent, they created an illusion that they were large in the first place ... the world
described in the seminal papers by Grubel (1968) and Levy and Sarnat (1970)
looked promising for international investors precisely because it was de facto and
de jure nearly impossible to invest across borders. Thus, many academic studies
and practitioners’ beliefs about the benefits of international investing may have
been too sanguine - and the home bias inferred from investors’ portfolios much too
large”.
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Although as long as correlations are not perfect the case for diversification remains in theory
valid, home bias seems in this light less of an important puzzle.
Finally, beside its fading empirical significance, home-bias does not explicitly consider the
monetary nature of financial assets. As it will be discussed in the next chapter, liquidity at
the international level depends crucially on the currency of denomination, and thus results
by definition in imperfect asset substitutability, beside considerations of “fundamentals” and
imperfections.
2.2.2 Positive-feedback trading, contagion and herding
Foreign holdings, beside being too small if compared to standard financial theories, are
also very volatile. The literature has individuated a number of mechanisms that explain
the characteristics of such volatility, namely positive-feedback trading, contagion and herding
behaviour. As for home bias, these phenomena are puzzling in light of theoretical predictions,
and imperfections were introduced in the canonical models to account for them.
International portfolio investment is often seen as being plagued by positive-feedback trad-
ing, i.e. investors tendency to behave in a pro-cyclical way with respects to foreign assets by
chasing returns. Bohn and Tesar (1996) represents a “classic” contribution in this literature.
The authors develop a very simple model of security purchase in a standard international cap-
ital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework. Let net NPkt be purchase of security k at time
t, by definition it is equal to:
NPkt = xktWt   (1 + gkt)xkt 1Wt 1
where xkt is the portfolio weight of security k at time t, Wt the size of the overall portfolio
at time t and gkt the capital gain on security k at time t. Now by definition W t is the sum
of past wealth plus the returns between t   1 and t, that is the sum of dPt dividends and gpt
capital gains on the total portfolio. Then approximately:
NPkt = (xkt   xkt 1)Wt 1 + (dPt + gPt )xkt 1Wt 1
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This equation shows that net purchases of a security depends on a change in its weight
within the portfolio, and on a portfolio rebalancing part, i.e. the net purchase of a security due
to changes in the value of the total portfolio. According to standard financial models, a change
in portfolio weight depends on a standard mean-variance choice: keeping return variance fixed,
an increase in expected return of a security determines an increase of its weight within a port-
folio. Investors that increase allocation to a particular security due to its performance are
therefore ‘chasing returns’. The combination of ‘portfolio rebalancing’ and ‘return-chasing’
eﬀects determine the ultimate net purchase of a security. The authors proceed to test empiri-
cally which of the two eﬀects is dominant when considering US investors purchases of foreign
assets. They find that return-chasing is a much more important motive that rebalancing.
Foreign investors, therefore, seem to engage in so-called ‘positive-feedback’ trading, that is,
they keep investing in high-return assets and sell low-return assets. Importantly, as a result of
their trading strategy, investors underperformed the market, by achieving lower returns and a
higher volatility than a market weighed portfolio.
In another “classic” paper, Brennan and Cao (1997) rationalise this phenomenon from a
theoretical point of view. They show that in a situation of asymmetric information, foreign
investors have an informational disadvantage vis-à-vis domestic investors and tend to react to
public information more than local investors. As a result, foreign investors will invest more
when returns in the host market are high and vice-versa, i.e. they will tend to chase returns.
Many other authors have broadly confirmed this correlation between flows and returns.
Froot et al. (2001) show that not only investors seem to engage in positive-feedback trading,
but their flows are persistent - that an increase in flows today predicts an increase in flows
in the future - and in turn predict higher future stock returns and increased asset prices.
The increase in prices could be interpreted as price pressure given by high demand beyond
what would be warranted by “fundamentals”, in line with the theoretical argument by Brennan
and Cao (1997) and the empirical evidence in Bohn and Tesar (1996). However, Froot and
Ramadorai (2001) argue and present evidence that portfolio flows actually forecast improve-
ments in fundamentals. Analogous results can be found in Bekaert et al. (2002): investors do
in fact reduce the cost of capital, and seem thus to have informational advantages rather than
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disadvantage. Under this light, positive-feedback trading is the optimal outcome of superior
information by foreign investors.
Despite this, most of the evidence seem to point to the opposite relationship. Several
authors (Kim and Wei, 2002; Borensztein and Gelos, 2003; Griﬃn et al., 2004; Aggarwal et al.,
2005; Dvořák, 2005; Bae et al., 2008; Jinjarak and Zheng, 2010; Hsieh et al., 2011) present
evidence that, especially in emerging markets, local investors have superior information as
compared to foreign investors, and that is indeed the cause of “positive-feedback” trading.
The already mentioned “gravity model” (Portes et al., 2001; Martin and Rey, 2004; Portes and
Rey, 2005) tries to explain flows on the basis of size and distance, and find that such a model
seem to explain a big part of international transactions in assets, thus giving credit to the view
of informational frictions as a key determinant of international financial flows.
Closely related to the positive-feedback phenomenon are herding behaviour and contagion,
respectively the correlation of investments decisions across investors and across markets. Both
these phenomena appear to be present in international portfolio investment, especially during
crises. There is evidence that these phenomena are also present in emerging markets: herding
behaviour is pervasive across emerging markets mutual funds (Hsieh et al., 2011; Borensztein
and Gelos, 2003; Chang, 2010; Jeon and Moﬀett, 2010), and contagion is often mentioned as a
key mechanism in spreading financial crises across emerging markets (Kaminsky and Reinhart,
2000; Forbes, 2004).
Both contagion and herding behaviour can be explained to by referring to informational
asymmetries. Herding behaviour can be explained by referring to “informational cascades”
(Borensztein and Gelos, 2003, p. 45): when foreign investors can observe the actions of other
investors, but remain at an informational disadvantage, they may interpret the actions of
other investors as a source of information and seek to imitate them. The model by Calvo and
Mendoza (2000) shows that in fact, herding behavior can be the rational response for some
investors. The information gathering costs in the presence of short-selling constraints and
increasing portfolio size can be too high to gather, and therefore investors prefer to conform
to a market portfolio selling oﬀ assets performing badly.
Similarly, the co-movement of asset prices around the world seems to vary over-time but,
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as Karolyi and Stulz (2002) show by surveying the literature, there is scant evidence of their
relation with fundamentals. There is evidence that sometimes, and especially in times of
crises, seemingly unrelated markets move - or rather crash - together. Contemporaneous
sales of assets from diﬀerent countries, even in the absence of fundamental changes in some
of these countries, has frequently aﬀected emerging markets (Froot and Tjornhom Donohue,
2002; Broner et al., 2006; Kaminsky et al., 2004a). Contagion can once again be the result
of herding-like informational asymmetries. For example in the model of Calvo (1999), as
liquidity constrained investors sell oﬀ assets of a country, other uninformed investors may
be induced to imitate them, thereby spreading selloﬀs across countries. Alternatively, as
shown by Kodres and Pritsker (2002), new information generates contagion, as informational
asymmetries exacerbate price movements that follow portfolio rebalancing.
Another way through which informational asymmetries can aﬀect emerging markets port-
folio investment is by considering the specific behaviour of foreign institutional as opposed
to individual investors. As it will be shown in chapter 4, foreign institutional investors have
grown in importance within emerging financial markets, representing a substantial part of of
the stock market capitalization, particularly when considering the free-floating part (Frenkel
and Menkhoﬀ, 2004, p. 1277). Emerging markets mutual fund investments and holdings have
also dramatically increased over the past decade, only briefly but sharply interrupted by the
global financial crisis (Gelos, 2011). Moreover there is widespread evidence that they behave
pro-cyclically, fueling the boom in capital flows - even three months before a crisis happens -
and the subsequent contraction (Kaminsky et al., 2000, 2001; Didier et al., 2008), and follow
quite tightly market benchmarks (Disyatat and Gelos, 2001). Many of the results shown about
positive-feedback trading, herding and contagion do in fact use data from emerging mutual
funds11.
Beside the already reviewed reasons - e.g. informational disadvantages of foreign investors -
the literature on institutional investors focuses on an additional layer of imperfections. These
arise out of a principal-agent problem: the principal - the investor - entrusts his savings
management to the agent - the fund manager-, but faces problems in monitoring performance,
and therefore sets up an incentive structure to ensure the manager follows his mandate. In
11See Gelos (2011) for an overview on this evidence specific to institutional investors.
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practice the performance of fund managers is assessed against a market benchmark or the
performance of other managers. Benchmark following has been documented among the most
important determinants of international asset allocation (Raddatz et al., 2013). As Frenkel
and Menkhoﬀ (2004) argue, this creates the incentive for herding among institutional investors,
as fund managers are incentivised to follow the decisions of other managers, in order to avoid
worse results compared to the average performance. The incentive structure also creates a
basis for positive-feedback trading and contagion, as “when returns in a country are low, funds
which are overexposed to that country tend to have below average gains ... therefore, they
reduce their exposure to all countries in which they are overexposed, including the aﬀected
country” (Gelos, 2011, p. 7). Calvo and Mendoza (2000) model financial contagion as a result
of delegated-investment problems: if the costs of performing above average exceed the benefits
of performing above average, it is rational for managers to just conform to the benchmark
portfolio, and therefore fuel contagion in times of a crisis. Miyajima and Shim (2014) confirms
empirically that the increased presence of asset managers in emerging countries’ financial
markets, herding behaviour and pro-cyclicality are reinforced.
In conclusion, there is considerable evidence that foreign investors in emerging markets
engage in positive-feedback trading, herd and spread financial shocks across countries. The
most common explanation has been to refer to informational frictions, which induce investors
to base their portfolio choice on something else other than direct information about the assets,
such as the actions of other investors or the conditions of other assets, and originates agency
problems in the the case of delegated investment. As a result of asymmetric information, trad-
ing behaviour of investors can therefore depart from fundamentals, and generate substantial
volatility.
2.2.3 General equilibrium models of capital flows and portfolio choice
All the themes discussed in the previous subsection were conducted at the micro or partial
equilibrium level. The realisation that portfolio choice had to be taken into account into
a broader general equilibrium macroeconomic framework emerged in the mid 2000’s. This
essentially filled a gap in the general equilibrium literature, and in particular in its more
advanced methodological tool, the Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.
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The New Keynesian general equilibrium approach to open-economy macroeconomics started
with Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995)12. Their model applies the typical New Keynesian features
of sticky prices and monopolistic competition to a two-countries general equilibrium model.
Essentially the authors build a bridge between two literatures: the “inter-temporal approach
to the current account”, which derives from the new classical literature where macroeconomic
phenomena are the result of optimal micro-economic responses to shocks in a frictionless
world, and the “Keynesian” classical open-economy models with nominal rigidities, such as
the Mundell-Fleming and the Dornbusch models, which provide many realistic insights at the
macro-level, but lack micro-foundations.
Financial markets in this literature initially were modeled in two “extreme” ways. The first
is analysing a model of financial markets with only one asset, generally an international bond,
as Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) do in their seminal model. This assumption, while unrealistic,
is preferred to the alternative of “complete markets” due to its consistency with the model
structure: “it is hard to imagine how price or wage rigidities could survive in a world suﬃciently
sophisticated that complete international risk sharing is accomplished” (Lane, 2001, p. 249).
However in these models, there clearly is not much scope for analysing gross asset positions
nor flows. The alternative “extreme” assumption usually made in these models is that financial
markets are complete. As Obstfeld (2004, p. 6) describes it is “a world of fully enforceable
state-contingent contracts covering all possible future random event”. The existence of several
diﬀerent assets under this alternative assumption, allows for the analysis of gross positions,
but it is a rather implausible assumption, which has also been empirically disproved (Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ, 2000).
In the mid 2000’s, general equilibrium models were in fact inadequate to address a number
of new and old empirical “puzzles” that came (back) to the fore. Among the “old puzzles”,
research focused on explaining the two already considered issues: the determinant of interna-
tional portfolio holdings, with special focus on equity home bias that, while declining, continued
to be a relevant phenomenon even in the phase of financial globalisation; and the relationship
between capital flows, trading and asset prices, with a special focus on volatility and contagion.
The “new puzzle” emerges from the consideration of financial globalisation, which gained
12Lane (2001) provides a comprehensive survey of the initial stage of this literature.
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prominence in those years (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001, 2003), in relation to another well
known tendency that characterised the decade before the global financial crisis: the rise of
global current account imbalances. It was emphasised that current account deficits, which are
traditionally deemed to be sustainable on the basis of some future income from goods trade
- that is with future trade surpluses -, can be financed with higher expected returns on the
foreign assets. External adjustments do not necessarily work through the trade channel, but
may also through a financial adjustment channel, which, with the rise of gross foreign asset
positions, is likely to become an increasingly important mechanism.
Some authors have in fact documented that asset prices and/or exchange rate movements,
have a sizable impact on the dynamic of net foreign assets, particularly for the US where these
“valuation eﬀects” in some years have almost completely oﬀset the current account deficit
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2003; Gourinchas and Rey, 2005b). Gourinchas and Rey (2005a)
argue that the US does in fact enjoy an “exorbitant privilege”, by paying considerably less on its
external liabilities than it earns on its external assets. This is due to the particular composition
of US portfolio holdings, long on foreign currency equity and FDI and short on short-term
dollar denominated debt. Gourinchas and Rey (2005b) and Cavallo and Tille (2006) argue that
this privilege can in fact smooth the US current account adjustment, which would otherwise
be extremely sharp. This view is not shared by Obstfeld (2004, 2012a), who argues that
valuation eﬀects are an unreliable source of financing for current account deficits, especially in
the long-run. Nevertheless both Obstfeld and Gourinchas share the view that the issue ought
to be analysed better, and that general equilibrium models with perfect markets were unlikely
to properly perform the task (Obstfeld, 2004; Gourinchas, 2006). Both “home-bias” and the
“valuation eﬀects” have been analysed with standard DSGE models, which however maintain
some of the heroic assumptions of perfect risk-sharing and rely on very specific assumptions
or model-design to explain the observed phenomena (Engel and Matsumoto, 2006; Kollmann,
2006; Heathcote and Perri, 2007; Ghironi et al., 2007). Hence, the call for a development in
the literature: “at the moment, we have no integrative general-equilibrium monetary model of
international portfolio choice, although we need one” (Obstfeld, 2004, p. 19).
The call was answered by several authors, who managed to get the technical improvements
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necessary to model imperfect multiple-assets financial markets (Devereux and Sutherland,
2007, 2011; Devereux et al., 2010; Evans and Hnatkovska, 2012; Tille and van Wincoop, 2010;
Bhamra et al., 2014)13. Standard DSGE models are solved by studying the dynamics of linear
approximations around a steady state. However, when financial markets are imperfect, the
portfolio coeﬃcients are not uniquely defined in a non-stochastic steady state, and similarly,
the first-order approximations of the portfolio equations yield conditions that are consistent
with any portfolio coeﬃcient14. The solution to this problem is employing higher order ap-
proximations to tie down both the steady state and the first-order time-changing portfolio
coeﬃcients (Devereux and Sutherland, 2007, 2011; Evans and Hnatkovska, 2012; Tille and van
13See also Pavlova and Rigobon (2010b) for a literature review and Devereux et al. (2010) for a introduc-
tion to a special issue of the Journal of International Economics, both related to the recent developments in
international macro-finance.
14 Devereux and Sutherland (2011) in section 2.2 explain this problem at length. Since the “true” non-
approximated equilibrium portfolio must be a function of “state variables”, the portfolio coeﬃcient at time t ↵
must be a function of the only state variable in their model, the net claims by home agents on foreign assets
Wt, so that ↵t = ↵(Wt). The first-order Taylor expansion of ↵(Wt) around the point W is:
↵(Wt) = ↵(W ) + ↵
0(W )(Wt  W )
where ↵(W ) is the zero-order, non time-varying component, and ↵0(W )(Wt W ) the first-order component,
capturing the dynamics. The usual approach adopted in DSGE models, is to find the deterministic steady state
and then use first order approximations of the model’s equations around it to tie down both the zero and first
order conditions around the deterministic steady state. In their model however, this is not possible, because
both the steady state and the first-order approximations of the portfolio equations do not yield a unique solution
for ↵. Only by using second-order approximations it is possible to find a value for the zero-order component,
and third-oder approximation to find the first-order component. In economics’ terms, in order to find unique
portfolio allocations, risk factors need to be part of the decisions, since assets only diﬀer in terms of risk
characteristics. However the approximated equilibrium conditions equations do not take into account risk: in
the non-stochastic steady state, risk is by definition excluded, and equilibrium conditions require assets to have
the same rate of returns; first-order approximation around the steady state yield equilibrium conditions that
require expected (rather than actual) returns to be the same. Risk only appears in second-order approximations
of the equations, by linking portfolio choices to the marginal utility of consumption, in line with the standard
prediction of the “consumption-CAPM”model (e.g. Cochrane, 2009). A second-order approximation “therefore
captures diﬀerences between assets in their ability to hedge consumption risk and thus ties down an optimal
portfolio allocation” (p. 15).
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Wincoop, 2010), or simplify the models and find exact solutions, although this is only valid
for special assumptions - i.e. log-linear utility functions (Pavlova and Rigobon, 2010b, 2011).
With these solution techniques, it is possible to incorporate market imperfections in DSGE
models. Tille and van Wincoop (2010, p. 159), for instance, simply add an “iceberg” costs to
foreign asset returns - i.e. agents receive the return on foreign equity multiplied by a factor
e ⌧ , which captures the information costs of investing abroad. In another model Tille and van
Wincoop (2008) introduce dispersed information, where investors have private information
about future fundamentals, alongside the noise in portfolio shifts generated by transaction
costs. These imperfections, along with the explicit recognition of risk, allow the modeling
of more realistic features of open-economy, such as capital flows in multiple-assets financial
markets and many of the associated theoretical “puzzles”. For instance some models allow for
valuation eﬀects oﬀsetting current account deficits (Devereux and Sutherland, 2010; Pavlova
and Rigobon, 2010a; Tille and van Wincoop, 2008, 2010), home-bias as a structural feature of
households portfolio choice (Devereux and Sutherland, 2009; Hnatkovska, 2010; Tille and van
Wincoop, 2008, 2010) and highly volatile (Hnatkovska, 2010) and partially disconnected from
fundamentals (Tille and van Wincoop, 2010) trading in foreign assets. Furthermore, these
models are able to show the co-movements of gross capital inflows and outflows, either as a
response of productivity shocks in the non tradable sector through the change of risk premia
(Hnatkovska, 2010) or productivity shocks through changes in assets hedging functions (Tille
and van Wincoop, 2008) 15.
However, there is a lack of consistency in some of the implications of the comparative
dynamic exercises. For example, while both Tille and van Wincoop (2008) and Devereux and
Sutherland (2009) find that a positive productivity shock in the home country leads to negative
gross capital outflows and an increase in home-bias, Hnatkovska (2010) finds that the opposite
is true. Pavlova and Rigobon (2010a) find that a positive supply shock generates a capital
gain and a current account deficit, whereas Devereux and Sutherland (2010) and Tille and van
Wincoop (2008) find just the opposite. Moreover, as Broner et al. (2013) argue, some of the
findings are inconsistent with the data, which likely reflects the focus on productivity shocks -
15More precisely change in the covariance between excess returns (the diﬀerence between home and foreign
assets) and exchange rates and the covariance between excess returns and excess future returns (p. 162).
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these models typically have Real Business Cycle core - as the main economic driver of capital
flows.
The recent literature in DSGE models therefore is able to address some of the empirical
“puzzles”. However they still maintain the key ingredients of general equilibrium modeling,
populated by representative agents, with monetary considerations being eﬀectively absent.
This, as it will be argued, constitute an important weakness of this literature, which is indeed
shown by the lack of analytical consistency of some of its results.
2.3 The legacy of the crisis: gross flows and risk-aversion
shifts
The 2008 financial crisis shook up the conventional understanding of how financial markets
have an impact on the economy. A major emerging theme, in light of the relationship between
the crisis and financial globalisation, is the increasing concern with two-ways gross capital
flows.
Traditionally, since the capital account is by definition equal to the current account, the
focus was placed on net capital flows. In the words of several prominent macroeconomists:
“Capital flows are traditionally viewed as the financial counterpart to savings
and investment decisions, in line with the narrative of capital flowing “downhill”
from capital-rich countries with lower rates of return to capital-poor countries
with higher returns. From this perspective, the focus is typically on net capital
flows, since that is what counts for funding a country’s borrowing requirements.”
(Brunnermeier et al., 2012)
The years preceding the crisis were undoubtedly related to global current account imbalances
- indeed some authors argued that they caused or were a key determinant of the global fi-
nancial crisis (e.g. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2009; Portes, 2009) -, but an even more remarkable
phenomenon was the expansion of gross capital flows and positions. Gross capital flows are
several orders of magnitude bigger than net flows, highly volatile, and strongly pro-cyclical
- falling dramatically during a financial crisis (Broner et al., 2013). In the case of emerging
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markets, typically private inflows have been mirrored by foreign exchange reserves accumula-
tion (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007). Under such circumstances, it has been argued, focusing
on current accounts to understand global financial imbalances is unwarranted (Johnson, 2009;
Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Borio, 2015). Understanding the patterns of gross flows is crucial
to analyse the actual financial relationships existing across countries, and the potential in-
stabilities that may arise as a result of them. While there exist disagreements with respect
to the centrality of current accounts for open economy macroeconomics, the idea that gross
flows matter at least just as much has become increasingly shared among economists: “net
international asset positions certainly remain relevant for several purposes ... but it is the
gross positions that better reflect the impact on national balance sheets of various economic
shocks” (Obstfeld, 2012b, p. 470).
As a result, many of the themes discussed in the previous sections have been re-examined
by taking this view into account. Cavallo et al. (2015) have developed a new taxonomy of
“sudden stops” distinguishing between gross and net sudden stops. Cerutti et al. (2015) analyse
gross inflows to emerging countries disaggregating by type of flows (banks or funds), and find
that the sensitivity to push factors largely reflect the type of lenders rather than domestic
fundamentals. Forbes and Warnock (2012) provide a wide-ranging empirical assessment of
the determinants of extreme gross capital movements, and crucially they disaggregate flows
according to whether they are driven by foreigners or domestic investors: beside “surges” and
“stops” they add the categories of “flight” and “retrenchment”, respectively a sharp increase and
decrease of gross capital outflows. The DSGE literature explored in the previous section, as
discussed, is also fundamentally preoccupied to include simultaneous expansion of gross inflows
and outflows combined with their “puzzling” features, such as positive-feedback trading and
equity home bias.
More fundamentally however, the recent evaluation of capital flows determinants, has put
strong emphasis on one factor: global risk-aversion. This factor had already appeared as a
determinant of capital flows to emerging markets as “pure contagion”, rather than fundamental-
driven contagion, in a renowned paper by Masson (1999). In case of pure contagion investors
“become more risk averse following bad news and less risk averse following good news irre-
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spective of fundamentals in their own markets” Karolyi and Stulz (2002, p. 52). Broner et al.
(2006, p. 212) develop a model that explains the transmission mechanism of contagion in these
terms:
“(i) weak relative performance due to an overexposure to the crisis country in-
creases investors’ risk aversion; (ii) the increase in risk aversion, in turn, produces
a retrenchment towards the average portfolio; and (iii) the retrenchment of over-
exposed investors, in turn, leading to a drop in stock prices in countries that share
overexposed investors with the crisis country”
Fundamentals, in this framework, do not necessarily play a role: investors simply rebalance
their portfolio on the basis of weak returns of their total portfolio, and therefore sell out
securities from countries where their portfolio is overexposed but may have little in common
in terms of fundamentals with the initial crisis country.
Gradually, risk-aversion gained prominence as an explanation of the capital flows cycles to
emerging markets. First, on the finance front, several studies have focused on emerging markets
sovereign spreads and found that global risk-aversion, often proxied by the VIX index16, has
a crucial role in determining the size of the risk-premium that emerging markets have to
pay (Baek et al., 2005; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 2008; Ciarlone et al., 2009; Özatay et al., 2009;
Petrova et al., 2010). More recently, risk-aversion has become a central concern of international
macroeconomics. Rey (2013) argued that global risk-aversion is the crucial factor determining
the global financial cycle, from leverage to asset prices and capital flows. Bruno and Shin
(2015) put forward a similar argument, whereby capital flows depend positively on bank’s
leverage, which in turn mirrors the VIX index and therefore global risk aversion. The empirical
literature has largely confirmed these ideas: the role of global risk-aversion (Ahmed and Zlate,
2014; Ananchotikul and Zhang, 2014; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Ebeke and
Kyobe, 2015) in driving capital flows to emerging markets is well established.
Furthermore the literature shows that changes in risk-appetite are heavily influenced by
16This is an index that measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500.
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monetary policy of advanced countries, with monetary expansion increasing the appetite for
risk and vice-versa (Fratzscher et al., 2012b,a; Chen et al., 2012; Zhu, 2012). This is also
recognised in the 2010 IMF Global Financial stability Report, which states that “(1) recent
capital movements have been partly generated by the low interest rate policy in the G-4 and
abundant liquidity in the global financial system; and (2) capital inflows can come to a sudden
stop once monetary policy in the G-4 is tightened”(IMF, 2010a). Additionally, the risk-appetite
channel reduces the policy space of emerging markets, as their central banks are induced to
follow the FED lower interest rates in line with advanced countries to contain capital flows
(Rey, 2013).
Very recent papers have suggested how the risk-appetite mechanism may apply to finan-
cial markets dominated by institutional investors and asset managers. Shin (2013) discusses
how in what he calls “the second phase of global liquidity”, institutional investors and their
asset managers have become the crucial providers of finance to emerging markets, particularly
through the corporate bond markets. Shifts in risk-aversion may quickly translate into capital
outflows from emerging markets, increasing yields on emerging markets bonds, with negative
consequences on corporations in those countries (Turner, 2014). That global risk-aversion also
aﬀects institutional investors rather than banks only is also documented by the (IMF, 2011,
2014). Ebeke and Kyobe (2015) show that, as foreign investors become dominant market
players in emerging bond markets, the impact of foreign monetary policy on financial markets
stability becomes substantial, through the risk-appetite, liquidity and portfolio rebalancing
channels.
Risk-appetite changes may therefore generate capital flows cycles. These cycles take the
form of an asymmetric asset swap between emerging and advanced countries, marked by shifts
in global investors’ risk appetite (McCauley, 2012): when risk is “on” capital flows to emerging
markets, and central banks in those countries accumulate safe assets as reserves, when risk is
“oﬀ”, such reserves are drawn down and bought back by the investors’ “flight to safety”.
In sum the post-crisis literature has evolved in considering more explicitly financial mecha-
nisms to understand capital flows. Gross cross-border flows and positions matter to understand
capital flows and their volatility, and risk-appetite cycles are a primary factor behind their
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dynamics. As it will be discussed in the next section, this represents a substantial progress
for the analysis of capital flows, but more could be gained in rooting these factors into the
historical and empirical context, and in more explicitly adopting a monetary analysis of the
economy.
2.4 Conclusion
Research touching upon the issue of financial flows to emerging markets and their determi-
nants has been vast and diverse. Since the early 1990’s, with the establishment of the “push-
pull” factors framework, researchers have been considering an increasing amount of potential
explanations as to which determinants are crucial to drive cross-border financial relationships,
with a special concern for their stability.
Conscious of the risk of oversimplification, a synthesis of the literature hitherto reviewed
can be made to classify two main categories of factors:
1. Characteristics of the Emerging Markets assets: fundamentals and market
imperfections
2. Investors’ risk appetite
The first category has been subject to a much longer and deeper analysis. Any factor aﬀecting
the risk/return tradeoﬀ of emerging markets assets fits into this category. The category could
then be further divided, for example by distinguishing domestic and external fundamentals,
but when looking at capital flows, it is logical to keep the category as one formally distinct
from investors factors. After all, as Ahmed and Zlate (2014, p. 234) argue, “whether growth
diﬀerentials widen because foreign growth is low or emerging markets growth is high, in both
cases it is economic fundamentals at work driving the flows”. Market imperfections also do not
fundamentally change the focus of analysis, since they also focus on the assets characteristics,
and in particular on the financial markets in which they are exchanged and the financial
institutions which exchange them. To be sure, this does not mean that adding informational
53
asymmetries is just a minor cosmetic change to the analysis, but simply that it keeps the
analysis on the assets and their markets rather than on the agents.
Investors’ factors have become central as explanatory factors in more recent years. The
idea that risk-appetite is volatile, and crucially depends on factors such as the macroeconomic
environment or agents’ balance sheets has become a central research topic 17. This represents
a whole diﬀerent area of analysis compared to the first category: changes in capital flows to
emerging markets and their consequences on asset prices are explained by changes in investors’
global appetite for risk, regardless of emerging markets asset characteristics. The importance
of this factor, documented by a rapidly expanding literature reviewed in the previous section,
opens up major issues regarding financial stability in emerging markets: even if fundamentals
matter, and policy-makers try to counterbalance changes in “external” factors, emerging mar-
kets can still be hit by global risk-appetite swings. It is indeed also on these grounds that the
IMF has reconsidered its position on capital controls, which can be adopted temporary, last
resort policy (IMF, 2010b, 2012), a view shared by other prominent economists (Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ, 2009; Lane, 2012; Rey, 2013).
While the surveyed literature represents a very useful starting point to explore the issue of
capital flows and asset prices in emerging markets, a number of limitations can be identified.
Firstly, the literature tends to over-aggregate diﬀerent kinds of investors. In a world with
multiple private agents making international investment decisions it is important to under-
stand which sector in the economy is driving capital flows. Moreover, it is key to understand
the precise nature of the investor driving such flows (e.g. banks, pension funds, sovereign-
wealth funds). While some micro-level literature assessing the role of mutual funds exists, the
macroeconomic literature focus on foreign claims and flows between countries. In short, there
is a need to take into account the evolution of “investors” through historical time and space.
Secondly and directly stemming from the previous point, the process of portfolio choice is
confined to the analysis of the asset characteristics and its economic and financial environment.
In most of the literature, the implicit - or sometimes explicit - presumptions is that, if it were
not for market imperfections, standard portfolio theory would hold. While undoubtedly the
17This also applies to the theoretical asset pricing literature. Cochrane (2011) in his presidential address
explains how changes in investors’ stochastic discount factors, rather than expected cash-flow payoﬀs, are the
major driving forces behind changes in asset prices.
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risk/return profile of an asset plays a major role, investors may have additional goals and
constraints driving their portfolio choice. The post-crisis literature’s focus on risk-appetite
expands the portfolio choice mechanism. But once again, it is important to locate risk-appetite
in the actual operations of the historically determined nature of “investors”.
Finally, much of the reviewed literature remains ultimately grounded on a ‘real’ analysis of
the economy. This is true of models essentially based on international loanable funds market
(Caballero et al., 2008), where interest rates are determined by the equilibrium between saving
and investment. Even in the more recent models with multiple assets and imperfect capital
markets, the portfolio choice is between foreign and domestic assets, which represent a claim
on real output, whereas money either does not even exist and prices are expressed in terms of
a numeraire good (Tille and van Wincoop, 2010), or determines the price through a quantity
theory of money approach (Devereux and Sutherland, 2009). The dynamics of capital flows
are thus determined by what are ultimately real economic decisions, chiefly the inter-temporal
consumption choice of economic agents, who determine aggregate saving, and consequently
the dynamics of current accounts and capital flows.
This limitation applies quite clearly to the “push-pull” factors framework and much of the
partial and general equilibrium analysis emphasising the role of market imperfections. On the
other hand, as mentioned, the post-crisis developments do partially overcome this limitation.
The increasing consideration of monetary and financial factors, such as the FED monetary
policy, the balance sheets of financial intermediaries and the focus on specific financial actors
- banks or institutional investors -, and more in general the attention to the gross two-way
flows and relationships clearly go beyond a purely ‘real’ analysis of the economy.
However the analysis is not wholly brought to its ultimate logical consequences. This is best
exemplified by Obstfeld (2012b), who argues that the expansion of cross-border transactions
can be conceptually understood as trading future consumption for future consumption, rather
than current consumption for future consumption, as in the case of current account imbalances.
These two-ways claims on future consumption, unlike current accounts, are not inherently
constrained: “at any point in time, the size of the current account imbalance is limited by
output sizes and the sizes of predetermined international assets and liabilities – but there is
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no limit to the number of times funds can be recycled in diﬀerent forms between Home and
Foreign” (p. 470). The analysis of Obstfeld however seems to remain rooted in the inter-
temporal consumption choice framework: the “asset-to-asset” transactions originate in the
consumption choice of representative households, to which the internationally traded “funds”
can ultimately be traced back. Even in this analysis, asset and liabilities are ultimately seen
as claims on real resources, rather than monetary claims18.
In sum, in line with the methodological considerations made in the introduction, the liter-
ature reviewed in this chapter can be considered as being on the one hand characterised by a
lack of realisticness and on the other hand by a strict adherence to atomicism. The absence
of money from the start, and of a deeper analysis of the portfolio choice process, in light of
the historical evolution of the financial sector rather than derived from “rational” behaviour,
indicates privileging instrumentalism over the realisticness of the assumptions.
Insights from the post-Keynesian and other economic traditions that have been grounded
in a ‘monetary’ analysis of the economy, can substantially enrich this framework. These
economic schools have long emphasised the importance of liquidity and balance sheets as
a crucial determinant of economic and financial behaviour. Additionally, they have clearly
underlined the importance of grounding economic analysis in historical developments, rather
than purely abstract ideal types. Reviewing them to develop a theoretical framework for the
analysis of capital flows to emerging markets is the task of the following chapter.
18This view echoes quite clearly what Schumpeter (1954, p. 686) terms the “monetary theory credit”, a
theory that sees “money as the only genuine and ultimate means of payment and the credit instrument that
embodied a claim to money”.
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Chapter 3
A theoretical framework for the
analysis of capital flows
Introduction
This chapter continues the development of a theoretical framework for the analysis capital
flows to emerging markets. It assesses the contributions of alternative schools of economic
thought in the subjects of money and finance and their potential contribution to a deeper
understanding this thesis’ topic. Bearing in mind the strengths and limitations found in
the literature reviewed in chapter 2, the analysis will start with a survey of post-Keynesian
monetary theory.
Post-Keynesian economists have long emphasised the importance of a monetary analysis
of the economy, and sought to understand the importance of money for the dynamics of a
capitalist economy. Key insights in these respects include the theory of liquidity preference, as a
theory of money stocks demand - and portfolio choice in general - and the theory of endogenous
money, as the demand for credit money as purchasing power. Particularly important for
this thesis is the work of Minsky (1975), who conceptualised of a monetary economy as the
interaction of the balance sheets and the resulting cash flows between economic units, and the
behaviour of such units as being dependent on their balance sheet and cash flows
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On the basis of this survey, the chapter will then proceed to develop these characteristics
in section 3.2. Firstly it will consider how the monetary nature of the economy applies to
the context of the open economy and the analysis of capital flows to emerging markets in
particular. Secondly, it will highlight the relationship that capital flows bear with liquidity
preference, in relation to contemporary post-Keynesian theories of the exchange rate. These
two points suggest an understanding of capital flows as international asset demand.
In recognising the importance of the historical context for a realistic economic theory,
section 3.3 highlights the rise of institutional investors as a major development that bears
considerable relevance in the process of global financial integration.
These themes are finally syntehsised into a theoretical framework in section 3.4. This is
based upon the understanding of the determinants of international asset demand by global in-
stitutional investors, in a world where liquidity and monetary factors matter, and the liabilities
of economic units substantially influence their behaviour.
3.1 Post-Keynesian monetary analysis
This section looks at the broad arguments about the monetary nature of the economy and
then moves to assess the post-Keynesian contributions, by referring to the theory of endogenous
money and liquidity preference. It then closes with the recent evolution of these debates that
seek to unify these two strands, and in particular highlights the role of Minsky’s theory and
the monetary theory as embedded in the Stock-Flow Consistent models literature.
3.1.1 Liquidity preference and endogenous money
As chapter 2 pointed out, a limitation of the conventional literature is its reliance on a real
analysis of the economy, or an insuﬃcient departure from it. A diﬀerent perspective should
start from the point of view that modern economies are fundamentally monetary. A monetary
analysis, in Schumpeter (1954)’s words:
“introduces the element of money on the very ground floor of our analytic
structure and abandons the idea that all essential features of economic life can be
represented by a barter-economy model ... it has to be recognized that essential
features of the capitalist process may depend upon the ‘veil’ and that the ‘face
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behind it’ is incomplete without it”.
A monetary analysis recognises the importance of money as an essential component of a
capitalist economy. It rejects the idea that money is neutral, that is the idea that what
matters for economic decisions are not nominal - i.e. monetary - values but “real” values. In
the words of Keynes, quoted in Bertocco (2005, p. 493):
“The distinction which is normally made between a barter economy and a mon-
etary economy depends upon the employment of money as a convenient means of
eﬀecting exchange. It is regarded as a mere link between cloth and wheat, ... It
is not supposed to aﬀect the essential nature of the transaction from being, in the
minds of those making it, one between real things, or to modify the motives and
decisions of the parties to it. ... That, however, is not the distinction which I have
in mind when I say that we lack a monetary theory of production. An economy,
which uses money but uses it merely as a neutral link between transactions in real
things and real assets and does not allow it to enter into motives or decisions, might
be called ... a real exchange economy”
On the contrary, monetary analysis considers all the fundamentals characteristics of a capitalist
economy - production, employment, consumption - are essentially monetary, in line with the
famous statement by Robert Clower that “money buys goods and goods buy money; but goods
do not buy goods”. Money, in the spirit of Marx, is also the end the capitalist production
process, and thus the underlying cause of capitalist dynamics: “the purpose of production is to
accumulate money - not to barter the produced commodities for other commodities ... money
is the object of production - it is not merely the way we measure the value of output” Wray
(2010, p. 4). Moreover, since goods do not buy goods, it follows that money is also needed as
a starting point for any economic activity. In short, as Keynes - quoted in Fontana (2000, p.
40) - stated: “The theory which I desiderate would deal ... with an economy in which money
plays a part of its own and aﬀects motives and decisions and is, in short, one of the operative
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factors in the situations of that the course of events cannot be predicted either in the long
period or in the short, without a knowledge of the behavior of money between the first state
and the last”.
Arguably, the school of thought that more than others stressed the importance of money in
a modern capitalist economy is the one associated with Keynes and the post-Keynesians19. A
useful way to summarise the post-Keynesian views on monetary theory is analysing how they
have addressed two fundamental functions of money: store of wealth and purchasing power.
This is indeed what Keynes himself does in chapter 13 of The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money (GT, from now on). After defining interest as “the reward for parting
with cash”, he considers that while the purchasing power of money justifies the loss of interest
“for the convenience of liquidity”, the absence of a yield on holding money makes the demand
for money as a store of wealth harder to explain (p. 109). To account for that, it is argued,
we must take into consideration the existence of uncertainty20. In conditions of uncertainty,
there can be three motives behind people’s demand for money - i.e. their liquidity preference
-: the transaction motive, the precautionary motive and the speculative motive. While the
first two essentially depend on the level of economic activity, and do not depend on the rate of
interest, the relation of the last one with the rate of interest is given considerable importance
in the GT. The underlying idea is that, with uncertainty about future rates of interest and
with well developed organised security markets, investors will try to bet and anticipate market
changes: if they expect the interest rate to increase, and consequently the price of their bonds
to decrease, the will increase their demand for cash holdings, as to avoid preemptively the
depreciation of their portfolio.
Keynes’ monetary theory in the GT is further developed in chapter 17. Firstly, Keynes
formulates the theory of “own rates of interest”, according to which, “for each capital-asset
19It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to provide a comprehensive debate about the several diﬀerent
strands of “monetary” economic theories. For instance, the marxian Money-Commodity-Money’ circuit and the
schemes of reproduction could be well considered one of the first consistent monetary theories of production.
Schumpeter also gave great importance to credit money as a necessary starting condition for innovation. What
follows is a critical overview over the various concepts that broadly defined post-Keynesians have put forward
to show the features of a monetary economy.
20Uncertainty is not very specifically defined in the GT. However, in his later writings, Keynes defines it as
the condition for which, with respect some events “there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable
probability whatever”. This really echoes Frank Knight’s definition of uncertainty as unforeseeable and therefore
not calculable, as opposed to risk, which can be accounted for by probabilistic forecasts.
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there must be an analogue of the rate of interest on money” (p. 142). The rate of interest of
an asset is its yield q, minus its carrying cost c, plus its liquidity premium l, the latter being
“the power of disposal” over that asset (p. 144). With respect to this characterisation, money
is peculiarly defined as an asset with a liquidity premium that greatly exceeds its carrying
costs, making its rate of interest essentially stable over-time - or at least comparatively more
stable than any other asset. Moreover money, according to Keynes, has two other essential
features: inelasticity of production and inelasticity of substitution. The first condition means
that money cannot be simply produced by employing labour; the second means that, as the
demand for it increase, “there is no tendency to substitute some other factor for it” (p. 147).
These conditions, coupled with the stability of its rate of interest, make the money rate of
interest the standard against all the other rates are measured and in turn form the basis upon
which money becomes the standard unit of account:
“Thus, we see that the various characteristics, which combine to make the
money-rate of interest significant, interact with one another in a cumulative fash-
ion. The fact that money has low elasticities of production and substitution and
low carrying-costs tends to raise the expectation that will be relatively stable; and
this expectations enhances money’s liquidity premium and prevents the exceptional
correlation between the money rate of interest and the marginal eﬃciencies of other
assets”. (p.152).
Keynes’ monetary theory in the GT therefore provides the means to justify under-employment
equilibrium: as people seek to increase their savings, thereby reducing eﬀective demand and
causing unemployment. As interest rates are determined by liquidity preference, rather than
saving, higher saving is not necessary accompanied by a fall in interest rates which would be
necessary to generate full employment.. “The trouble arises, therefore, because the act of saving
implies, not a substitution for present consumption of some specific additional consumption
which requires for its preparation just as much immediate economic activity as would have
been required by present consumption equal in value to the sum saved, but a desire for “wealth”
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as such, that is for a potentiality of consuming an unspecified article at an unspecified time.”
(p.135).
The monetary analysis contained in the GT seems to focus more on the store of wealth
function of money (Bertocco, 2005, 2007), which can lead to interpret the theory of liquidity
preference solely as a theory of money as a store of value (Tily, 2012). Some post-Keynesians
authors have sought to develop Keynes’ monetary theory on these lines, focusing on liquid-
ity preference in conditions of fundamental uncertainty (Davidson, 1972a,b; Dequech, 2000).
Fundamental uncertainty is especially pervasive in financial markets and results in the im-
possibility of determining precise probability functions about future asset prices. In these
conditions, expectations will be driven by conventions, about what is collectively deemed to
be “fundamental” in driving asset prices, and confidence swings as a result of psychological
factor. This interpretation of liquidity preference is also what some authors, whose theories
constituted the core of the neoclassical synthesis, like Hicks and Tobin, have tried to model
(Bibow, 2009, chap. 4). Diﬀerently from the original formulation of the GT, as Carvalho
(2010) argues, is the major emphasis on the precautionary motive, which Keynes had con-
flated into the transaction motive. Moreover, in the GT, Keynes simplifies his theory as the
choice between only two simple assets, money and bonds, thus considerably simplifying the
issue of portfolio choice. In sum “Keynes’ liquidity preference is a theory of money allocation
that helps us understand how economic agents perceive their demand for money” (Sawyer,
2003).
However, the theory of liquidity preference as expressed in the GT has one very important
limitation: it assumes, more or less explicitly, that the money supply is exogenous and fixed.
Another key issue in post-Keynesian theory was therefore the development of a theory of
“endogenous money”, that is a theory in which money is endogenously created by private banks
through credit creation which finances production. Keynes (1937), in fact, acknowledged the
limitation of his approach to money in the GT and added the “finance motive”, firm’s need for a
source of finance in order to undertake investments, as a determinant of money demand. While
the analytical consistency of this addition is disputable (Chick, 1999; Bertocco, 2005; Bibow,
2009), it provided, along with Keynes’ earlier works in the Treatise on Money, a foundation
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upon which theories of money endogeneity could be built.
The precise nature and mechanisms of money endogeneity have been subject of intense de-
bate21. A strand, which can be connected to the work of Kaldor, is the so-called “horizontalist”
or “accommodationist” school (Kaldor, 1985; Moore, 1979; Lavoie, 1984), according to which
banks accommodate the demand for money by firms, the central bank in turn accommodates
the demand for reserves by banks: the money supply is infinitely elastic with respect to the
interest rate. This view seems to undermine the role of liquidity preference, as the demand for
credit-money is what determines the money stock while the interest rate is exogenously chosen.
As Kaldor (1985, p. xvii) puts it, “once we realise that the supply of money is endogenous (it
varies automatically with the demand, at a given rate of interest), liquidity preference and the
behavior of the velocity of circulation ceases to be important”.
The “structuralist” view (Dow and Dow, 1989; Dow, 1996; Palley, 1996; Chick and Dow,
2002) criticised the “horizontalists” precisely on the grounds that it overlooked the importance
of liquidity preference in the process of credit supply. Especially important is the liquidity
preference of banks, which, it is argued, are not passively accommodating the demand for
credit, but actively manage their balance sheets. The demand for money too needs to take
into account liquidity preference, if one broadens “money” to include interest-bearing deposits
(Dow and Dow, 1989). Some authors have in fact argued that “horizontalism” is in fundamental
contradiction with the theory of liquidity preference and Keynes’ monetary theory more in
general (Cottrell, 1994; Monvoisin and Pastoret, 2003; Carvalho, 2010). For the structuralists,
the money supply therefore, while being endogenous, is not horizontal but slightly upward
sloping as a result of liquidity preference considerations: as demand for credit increases, lending
rates will increase, therefore resulting in a positive relationship between economic activities
and interest rates. Structuralist theory therefore oﬀers “middle ground position” between the
“extremism” of both horizontalism and the exogeneity of the money supply (Chick and Dow,
2002).
Finally, a third approach to monetary endogeneity is the so-called “monetary circuit” ap-
proach (Parguez and Seccareccia, 1999; Halevi and Taouil, 2002; Realfonzo, 2006; Gnos, 2006),
21Overviews of the debate can be found in (Cottrell, 1994; Fontana, 2003)
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which also draws from Keynes’ writings, although not exclusively22 and was developed inde-
pendently from the “traditional” literature in post-Keynesian economics. In the ciruitist theory
“the working of the economy is described as a sequential process, characterised by successive
phases whose links form a circuit of money” (Realfonzo, 2006, p. 106). The circuit starts with
bank credit granted to firms; then firms pay their inputs - in the aggregate this corresponds to
the total wage-bill - and undertake production; once production is complete, firms put their
goods on the markets, which are bought by workers; money therefore flows back to firms,
which pay back their loans, eﬀectively destroying money and thus closing the circuit.
To summarise, there are two main lines of thought in the post-Keynesian literature, about
the nature of a monetary economy. The first, which originates in the liquidity preference
theory contained in the GT, focuses on the role of uncertainty in creating a demand for money
stocks, and liquid assets more broadly defined. In this sense therefore, liquidity preference
can be interpreted as theory of asset choice, and considers the money as a store of wealth
(Tily, 2012). The second line of thought focuses on the endogenous money creation through
bank credit. Endogenous money theory and “circuitism” focus more on the circular flow of
money, therefore highlighting the importance of money as “purchasing power” (Fontana, 2000;
Sawyer, 2003). However it is hardly contestable that in a modern capitalist economy money
plays both roles. The debates in post-Keynesian monetary theory seems to originate in a
diﬃculty to provide a consistent theory of money that reconcile its two fundamental roles
(Fontana, 2002). As Chick (1999, p. 126) puts it, “while Keynes broke the classical dichotomy
between the monetary and real aspects of the economy, this device simultaneously created a
new dichotomy between flows (the analysis of income) and stocks (portfolio analysis)”.
3.1.2 A possible synthesis
Analysing some recent developments in the post-Keynesian literature, it seems that a syn-
thesis between the various approaches can be found. While post-Keynesian scholars acknowl-
edge that decisions behind a “finance” demand for credit money are quite independent from
22Both Gnos (2006) and Realfonzo (2006) mention Marx, Schumpeter andWicksell as main points of reference
for the the French and Italian schools of monetary circuit. Arestis and Glickman (2002); Halevi and Taouil
(2002) point out the close relation between circuit theory and Kalecki.
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the “portfolio” demand for money as an asset, in practice the two are usually merged together
into a single “demand for money” function. This not only represents a theoretical shortcom-
ing but also creates, as Sawyer (2001, 2003) has convincingly argued, an empirical problem:
credit-money as purchasing power corresponds to what is today defined as M1, whereas money
as a store of wealth corresponds to M3 or M4 (other than M1), a distinction that Kalecki had
already pointed out. As Bertocco (2005, 2006, 2007) has explicitly argued, what is needed is
a framework that specifies the distinction between a credit and a money market. He refers
to Tobin’s contributions that distinguished between an income account and a capital account:
the former tracks income flows, where income decisions such as investments are made, the
latter tracks supply and demand of diﬀerent assets, tracking the change of stocks over-time.
Credit-creation, being the outcome of firms’ investment decisions, is related to the income ac-
count, while the money-market, being associated with portfolio allocations by wealth holders,
is part of the capital account.
Viewpoints similar to Bertocco’s have been expressed by several others scholars over the
past decade. Brown (2003) argues that the main interpretation of liquidity preference is flawed,
conflating a transaction/finance demand for credit money with the portfolio decisions of wealth
holders, and therefore should be re-interpreted in the spirit of the Treatise on Money ’s concept
of “bearishness”, i,e, the desire to hold assets with stable values, even if low yield. If there is
a rise in liquidity preference, the “bears” prevail, and there is a shift towards broadly defined
money, increasing the yield and decreasing the prices of long-term securities:
“It is the ever-present potential for convulsive shifts in the structure of relative
prices among securities, brought about by the interplay of psychological and insti-
tutional factors, that is, or more accurately, ought to be, the quintessence of LP.”
(p. 331)
This view of liquidity preference actually has several important precedents (Townshend, 1937;
Boulding, 1944; Robinson, 1979; Mott, 1985). In today’s world, where secondary markets for
securities are deep and well developed, liquidity preference is relevant for all assets that pertain
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to what Keynes called “financial circulation” (Erturk, 2006, 2005).
There is no incompatibility between this view of liquidity preference and the endogenous
money theory: “under the assumptions of extreme horizontalism, this analysis [liquidity pref-
erence] does not apply to the overnight rate, to loan and deposit rates, and to government
bond rates ... still, this leaves a great range of assets whose prices are in part determined by
liquidity preference” (Wray, 2006, p. 9). Lavoie (1996, 1999, 2006) - one of the most prominent
horizontalists - has also repeatedly claimed that horizontalists have never questioned the im-
portance of liquidity preference - and other reasons - in influencing interest rates, but simply
argued that there is no compelling case for an upward sloping money supply curve. While
still claiming that horizontalism is the best approximation, he acknowledges the fact that liq-
uidity preference has a role to play even in banks’ credit creation including credit rationing,
households portfolio allocation and firm’s financing decisions.
Although less directly related to the theory of liquidity preference, the theory of the mon-
etary circuit is also fully compatible with the idea that money can be held as a stock. This is
well explained by Realfonzo (2006):
“monetary circuit theory distinguishes between the demand for money to fi-
nance production (which Keynes called ‘finance motive’) and the demand for cash
reserves (dependent on the famous transactions, precautionary and speculative mo-
tives). The finance motive explains the creation of money and its injection into the
economy ... The demand for cash reserves leads to the formation of money stocks
which are present at the closure of the circuit.” (p. 110-11).
Thus, in the monetary circuit there is a clear distinction between the credit market23, where
banks and firms bargain over loans, and the financial market, where households can decide to
use part of their savings in security purchases. The interest rates forming in the two markets
are diﬀerent, the second being more directly related to the general public’s liquidity preference.
23Unfortunately Realfonzo (2006) calls the credit market “money market”, thus potentially sparking confusion
in terminology.
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There seems therefore to be a line thought pointing to the importance of analysing together
the flows of income and the wealth allocation of the various sectors, in a wider macroeconomic
framework. A very useful theoretical framework in these respects, can be found in theory of
Minsky, and especially his “Wall street paradigm”, which he exposed in his book John Maynard
Keynes (Minsky, 1975; Dymski and Pollin, 1992; Dymski, 1997; Bellofiore et al., 2010). In
chapter 4, Minksy depicts a modern monetary economy, essentially in terms of balance sheets
and cash flows:
“In a capitalist economy, one way every economic unit can be characterized is
by its portfolio: the set of tangible and financial assets it owns, and the financial
liabilities on which it owes ... Each economic units makes portfolio decisions ...
what assets are to be held, controlled, or acquired ... [and how] the position in
these assets ... is to be financed. Both assets and liabilities ... set up cash receipts
or expenditures over some fixed or variable future time period” (p. 70).
To analyse the dynamics of a Wall Street economy, it is therefore central to assess the balance
sheet structure and the cash flows dynamics of the various units that compose it. This leads
to a re-interpretation of Keynes’ theory of the “own rate of interest” as a theory of asset prices:
an asset is valued on the basis of its quasi-rents, its carrying costs and the liquidity premium.
In the context of the Wall Street paradigm this acquires a particular interpretation, related
to the balance sheet structures where the quasi-rents from are cash inflows from assets, the
costs of holding such assets are the cash commitments from the liabilities, and the liquidity
premium is the the implicit yield that liquid assets owe to their ease of disposal - that is it
can quickly generate an actual cash flow if sold. In deciding the composition of their balance
sheets, economic units speculate that their liability cash commitments can be met by cash
receipts originating from its assets. Liquidity preference essentially aﬀects the shift of balance
sheets, not only as an asset shuﬄing between money and bonds, as in the original Keynesian
formulation, but between capital/non liquid financial assets and liquid assets on the asset side,
and in the leverage choice on the liability side.
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Minsky also acknowledged the importance of an elastic supply of money (p. 123), and
the diﬀerence between credit creation and the portfolio choice of units: “the finance for both
additional capital-asset production and the increased debt-financing of positions has to come
from some place. Two sources of such financing may be identified: the creation of money
and portfolio diversification of wealth owners.” (p. 121). Finally, Minsky believed that the
evolution of the economy as a macro-monetary system could be based on the distinction
between three diﬀerent types of cash flows, income flows, balance sheet flows and portfolio
flows, “which he proposed to integrate into what we would now call the “flow of funds” accounts,
showing the evolution of money in circulation and portfolio balances” (Toporowski, 2012a, p.
6).
It would thus seem that Minsky’s Wall Street paradigm provides a useful theoretical frame-
work upon which to develop the view of a monetary economy that is characterised by balance
sheets that evolve through time through the dynamic interaction of cash flows. It also enriches
the traditional Keynesian view of decisions under uncertainty, by highlighting the importance
of the liability structure in determining portfolio choice. The burgeoning literature on Stock-
Flow Consistent models24 seems to provide a formalisation of this view:
“SFC macroeconomic models are, by definition, ones in which the balance sheet
dynamics of all assumed institutional sectors (given by sectoral saving flows, portfo-
lio shifts, and capital gains) are explicitly and rigorously modeled .. this definition
implies (as exemplified in the next section) that SFC models are necessarily based
on social accounting frameworks that consistently ‘integrate’ conventional product
and income accounts with ‘flow of funds’ accounts and a full set of balance sheets”
(Dos Santos, 2006, pp. 542-543).
Unsurprisingly, Minsky is mentioned by Godley and Lavoie (2012) as a main linkage between
the Stock-Flow Consistent approach and post-Keynesian economics.
In sum, a monetary analysis of the economy is characterised by both an endogenous money
24See (Dos Santos, 2006; Caverzasi and Godin, 2015) for an overview.
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supply, and agent’s liquidity preference under conditions uncertainty. Furthermore, these
processes give rise to a complex set of balance sheets and financial transactions, which represent
the interactions between economic units in a sophisticated financial system, such as the one
that exists today, and determine the evolution of asset prices.
How can this picture be applied to the context of international capital flows, and what are
its implications in relationship to their determinants, surveyed in the chapter 2?
3.2 Post-Keynesian monetary theory in the open-economy
This section applies the considerations about the nature of a monetary economy emerging
from section 3.1 to the context of the open economy. The theoretical concerns discussed in
the previous section can also be observed at a diﬀerent level of abstraction, in the analysis of
capital flows as analysed from a monetary perspective. Firstly, it discusses the importance of
understanding capital flows as flows of funds, rather than real resources, and the implication
that this has on the importance of the current account. Secondly, it explores the application of
liquidity preference theory in the open-economy, by referring to post-Keynesian theories of the
exchange rate. These are then summarised in the understanding of capital flows as investors’
international asset demand.
3.2.1 International monetary flows
The monetary view of the economy based on Minsky’s theory, whereby agents interact
by engaging in financial transactions and holding claims on one another, can be extended
to the context of an open economy. In a monetary open economy, capital flows are nothing
but financial transactions between economic units located in diﬀerent countries. A monetary
analysis needs to consider capital flows as “flows of funds”, rather than transfers of “real”
resources, as a result of which some units will hold claims on foreign units which in turn incur
liabilities for foreign units. As Carvalho (2009, p. 19) puts it, “foreign investment should not
be confused with “real” resources, just as domestic savings should not be confused with surplus
corn. Cross-border financial transactions ... by themselves they represent the circulation of
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foreign currency, not of real goods or real capital” .
Although this view is a natural implication of a monetary analysis of the economy, its direct
consequence is to break down the conventional analytical link between capital flows and current
accounts. Current accounts are the outcome of decisions pertaining to the “real economy” or,
in “accounting terms”, economic units’ income accounts: saving and investment or imports
and exports. In a monetary economy these have a financial transaction counterpart in the
capital account, which can be divided, mirroring Minsky’s definitions, into income flows (the
trade in goods and services) and balance sheet flows (net factor income). However, financial
transactions may also have nothing to do with these decisions. These “portfolio transactions” -
that is, transactions resulting from the purchase and sale of existing and newly-created assets
- are logically distinguished from the current account, and can be - and are in practice - several
orders of magnitude higher than income and balance sheet flows.
To capture the dynamics of such transactions the focus needs to shift from net to gross
capital flows, as a recent paper by Borio and Disyatat (2011)25 vividly argued. The authors
claim that the focus on net flows arises out of a confusion between “saving” and “financing”:
in a monetary economy, saving is nothing but income not consumed which has no necessary
relationship, let alone a causal one, with financing, a cash flow concept representing a monetary
transaction. In the open-economy the same distinction can be made between current accounts
- or net capital flows - and gross capital flows, where the former only represent the diﬀerence
between saving and investment of an economy as a whole, whereas the latter represent all
cross-border financial transactions.
A number of implications follow. Firstly, gross capital flows bear little relationship to
current accounts because most financial transactions result in zero-net flows. An example
can clarify this point: suppose a US private resident purchases a UK security, denominated
in British pounds sterling. This represents an increase in US claims to the UK and thus a
gross outflow. However, to purchase the security, the US resident must pay for it in Pounds
Sterling, which leads him to either run down any reserves he might have in that currency, or
exchange his dollars for British pounds in either a US or a UK bank (at least indirectly). This
results in either a reduction of gross outflows or an increase in gross inflows, thereby oﬀsetting
25It is interesting to note that the authors are not explicitly referring to post-Keynesian monetary theory.
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the initial transaction. As a result, although financial transactions have occurred, and new
two-ways claims have been established, no net change in capital flows will result.
Secondly, by implication, this means that the current account does not reveal much about
how investment in a country is financed. “Even if, say, a country’s current account is in balance,
or no imports and exports take place at all, the whole of its investment expenditures may be
financed from abroad” (p. 9).
Thirdly, it is wrong to link any specific type of gross flow to the current account. Specifi-
cally, this point relates to the widely-held view that current accounts are needed to accumulate
reserves. Reserve accumulation is, however, a financial transaction that generates oﬀsetting
flows and, for it to occur, there only needs to be a gross inflow of foreign currency, which may
not necessarily be related to the current account. Finally, this is clearly even more valid in the
presence of multilateral capital flows: “in terms of national income accounting, deficit coun-
tries are compensating for the non-consumption of surplus countries. In this sense, current
account deficits are matched by saving in other regions. But the underlying consumption and
investment expenditures that generate such imbalances may be financed in a myriad of ways,
both domestically and externally” (p. 10).
This view is alternative to “real” and loanable funds theories of capital flows. It goes
beyond Obstfeld’s (2012) view presented in chapter 2, which sees gross positions as repeatedly
exchangeable but ultimately as claims on real resources. It also goes beyond applications
of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis to the boom-bust cycles and financial crises in
emerging markets (Kregel, 1998; Arestis and Glickman, 2002; Schroeder, 2002; Onaran, 2007;
Frenkel and Rapetti, 2009)26. In this line of inquiry, capital flows add to the domestic build-up
of financial fragility in emerging markets. In particular, financial liberalisation - both domestic
and capital account - kicks oﬀ the boom phase of the cycle: high interest rates and good growth
prospects attract foreign capital, which in turn eases the financing conditions in the economy,
increasing the liquidity of financial markets and institutions. The economy will then experience
a credit boom, with rising asset prices. At the same time, the real exchange rate appreciates,
following nominal exchange rate appreciation and/or increasing prices of non-tradable as a
result of the boom in aggregate demand, generating a current account deficit. As the boom
26A full exposition of the financial instability hypothesis is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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proceeds, more economic units will present an increasingly fragile financial structure, by short-
term borrowing, often in foreign currency - as the cost of borrowing abroad is lower, given
the interest rate spread and the real exchange rate appreciation of the domestic currency. At
some point, however, the fragility of the economy would be such that either some endogenously
generated problems occur in the domestic economy (e.g. a bank failure), or international
investors start to doubt the soundness of the economy and begin to decrease their exposure to
it or even speculate against its currency. Either way, financial fragility will quickly turn into
a financial crash, with the dramatic fall of the exchange rate and higher interest rates, which
will create extremely serious situations for economic units.
While these theories accurately depict the dynamics of the emerging markets’ crises in the
late ’90s, recent events cast doubts about their validity as a general theory of open economy
boom-bust cycles. The pre-2008 cycle of capital flows to emerging markets presents some
substantial diﬀerences from the story outlined above. First of all, most emerging markets
had solid “fundamentals”, such as government fiscal soundness, or they contained firms’ and
banks’ leverage; secondly, they received massive capital inflows despite their current account
surpluses, which in some Asian countries were remarkable; thirdly, the highly destructive
phenomena of currency and maturity mismatches were largely not present; fourthly, they
accumulated unprecedented levels of foreign exchange reserves, as a shield against both the
likelihood and the consequences of a financial crisis. Despite all of the above, in late 2008,
massive capital outflows from emerging markets, with asset deflations and exchange rate falls,
and a generalised, albeit less severe than in the past, economic crisis. Theories that ultimately
link financial crashes to unstable domestic financial systems, and those in which capital flows
simply amplify or trigger phases of the cycle, are therefore not well equipped to analyse
the recent trends of financial globalisation. Therefore, the existing literature’s application of
Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis to balance-of-payments crises cannot be considered a
generally applicable characterisation of capital flows cycles, to the extent it tends to place an
unnecessary high focus on current accounts and domestic credit booms27.
Theoretically, the limitations of these theories can be traced back to their insuﬃciently
27This does not mean that such characterisations are not useful anymore. For example, emerging eastern
european economies in the 2002-2007 period have experienced a boom-bust cycle of capital flows that could
arguably be consistent with those theories.
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clear distinction between gross and net capital flows. Once it is recognised that current ac-
count imbalances do not necessarily play a role in open economy financial crises, since a great
deal of capital flows consist in portfolio transactions, it becomes clear that boom-bust cycles
may therefore be largely detached from domestic financial conditions, as much of the current
empirical literature also confirms. In a monetary economy, the determinants of capital flows
need to be understood as the determinants of such “portfolio transactions”, which may or may
not be related to the build-up of internal financial fragility, and the dynamics of the current
account.
A final word of caution is in order. De-emphasising current accounts does not imply that
these are irrelevant for exchange rates. As Lavoie (2014, p. 494) claims, current accounts in
the long-run tend to determine the appreciation or depreciation trends of a currency, with
capital flows having a short-term impact but often resulting in an opposite eﬀect in the long-
run. The contention of this dissertation is that, although current accounts, as implied by the
logic of Stock-Flow Consistency, guide the long-run trends of exchange rates, movements in
capital flows are often sizable and quick enough to counterbalance these long-run trends in the
short-run, so that the long-run equilibrium exchange rate may not always be reached before
the direction of capital flows change again.
3.2.2 Fundamental uncertainty, currency hierarchy and liquidity cy-
cles
As discussed in section 3.1, post-Keynesian economists have long emphasised the role liquid-
ity preference in an uncertain world. In financial markets, portfolio transactions by economic
units are considered to depend largely on conventions, and the belief about how the market
as a whole will align to such evolving conventions. In the context of the open-economy, post-
Keynesian theory has especially focused on the determination of the exchange rate as a result
of such mechanisms.
The work of Harvey (2010) is probably the most renowned application of post-Keynesian
concepts of uncertainty and expectations to the theory of exchange rates and capital flows.
The theory is chiefly based on the concept of fundamental uncertainty, whereby expectations
about asset prices are mostly based on conventions and psychological factors, in the absence of
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stable probability functions. Market sentiment is therefore the crucial determinant of financial
market expectations, which drive short-term capital flows and in turn exchange rates.
Under this view, capital flows and foreign exchange markets are a prime example of a
“beauty contest”. Fundamentals may play a role only insofar as they represents relevant in-
dicators to drive exchange rates in the future, as participants are “guided by mental models
of the currency market that are in turn based on experience and scholarly and professional
research” (Harvey, 2006, p. 164). However technical factors, as well as behavioural factors are
likely to be just as pervasive.
Other post-Keynesian authors also start from liquidity preference, but take a less “funda-
mentalist” 28 approach. The theoretical framework of reference is the theory of the own rate
of interest in Keynes’ GT chapter 17, which has also been discussed in section 3.1. Accord-
ingly, diﬀerent assets have diﬀerent liquidity premia, depending on their ability to function as
a means of payment or store of value, and have a corresponding rate of return. In the open
economy the crucial aspect determining an asset’s liquidity is its currency of denomination.
Capital flows must therefore be understood in relation to the conditions of the international
monetary structure, which determine the liquidity of currencies. Some post-Keynesian authors
have characterised this with the notion of “currency hierarchy”, according to which diﬀerent
currencies have diﬀerent liquidity premia, based on their ability to store value and exchange
medium (Terzi, 2005; Andrade and Prates, 2013). In this hierarchy emerging markets remain
in a lower position, with their currency being exchangeable internationally but only working
as a limited store of value, and therefore carrying a low liquidity premium. This contributes
to justify the high interest rates that assets in emerging markets generally oﬀer compared to
assets denominated in core currencies.
Kaltenbrunner (2011, 2015) expands this view, developing a comprehensive framework for
the analysis of the exchange rate and capital flows, mostly based on the work of Minsky (1975).
The central contention of her work is that a currency’s liquidity premium does not only depend
on its role as a store of value, but is crucially determined by its ability to be used to meet
outstanding obligations; that is, to use assets denominated in that currency to cover liabilities
funded in the reserve - core - currencies.
28In the sense of Coddington (1976).
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Several factors will in turn aﬀect this ability. First is the stock of a country’s foreign
liabilities, which comprises the foreign currency debt boom-bust “Minskyan” cycles described
above. Kaltenbrunner however also goes beyond that, in arguing that any accumulation of
foreign liabilities exposes the country to heavier impacts on its financial and currency stability.
Second is the ability to generate foreign currency flows to meet outstanding obligations through
income generation, i.e. through trade and net factor income surpluses - a condition which
emerging markets unsurprisingly often seek to achieve. Finally is the ability to face foreign
liability commitments by selling assets, including the “institutional liquidity” of a country’s
financial markets.
In synthesis, a country’s currency will have a higher liquidity premium, the lower its (net)
exposure to foreign investors, and the higher its capacity to face those obligations through
either income/balance sheet flows or portfolio transactions. In determining a currency’s liq-
uidity premium, any indicator of the evolution of these factors could therefore be regarded as
a “Keynesian fundamental”, around which market conventions will be catalysed. Foreign ex-
change reserves in particular can be interpreted as a crucial determinant of emerging markets
currency liquidity, since they eﬀectively represent a country-level hedge of foreign liabilities.
Indeed, the primary role of foreign exchange reserves is precisely to dampen exchange rate
volatility, providing direct support to the “institutional liquidity” of foreign exchange markets.
Emerging markets have historically presented vulnerabilities in all these “Keynesian fun-
damentals”. They have a long history as “bad borrowers”, highly unstable exchange rates, and
in general their currency cannot readily be used to face international liabilities. Emerging
markets assets therefore have lower liquidity premia, and as such occupy a subordinate and
peripheral position among financial assets.
This goes a long way in explaining the equity home-bias “puzzle". Since emerging markets’
currencies cannot be used to face international obligations directly, emerging markets assets
carry a structurally lower liquidity premium, and it is logical to see them in small proportions
within foreign investors’ portfolio. Imperfect asset substitutability is a natural consequence of
a monetary analysis of capital flows, where diﬀerent currencies have diﬀerent capabilities to
serve as money.
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Furthermore, the lower liquidity of emerging markets’ currencies makes them subject to
unstable patterns of capital flows and exchange rates. These patterns, as Biancareli (2009,
2011) argues, can be characterised as “liquidity cycles”. Capital flows to emerging markets are
always “a consequence of a reduction in liquidity preference in the international level” (p. 9).
This is because, in addition to the inherent instability of contemporary capital flows, emerg-
ing markets face the additional problems of being in a subordinate position in the currency
hierarchy: emerging markets assets, being a risky non-core part of an investors’ portfolios -
due to the lower liquidity of their currency of denomination - are subject to sudden losses of
confidence and thus likely to be liquidated quickly in times of turmoil. “Hence, the power
of domestic “fundamentals” — which can, of course, reinforce a trend already in progress or
compensate its eﬀects — are clearly subordinated to more important forces” (Biancareli, 2009,
p. 11). Momentum strategies and “herding” behaviour appear in this light less “puzzling”.
The theory of currency hierarchy is therefore a powerful component for the analysis of
capital flows to emerging markets. In line with the discussions made in the previous section,
capital flows are seen as monetary transactions, resulting from international investors’ chang-
ing liquidity preference, and the interaction that such a preference depends on the liquidity
premium of currencies – i.e. their ability to be used as ‘money’29 The specificity of emerging
markets lies in the lower liquidity of their currencies, which makes their assets a peripheral
and more volatile component of investors’ portfolio.
3.2.3 International asset demand
In sum, the extension of the key features of post-Keynesian monetary theory to the context
of capital flows and emerging markets can be syntehsised in seven main points:
29 Indeed, as Biancareli (2009, p. 5) suggests, “liquidity cycles” could even replace the term capital flows
due to the latter’s association with the idea of a foreign savings/current account analysis, whereas the focus
should be on private financial capital, which “seems to move without any close relation with the current account
result”.
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1. Firstly, it allows for the recognition that capital flows are flows of funds, coming from
and going to money stocks, and therefore pertaining to the analysis of capital account
changes;
2. Secondly, as a result, the focus should be on gross rather than net flows, as the latter
simply reflect the financial transaction related to income flows, whereas international
flows can be several times higher than their net result;
3. Thirdly, in today’s world, most of these flows of funds are portfolio transactions - i.e.
purchases and sales of assets;
4. Fourthly, an economic unit’s portfolio choice at the international level remains subject
to fundamental uncertainty, in particular, with respect to the currency of denomination;
5. Fifthly, a crucial determinant of portfolio choice will be therefore the liquidity of the cur-
rency, which in turn depends on the systemic “Keynesian fundamentals” that determine
the ability of such currency to be used to face liabilities. This provides a clear rationale
for the notion of imperfect asset substitutability;
6. Sixthly, capital flows result from the changing liquidity preferences of international in-
vestors;
7. Seventhly, due to lower liquidity of their currency, emerging markets are a peripheral
components of portfolios, which results in cyclical and volatile capital flows;
Capital flows can be understood here as international asset demand, the demand that foreign
investors have for a country’s assets. They are the result of a financial decision rather than a
real one, and will therefore be subject, in line with the post-Keynesian literature, to liquidity
preference considerations. Emerging markets are at a disadvantage, due to the lower liquidity of
their currency, which makes their financial assets by definition a marginal and risky investment,
subject to greater volatility of demand.
These elements are key to a proper understanding of the patterns of capital flows and
address most of the criticisms raised at the end of chapter 2, chiefly the full appreciation of
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the monetary nature of the phenomenon of capital flows. However, they do not fully address
the issue of the nature of investors. To paraphrase Kalecki, countries do not invest as a whole30,
and therefore it is important to understand which economic units within countries are investing
in foreign assets and why, and as such locate these theories within the historical developments
of the financial system. Kaltenbrunner (2011) does in fact acknowledge the importance of
distinguishing between diﬀerent types of investors, as the behaviour and motives of diﬀerent
institutions may diﬀer.
There is therefore a need to understand the role of the diﬀerent sectors in shaping the
dynamics of gross financial flows. To do so it is important to assess the institutional charac-
teristics of the financial system in contemporary capitalism. This will be the task of the next
section.
3.3 The rise of institutional investors
Understanding gross capital flows, according to the ideas put forward in the previous
section, necessitates going beyond abstract theoretical concepts. Innovation, following Schum-
peter, is a key characteristic of a capitalist economic system. Understanding capitalism as a
monetary economy thus requires an historical analysis of the evolution of the financial system.
In this section it is argued that a key development in the financial markets has been the
emergence of institutional investors. The analysis financial globalisation and capital flows to
emerging markets, needs therefore to take into account the pivotal role of institutional investors
in contemporary financial markets.
3.3.1 Money-Managers and the Theory of Capital Market Inflation
Innovations in the financial sector have been at the forefront of the evolution of late 20th
century capitalism. As the literature on “financialisation” shows31, the role of financial in-
stitutions and practices has experienced considerable changes over the past three decades,
30With the notable exception of foreign exchange reserves accumulation.
31The literature is extremely vast. See Stockhammer (2012) for theoretical review of the recent themes. See
also Toporowski (2012b) for a critical overview.
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considerably aﬀecting households, non-financial firms, banks and economic policies. Specific
stylised facts include: the push for “shareholder value” creation by non-financial firms, the
rise of household debt, innovations in the financial markets ( e.g. the creation of new asset
classes such as derivatives), the change in banking practices towards fee-generating business
and the creation of “shadow banking” system, the dominance of market-based over bank-based
financial systems, the liberalisation of international capital accounts.
The diversity of the views and facts raised by diﬀerent authors suggest the richness and the
importance of the “financialisation” debate. On the other hand they highlight the diﬃculty
in finding a common framework of analysis, as the extremely broad definition which is gener-
ally used for financialisation suggests: “financialization means the increasing role of financial
motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the
domestic and international economies” Epstein (2005, p. 3). It is hard to disagree that this
definition is clearly relevant for the analysis of modern capitalism. However it is similarly
hard, as Toporowski (2012b) argues, to formulate a coherent theory that goes beyond such a
definition and the observation of some sketchy, albeit important, empirical facts32.
One of the most important financial system developments of the past thirty years is the
rise of institutional investors as key actors in the financial markets and in the economy in
general. This was the result of the increasing institutionalisation of household savings, espe-
cially through the inauguration of funded pension schemes, which has characterised (primar-
ily) Anglo-Saxon countries since the late ’70s. Institutional investors and asset managers, as
claimed by Grahl and Lysandrou (2006), have become a mass industry serving large parts of
the population, so that they eﬀectively determine the very large trading volume that exists in
capital markets nowadays. The importance of institutional investors for contemporary capi-
talism is also highlighted by the fact that some scholars, quite independently from each other,
have addressed it as the most important development in modern economies, going so far as to
dub contemporary capitalism as “pension fund capitalism” or “money-manager capitalism”.
Hyman Minsky was one of the first scholars to recognise the relevance of the rise of “money-
managers” for the structure of American - and global - capitalism. While Minsky is mostly
32The concept of financialisation has also been applied to the context of developing countries and their
external relationship by Powell (2013). See alsoBonizzi (2013) for a more general review of the literature on
financialisation and developing countries.
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known for his “Keynes-inspired” theories of the business cycle, which gave rise to the Wall-
Street paradigm and the Financial Instability Hypothesis, in the late stages of his career he
focused on long-term trends of capitalism development. His work starts from a reappraisal of
Schumpeter33 who, along Marx and Keynes, “define the problem that economic theory must
explain as the path of development of an accumulating capitalist economy through historical
time”, which “do not lead to smooth progress but rather to ’explosions’ and breakdowns ...
crises are the normal result of the capitalist process” (Minsky, 1983a, p. 2). This gives rise
to a view of “economies as evolving systems, systems that exist in history and change in
response to endogenous factors ... history doesn’t lead to an end of history” (Minsky, 1992b,
p. 104). Hence, there is a need to formulate historically grounded theories: “He [Minsky]
firmly believed that general theories are either plainly wrong, or are simply too general to be
of any use ... institutions must be brought into the analysis at the beginning; useful theory is
institution-specific” (Papadimitriou and Wray, 1998, p. 201).
Charles Whalen (2001), who worked with Minsky in the development of his theory of
capitalist development (Minsky and Whalen, 1996), has summarised the four key features
of such a view. Firstly, there is the focus, as in Schumpeter, on the role of credit and the
financial structure in driving capitalist dynamics: a credit system, i.e. “a set of institutions
that were not dependent on prior savings in order to finance investment” (Minsky, 1983a, p.
15), is a necessary component of a capitalist economy. Borrowing Schumpeter’s expressions,
Minsky argued that the banker is the ephor of market economies, thus eﬀectively being the
“overseer” of the economy and deciding, by (not) providing credit, what “enter the realm of
the possible” (Minsky, 1992b, p. 106). Secondly, Minsky highlighted the importance of profits
as key determinants of capitalist dynamics:
“among the players in financial markets are entrepreneurial profit-seekers who
innovate. As a result these markets evolve in response to profit opportunities
which emerge as the productive apparatus changes. The evolutionary properties
33While praising Schumpeter’s views on credit and capitalist development, Minsky was also highly critical of
the inconsistency in Schumpeter’s works. He especially blamed his ambiguous relations with Walrasian general
equilibrium theories, which he found inconsistent with his early views as expressed in “The theory of economic
development” (Minsky, 1983b, 1992b).
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of market economies are evident in the changing structure of financial institutions
as well as in the productive structure”(Minsky, 1992b, p. 106).
Thirdly, in a sense combining the previous two points, innovations in the financial sector
are also dynamic forces. The financial sector, being driven by profits like any other sector,
is constantly evolving through time so that “the ephor is itself endogenously determined”
(Minsky, 1992b, p. 106). Finally, Minsky recognised the role of policy as driver of change.
The banker is the only ephor if there is no central authority supervision over the economy, but,
once it recognised that economic changes endogenously generate instability, the importance
of the government and the central bank “as the ephor of the ephor of the financial structure”
(Minsky, 1988a, p. 10) becomes central.
With this theoretical framework Minsky analysed the evolution of US capitalism. He di-
vided it into four stages: commercial, finance, managerial and money manager capitalism34.
Money manager capitalism emerges out of the relative stable phase of managerial capitalism,
with the institutionalisation of funded pension schemes which integrated and/or replaced so-
cial security system based pensions. This led to vast accumulation of savings stocks that were
entrusted to external fund managers, who became the new key actors in the economy. The
behavior of these managers led to remarkable changes in the economy. Firstly, with the the
rise of managed-money funds most companies shares were actively traded by money-managers,
whose sole interest is to maximise the financial return of their managed portfolios, resulting in
major emphasis by corporate managers on short-term profits and companies’ valuation. Sec-
ondly, since fund managers do not generally value control and long-term holding of securities,
they tend of accept “oﬀers” that improve their portfolio, hence facilitating securities exchange
for the purpose of highly speculative merger and acquisitions activities such as leveraged buy-
outs. Thirdly, money-manager capitalism increases the scope for international diversification,
as money managers are always striving to find ways to improve their returns. Finally, money
managers will also tend to exhibit herding and momentum behaviour, given by the incentives
to follow benchmarks of their performance evaluation structure (Menkhoﬀ, 2002; Wray, 2009;
34We focus here only on the last stage. See (Minsky, 1988a, 1992b; Whalen, 2001) for a complete overview
of the first three.
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Liang, 2011).
Another useful theoretical framework to analyse the increasing importance of institutional
investors is “the theory of capital market inflation”, which was formulated by Toporowski
(2002) and subsequently developed in later works (Toporowski, 2010). The theory provides
a disequilibrium - alternative to standard finance theory inspired by various versions of the
eﬃcient market hypothesis and the capital asset pricing model - theory of financial markets
mechanism. It argues that the inflows of funds into the capital markets is what eﬀectively
determines the general level of security prices: whenever the supply of equity capital is higher
than demand by firms, a net excess inflow of funds enters capital markets. This net excess
inflow is traded within the market by financial intermediaries and inflates the price of securities.
This process lasts “until eﬀective prices reach a level that elicits the issue of suﬃcient new stock
to take up the positive net inflow, or until the positive inflow ceases” (p. 34). Once the supply
of equity capital becomes smaller than its demand and the cumulated excess inflows dry up,
the rising illiquidity leads to deflation.
The historical process, according to Toporowski (2002), that originated the process of
capital market inflation was the creation of funded pension schemes in the late 70’s35. The
introduction of pension funds created a huge and sudden inflow of funds into the equity markets
that pushed up securities price. At the same time the decline of funded pension schemes poses
an ultimate constraint on the process of capital market inflation: as pension funds reach
“maturity”, i.e. the situation by which the pensions expenses exceed the contributions, the
decline of their investment will lead to more “bearish” markets and eventually to deflation.
Thus in the the long-run capital market inflation is unsustainable, creating potential issues for
both pensioners security and financial stability more in general.
There are clearly points in common with the theory of capital market inflation and the
economics of Minsky. Indeed Toporowski (2002, p. 6) considers Minsky as “the writer whose
work is most immediately developed in this book”, and in a later paper (Toporowski, 2000,
p. 4-6) he specifies the links between his theory and those of Minsky, suggesting two main
points of connection. The first is Minsky’s concept of “layering”, the “pile” of claims that
35Indeed the subtitle of the book refers to “capital market inflation, financial derivatives and pension fund
capitalism”.
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units have on each other in the financial system which, in the case of a large-scale inability to
meet such claims in a sub-sector of the economy, could bring about the generalised collapse
of the system. Toporowski argues that this is in fact the situation with pension funds: in a
situation of suﬃciently large-scale maturity, the need to sell assets in order to meet pension
liabilities would make the security prices collapse, thus generating widespread insolvency in
the pension fund sector. Secondly, Toporowski refers to Minsky’s famous taxonomy of the
financing structure and argues that the current structure of the capital market is essentially a
big Ponzi scheme, in which units seek capital gains that depend on a continued inflow of funds
into the market.
A more general, albeit implicit, link between Toporowski’s and Minsky’s theories, is the
focus on the liability side of balance sheets as a determinant of investment choices. Just as
Minsky’s economic units choose their asset composition on the basis of their liability struc-
ture, in the theory of capital market inflation institutional investors will purchase securities
depending on the maturity and size of their liabilities. This is most clearly expressed in a sub-
sequent paper (Toporowski, 2010), where it is argued that institutional investors’ net purchase
of equity depends on their net cash flows: whenever the contributions to the funds exceed the
net payments of liabilities, institutional investors will have spare cash to invest in equities. As
it will be argued throughout the dissertation, beyond cash flows, the structure of liabilities is
likely to have a more general impact on the asset allocation of institutional investors, and on
their “risk-appetite” in particular.
The theory of “capital market inflation” and Minsky’s concept of “money manager capi-
talism” suggest that the historical development of western capitalism has given institutional
investors a central position in the economy. These investors are among the most important
originators of portfolio transactions in today’s economy, and therefore their behaviour is cru-
cial to understanding the patterns of financial claims, balance sheets and transactions. The
view taken here therefore claims the need to link the insights put forward by the theories
of economic development about the changing role of finance through the rise of institutional
investors, with a theoretical framework grounded in post-Keynesian monetary theory, as de-
veloped in the previous section. In this sense, Toporowski’s theory of capital market inflation,
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which adopts a similar approach, represents the most important and direct inspiration for the
theoretical framework of this dissertation.
3.3.2 Institutional investors and global financial flows
The view that institutional investors are increasingly important in today’s financial markets
has become widespread in recent years. Recent work by the Bank of England (Haldane, 2011,
2014), the IMF (2011; 2014) and the Bank for International Settlements (Miyajima and Shim,
2014; BIS, 2011), amongst others, confirm that understanding institutional investors’ portfolio
choice is key to addressing important global financial stability issues, including the movements
of capital flows to emerging markets. This view is generally shared by authors working in
the post-Keynesian and institutionalist tradition, who argue that institutional investors have
become prominent actors in financial markets – including in emerging markets –, not always
with positive consequences (Harmes, 2001; Frenkel and Menkhoﬀ, 2004; Liang, 2011). The
empirical relevance of these phenomena will be discussed in the next chapter.
The removal of restrictions to capital flows across several countries has made it possible
for institutional investors to invest in foreign assets rather easily. Indeed, it could be argued
that the growth of international portfolio transactions by institutional investors is an essential
characteristic of modern capitalism. Minsky (1988b, p. 35) suggested that as managed funds
grow, international portfolio diversification is likely to be an increasingly common phenomenon.
He also pointed out that “the international dimension of the movements from institutions to
markets for financing is that the exports and import of capital increasingly takes the form of
the purchase of managed and international portfolio diversification by managers of money”
(Minsky, 1988a, p. 10). The view that financial globalisation and the institutionalisation of
savings are closely linked is expressed by Braasch (2010, p. 2):
“The institutionalisation of savings is one of the main drivers of financial global-
isation. Given the rapid increase in inflows to such large, cross-border institutional
investors, the search for yield and for ways of diversifying risk has forced portfolio
84
managers, working in a highly competitive environment, to channel more funds into
hitherto relatively peripheral markets, which are less correlated with one another”
Moreover this is linked to the understanding of international financial fragility at the macroe-
conomic level (p. 3):
“If the behavior of key global market players is not understood, it will be impos-
sible to understand the process of financial globalisation or to achieve significant
progress in analysing the causes and implications of financial crises ... This is not
about gaining an insight into individual investors’ strategies, but about obtaining
better data at the aggregate level, in other words for the main investor groups, in
order to assess market dynamics, to achieve better and more timely monitoring.”
This is the key link between the analysis of portfolio choice, and the international macroeco-
nomic analysis of financial globalisation. Portfolio shifts by institutional investors are a crucial
determinant of capital flows in today’s world. It is certainly not the only one: international
bank credit, short-term highly speculative carry-trade operations by hedge funds or other
financial institutions and long-term productive foreign direct investments clearly represent im-
portant components of gross capital flows. Nevertheless, given the importance and the size of
institutional investors in the modern economy, they are likely to be one of the most important
sources of international transactions.
Importantly, the pivotal role of institutional investors reinforces the asymmetry between
advanced and emerging markets. As the discussion in the previous subsection makes clear,
and the next chapter will show the rise of institutional investors is predominantly a phe-
nomenon that occurred in advanced economies36. This only serves to reinforce the dominance
of core countries currencies, given that institutional investors would prefer their assets to be
denominated in the currency of the country they are located, and in which their liabilities are
36An exception to this is the very recent rise of sovereign wealth funds.
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denominated. Furthermore, due to the lack of a domestic investor base in emerging markets,
the liquidity of their financial markets – beside that of the foreign exchange market – will be
lower and dependent on foreign investors. This further strengthens the view that capital flows
to emerging markets are eﬀectively the outcome of foreign private portfolio decisions.
Capital flows to emerging markets are thus here analysed as the demand for emerging
markets’ assets by institutional investors, the flow of funds that institutional investors move
from/to emerging countries’ financial markets Figure 3.1. However, equipped with the theories
discussed so far in this chapter, it is clear that motives beyond “diversification” are likely to
be relevant. This is what the following section will describe.
Figure 3.1: Theoretical framework
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3.4 Institutional investors decisions and capital flows to
emerging markets
The determinants of capital flows to emerging markets must be based on the understanding
of what leads institutional investors to change their demand of their assets. In line with all
of the theoretical arguments presented so far, figure Figure 3.2 presents an overview of the
various channels through which their demands for emerging market assets are determined.
Figure 3.2: Institutional investors channels
Similarly to chapter 2, the first broad category of determinants can be defined as the
characteristics of the assets. Any factor that aﬀects the risk/return profile of an asset falls into
this category. Financial market factors, such as historical volatility and returns, or domestic
economic “fundamentals” such as economic growth, or global factors such as commodity prices
or the Federal Reserve monetary policy represent renowned examples of this. Countries’
political stability may also aﬀect the view of the overall riskiness of an asset. These factors all
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aﬀect the desirability of an asset according to the traditional theory of portfolio diversification.
However, in line with the views presented in the preceding sections, a much more promi-
nent role needs to be given to liquidity considerations. “Keynesian fundamentals”, in partic-
ular, determine currency liquidity and therefore the liquidity and stability of a country as a
whole. These vary according to the historical and country-specific context, but aﬀect what
is ultimately a country’s ability to face its external obligations. The accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves, a major development over the past fifteen years in emerging markets, may
well be liquidity-enhancing from this point of view, as it acts as a systemic buﬀer against
currency swings and insolvency on foreign liabilities.
The second broad category is investors’ liquidity preference, which again resembles the
conventional views about the “risk appetite” channel. Global risk appetite in much of the
“mainstream” literature is measured by the general level of market volatility, which induces
investors to reallocate their portfolio to more/less risky assets. A post-Keynesian interpretation
would relate this to fundamental uncertainty about expectations and the general state of
general confidence in financial markets. In a dynamic “Minskyan” sense, good news slowly
increase risk appetite, and reduce liquidity preference, and conversely, financial fragility often
turns into a crash due to panic spreading, as in Biancareli (2009, 2011) theory of “liquidity
cycles”. Peer-pressures and benchmark following can also exacerbate such processes to magnify
the co-movement of liquidity preference and asset prices.
However, risk appetite and liquidity preference are not purely “behavioural” phenomena,
but are also aﬀected by institutional investors’ balance sheets. In line with Minsky’s and
Toporowski’s theories, the asset structure of an economic unit needs to be assessed in rela-
tion to the associated liabilities, which are therefore an essential component of investment
decisions. Institutional investors’ liabilities, however, are of a peculiar nature since they are
contractual long-term obligations, such as future pension incomes to be paid and technical
provisions for insurance policies, rather than debt commitments. Institutional investors thus
have small margins of choice in the determination of their liability structure and the cash flow
commitments resulting from them. They can change the oﬀer of their products - which is
indeed going with the shift from defined benefits to defined contribution pension schemes -
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but they clearly lack the flexibility of banks or other investors that manage their short-term
funding sources on a daily basis. Since the liability structure is relatively rigid, the asset
allocation is the institutional investors’ main level of decision.
A key contention of this dissertation is that the financial conditions of institutional in-
vestors’ liabilities are crucial in determining their liquidity preference. Such investors have
often promised - or at least target - rates of returns; this determines the size of their liabilities,
and their main goal is to ensure that their assets are large - and liquid - enough to cover such
obligations. In conditions of low returns, assets will grow at a slower rate than liabilities, thus
generating potential financial troubles in the long run. As a result, they will engage in a search
for assets that can produce suﬃcient returns to match their long-term liabilities. These assets
may include emerging market bonds and equities which, although less liquid and riskier, do in
general promise higher rates of return.
This mechanism eﬀectively implies a reduction in liquidity preference – or an increase in
risk appetite – although, rather than a genuine preference or appetite, it is more a “forced”
search, induced by the liability structure. This process from a purely theoretical possibility.
“Liability-driven investment”, as it will be discussed in the next chapter, is an increasingly
popular investment paradigm amongst pension funds, whose primary purpose is precisely to
put liabilities at the core of the operations of institutional investors (BIS, 2011).
The third broad category aﬀecting institutional investors asset demand is regulation and
other institutional mechanisms. These may for instance be changes in macroeconomic regula-
tions at the international level, such as capital controls or financial transaction taxes, which
may promote or contain cross-border investments. On the other hand, there may be domestic
regulations and accounting rules that could have a significant eﬀect on institutional investors’
portfolio choice. For example, it is likely that regulations that impose capital requirements
on institutional investors, such as Solvency II for insurance companies in Europe, may pose a
restraint on investments in risky assets, which could aﬀect negatively the size and stability of
emerging markets investments.
Finally, although not crucial in the post-Keynesian literature, informational asymmetries
and other market frictions may indeed aﬀect the way many of these channels work. For
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example, agency problems may aﬀect the institutional decisions of a pension fund, or high
information acquisition costs may reduce and/or make more volatile the demand for emerging
markets assets.
To provide a realistic picture of the current trend of capital flows, it is important to
analyse what cyclical and structural factors are - or will be - pushing, through these channels,
institutional investors to increase their portfolio allocations towards emerging markets assets.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter has developed an alternative approach for the analysis of capital flows to
emerging markets. It has been argued that to adequately understand their determinants,
the analysis should seek to move beyond the limitations that can be found in the current
mainstream literature. These consists in the over-aggregation of investors into a single category
at the macroeconomic level, the consideration of an often too narrow range of portfolio choice
determinants, and the real rather than monetary nature of much of the analysis of capital
flows.
By assessing the debates on monetary theory in the post-Keynesian literature this chapter
has argued that capital flows need to be analysed within a “monetary economy” framework,
where money is part of the analysis from the beginning, as opposed to entering as a “friction”
in more sophisticated levels of analysis. The supply of credit money as purchasing power -
and primarily to finance investment - and the demand for liquid assets as store value - for
either speculative or precautionary reasons - are a central component of a capitalist economy.
Liquidity preference is thus understood as a theory of asset choice, that is relevant for all
the macro-sectors in the economy. Particularly useful in this sense is Minsky’s Wall Street
paradigm, that conceptualise economic units as balance sheets, whose assets generate cash
flows and liabilities generate cash commitments.
In the context of the open economy, capital flows need therefore to be understood as
international “flows of funds” between units as opposed to real resources flows. In this sense,
the traditional analysis of capital flows on the basis of current accounts is particularly limited,
as it only analyses a portion of total capital flows, namely the part that settles trade and
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net factor income transactions (income and balance sheet flows in Minsky’s terminology).
However, flows unrelated to trade or net factor income (portfolio transactions in Minsky’s
terminology) have surged in the past decade. Hence the need to focus on gross as opposed to
net capital flows.
Applying liquidity preference theory to cross-border investment points to the key role of
exchange rates. In particular, Keynes’ own rate of interest theory gives rise to the notion of a
“currency hierarchy”, in which countries’ currencies have diﬀerent liquidity premia, according
to their ability to work as store of value, and especially their usage as a mean to face liabilities.
Emerging markets’ middle-ground position in the currency makes them subject to swings in
global liquidity preference, profoundly aﬀecting their financial market stability.
The chapter has then assessed which important developments in the institutional structure
of western capitalism, particularly in the financial sector, are relevant for the understanding
of gross capital flows. It was pointed out that a major structural development is the rise of
institutional investors and their managers, as key actors in modern economies, so that some
authors have called the present stage “money-manager” or “pension-fund” capitalism.
Finally, the chapter has analysed the rising role of institutional investors in light of the
framework on gross capital flows to emerging markets. Capital flows can be the demand for
their assets by foreign institutional investors. It was argued that the decisions by managers
to invest in emerging markets are aﬀected by economic factors through three main categories:
the asset risk/return characteristics which include the considerations made about liquidity
and currency hierarchy, investors’ risk-appetite, particularly in relation to their liabilities, and
institutional decision mechanisms and regulation.
Combined, these theoretical arguments help overcoming the limitations of conventional
literature highlighted in chapter 2, and set out a useful theoretical framework for the analysis
of capital flows to emerging markets. The view expressed here argues that the analysis of
the impact of recent events - such as the global financial crisis - through these channels may
provide a useful framework to assess the current trends in capital flows to emerging markets.
As these countries become increasingly integrated and attract capital flows, such a frame-
work would point to improvements in their “Keynesian fundamentals”, such as the accumu-
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lation of foreign exchange reserves and the reduction of foreign currency debt, which would
enhance the “institutional liquidity” of their currency. On the other hand, the low interest
rate environment could pressure institutional investors to search for riskier assets that may
ensure them enough returns to cover their growing liabilities. This second channel is likely to
be very important, as the prospect of rising interest rates in advanced countries may not only
reduce diﬀerentials in returns, but may also signal an improvement in institutional investors’
liabilities, which could decrease their demand for risky assets. The recent fall in the demand
for emerging markets’ assets was, in fact, also triggered by the prospect of a rise in the federal
funds rates.
Evaluating the validity of these intuitions, and assessing their implications will be the task
of the following chapters.
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Chapter 4
Empirical evidence on capital flows
and institutional investors holdings
of emerging markets assets
Introduction
This chapter will provide some descriptive empirical findings based on the theoretical frame-
work presented in the previous chapter, as well as background evidence with respect to this
thesis’ research hypotheses. It focuses on three key ingredients discussed in the previous
chapter: emerging markets financial integration, institutional investors, and the Keynesian
“fundamentals” of emerging markets’ assets.
As argued in the previous chapter, a monetary analysis of capital flows requires the assess-
ment of gross flows and their composition. This is covered in section 4.1, which shows how the
integration of emerging markets 37 into the global financial system has been largely driven by
the expansion of foreign private inflows, which do not seem to follow the dynamics of current
accounts. The mirror image of capital inflows has been the accumulation of foreign exchange
37Emerging markets are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India, In-
donesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey.
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reserves, pointing out once again the subordinate nature of these countries in the process of
financial globalisation. The section also documents how institutional investors have played an
increasingly important role in this process, especially since the crisis.
Section 4.2 locates the increasing demand for emerging markets assets in the historical
evolution of institutional investors’ operations. It discusses the changes in institutional in-
vestors’ asset allocation, highlighting their relation to liabilities, and regulatory and institu-
tional changes. It will be shown that the demand for emerging market assets fits into the
broader changes in institutional investors’ portfolio choice, driven by their increasing concern
- partially induced by regulation - about liabilities. In this framework emerging market assets
are part of a larger movements towards “alternative” asset classes to enhance portfolio returns,
while simultaneously reducing allocation to conventional return-seeking assets, i.e. domestic
equity.
Section 4.3 explores the attractiveness of the the risk/return profile of emerging markets
assets, with particular reference to the “Keynesian fundamentals” that make these countries
less risky from a systemic point of view. It will be shown that the decade prior to the crisis saw
considerable improvements on several grounds, thus validating investors’ behaviour. However,
in the most recent period, this relationship seems to have weakened, with fundamentals being
constant or mildly deteriorating, despite a continuous inflow of foreign funds.
The final section concludes.
4.1 Emerging Markets and the global financial system
4.1.1 Financial globalisation
Financial integration, through the growth of cross-border capital flows and holdings ex-
panded substantially over the past two decades. The process started in the 1980’s but really
took oﬀ in the 2000’s, and despite a slowdown in 2008, has kept increasing after the crisis.
While the phenomenon is most prominent in advanced economies, emerging markets have be-
come increasingly integrated too, and now account for about 10% of the total international
positions38.
38Source: own calculation based on IMF balance of payment statistics. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007);
Lund et al. (2013) for a discussion.
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Figure 4.1 shows the steady expansion of international balance sheet positions in emerging
markets. Emerging markets foreign assets and liabilities have steadily increased in absolute
terms since the early 1990’s, picking up especially after 2003. As of 2013, assets and liabilities
have increased to about 15 USD trillions, about six times as big as their level at the turn of
the century. Looking at the same figures as a share of GDP (Figure 4.2), emerging markets
foreign liabilities have grown from about 40% in the early 1990’s to about 65% in 2013, which
is remarkable considering the growth performance of these countries over the past fifteen years.
The global financial crisis from this perspective looks like a dip, though a significant one, in a
secular upward trend. The speed of the trend however has slowed down since the crisis.
Figure 4.1: International investment position
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Source: Author’s calculations based on updated and extended version of dataset constructed
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS)
95
Figure 4.2: International investment position - % GDP
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Source: Author’s calculations based on updated and extended version of dataset constructed
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS)
Interestingly, the growth of foreign assets and foreign liabilities follow diﬀerent patterns:
while assets have grown every year as a proportion to GDP, even if at variable paces, liabilities
seem to follow more closely the trends in capital flows cycles. The flat level of foreign liabilities
to GDP in the late 1990’s and early 2000’s marks the impact of the emerging markets’ financial
crises, and similarly their decline in 2008 represents the impact of the global financial crisis. In
those years foreign assets kept growing, although more slowly than in other years. Moreover,
throughout the period foreign liabilities are bigger than foreign assets, indicating a negative
net international investment position for the country group as a whole. These facts indicate
that emerging markets have entered financial globalisation from the liability side, i.e. the
process is first driven by foreign lending and investment, with foreign assets lagging behind
and only recently catching up.
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This can be further inferred by the composition of their international investment posi-
tion. As Figure 4.3 shows, the expansion of foreign liabilities in emerging markets consisted in
increases in all types of flows and holdings, but was driven primarily by foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and portfolio equity liabilities in the 2003-2008 period, with debt-like liabilities
only substantially rising since 2006.
Figure 4.3: Emerging markets international investment position - liabilities
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by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS)
On the other hand, the expansion of emerging markets assets, as shown in Figure 4.4,
is driven by the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. This indicates that emerging
markets foreign assets are mostly the result of central banks hedging against the growing
foreign liabilities of their country as a whole, by investing in foreign exchange reserves39. This
39Foreign exchange reserves could be accumulated for mercanitlist purposes, i.e. the aggressive intervention
to maintain low exchange rates in order to favour exports. On balance, it looks like the evidence points
to the “precautionary” motive as the crucial dimension behind the accumulation of foreign exchang reserves
(Aizenman and Lee, 2007).
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further confirms that for emerging markets financial integration is mostly induced by foreigners
than locals investing abroad. Only in very recent years a sizable growth of FDI from EMs can
be observed.
Figure 4.4: Emerging markets international investment position - assets
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by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and IMF Balance of Payments Statistics (BOPS)
Quarterly figures for capital flows to and from emerging markets (Figure 4.5) broadly
confirm this picture. Inflows and outflows have increased substantially since the mid-2000’s
and have recovered to levels comparable to the pre-crisis peaks. The crisis does not seem to
have lasting eﬀects on the process of financial globalisation in emerging markets. A diﬀerence
between the pre-crisis and the post-crisis situation can be found in the higher levels of gross
inflows compared to outflows, which is mirrored by a smaller current account surplus, as it
will be shown below.
98
Figure 4.5: Capital flows: Emerging Markets
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With respect to their composition, FDI inflows seem to be more stable and remained
positive throughout the entire period. Both portfolio and other inflows are much more volatile,
driving the cyclical movements, and becoming negative in some quarters, most notably in the
fourth quarter of 2008, which resulted in an aggregate negative figure for capital inflows as a
whole. Furthermore, portfolio inflows have grown from 16% in the 2000-2008 period to 27%
in the post-crisis period as a share of total inflows.
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Once again, the mirror image of such cycles is the change in reserves, which accounts for
almost half of total outflows in most quarters throughout the entire period. This is again
particularly clear in 2008, when the figure becomes substantially negative, reflecting the draw-
down in foreign exchange reserves by central banks facing negative capital inflows. Again, it
can be observed that another growing component is in the forms of FDI, reflecting the recent
outward investment expansion of emerging markets’ corporations.
As a whole, these charts show emerging markets increasingly have been increasingly em-
bedded in the process of financial integration, which the crisis in 2008 does not seem to have
substantially aﬀected. However their integration has not occurred in equal terms on their
assets and liability side. These countries have become substantial recipients of foreign invest-
ments, both direct and financial (credit and portfolio). The latter have become more important
after the crisis, and while substantial and growing, have presented a high degree of volatility.
Emerging markets’ response to these trends has been the accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves
Some additional characteristics of capital flows may be inferred from Figure 4.6 and Fig-
ure 4.7. The current account of emerging markets, whose deficits in the late 1990’s, as dis-
cussed in chapter 2, was usually associated with currency and financial crises, has registered
surpluses throughout the 2000’s, reaching a peak of 5% of GDP in 2006. This surplus has
declined markedly during the global financial crisis, and then kept decreasing in recent years,
so that the IMF projections show an eﬀectively balanced position in the next few years.
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Figure 4.6: Emerging markets current account
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Figure 4.7: Emerging markets net flows
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While current account surpluses clearly contributed to the accumulation of reserves through-
out the period, since 2002, these came often with substantial positive net capital inflows.
Especially since 2009, as current accounts surpluses slowly declined, private capital inflows
became especially prominent, representing a larger surplus for emerging markets than current
accounts. Foreign exchange reserves accumulation has been therefore the result of a combi-
nation of both current and capital account surpluses in emerging economies, with the latter
becoming less important since the crisis. This is important, in light of the discussions made
in the previous chapter: the current account can be a source of financial flows, but taken in
isolation is not informative to understand the dynamics of financial globalisation.
In sum, these figures show that the process of financial globalisation for emerging markets is
a relatively new phenomenon but its expansion has been really dramatic, especially in the last
decade. Emerging markets seem to be more subjects than actors in it, receiving capital inflows,
which increasingly take the form of portfolio flows, and accumulating foreign exchange reserves.
With the decline of current account surpluses across the emerging markets world, the dynamics
of the balance of payment and in particular the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves have
become more closely exposed to the private capital inflows, which have substantially increased
but remain volatile. This gives credit to the interpretation of capital flows as the demand for
emerging market assets proposed in the previous chapter.
4.1.2 Emerging markets portfolio holdings by advanced countries
The mirror image of the balance of payment data presented in the previous sub-section,
are cross-border financial holdings. The following figures are from the Coordinate Portfolio
Investment Survey (CPIS) database from the IMF. Through survey-based methods, these
figures seek to establish a complete overview of bilateral cross-country portfolio holdings.
These figures show how, as the process of financial globalisation deepens, emerging markets’
cross-border connections have grown in importance.
Figure 4.8 shows the foreign portfolio holdings of advanced countries. Total foreign holdings
in 2014 have increased by almost four times since their level in 2001, with a particularly steady
increase in the 2002-2007 period. The figure for holdings of emerging markets assets shows a
very similar picture growing overall, but their growth has been more pronounced: emerging
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markets assets holdings by advanced countries grew by more than six times, from around $250
billions to about $2.3 trillions in 2014. As a result, the share of emerging market assets within
advanced countries’ foreign assets holdings has doubled, from about 4% to more than 8%.
Figure 4.8: Advanced countries foreign assets
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This secular growth is however not immune to cyclical patterns, since advanced countries’
total and emerging markets holdings both follow clearly the financial cycles, dropping in 2008,
2011 and 2013 and increasing in all other years. Furthermore, emerging markets holdings are
more pro-cyclical, changing more than proportionally within the total foreign assets portfolio.
The volatility of emerging markets assets holdings therefore remains high.
In terms of their composition between equities and bonds, two phases can be distinguished
in Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10. In the 2002-2007, most of the expansion has been in the form
of equities, which increase from 4.5% to almost 12% within advanced countries foreign equity
portfolio, and growing to represent almost 80% of total emerging markets holdings. This is not
surprising considering the performance of the stock markets in these countries, which likely
attracted foreign investors. Since 2009 the trend has reverted, as emerging markets equities
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actually declined within foreign equity portfolios, stabilising at around 10%. Bonds did on
other other hand gain momentum, growing from 2% in 2007 to about 6% in 2014 within
the foreign asset holdings, and increasing to 40% of total emerging markets holdings. This
trend is driven in particular by growing popularity of local currency EM bonds amongst global
investors, as documented by World Bank and the BIS (Miyajima et al., 2012; Sienaert, 2012).
Figure 4.9: Equity and bonds composition
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Figure 4.10: Equity and bonds composition
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Some further information can be gathered from the database by Arslanalp and Tsuda
(2012). This database tracks sovereign debt outstanding, distinguishing by holder type. As
shown in Figure 4.11 and Figure 4.12, interest in government bonds has risen steeply since
the financial crisis. This has been driven entirely by institutional investors, which increased
their presence from 10% to 20% in the 2009-2013 period, driving up the total foreign presence
from 20% to 30%. Most of this additional holdings have been in the form of local currency
instruments, which saw the presence of foreign investors increasing from 10% to 25% over the
same period.
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Figure 4.11: Sovereign bonds
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Figure 4.12: Local currency sovereign bonds
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Overall the CPIS figures show the steadily expanding importance of portfolio investment
by advanced countries in emerging markets assets. This pattern is more evident for equities in
the pre-crisis time, and for bonds since 2009. Emerging markets assets holdings remain more
volatile than total foreign assets, with a higher degree of pro-cyclicality.
This is in line with the theoretical discussion made in the previous chapter. Emerging
markets appear to be a growing but still “peripheral” part of advanced countries’ portfolio: a
good investment during normal and boom periods, but a quickly disposable one during bad
times. The lower liquidity of these markets is likely to enhance these cycles. The causes of
these patterns need to be related to investors decision mechanisms and emerging markets asset
characteristics. Before exploring these in detail, the following subsection is linking more clearly
these patterns to institutional investors.
4.1.2.1 Funds figures
This section will explore some figures by the Emerging Portfolio Funds Research database.
In particular it uses figures from the “Country Flows” dataset. This dataset combines the data
from the “Fund Flows” dataset, which has figures for net flows into and out of a very large
sample of mutual funds40, with the “Country Allocations” dataset, which calculates the funds’
allocation to each country. The “Country Flows” dataset shows the resulting combination by
presenting estimates of flows and asset holdings to each country. While these represent only
a sample of total portfolio flows to emerging markets, it has been shown to represent about
half of equity and one eight of bonds flows, and to be representative and consistent indicator
of fund-level and macro-level data (Pant and Miao, 2012; Jotikasthira et al., 2012; Kroencke
et al., 2015, p. 22).
Very importantly for the purpose of this dissertation, the EPFR database allows for the
distinction of underlying investors between retail and institutional investors. As shown in Fig-
ure 4.13, the proportions are roughly equally split into retail and institutional investors. While
for bonds these have remained relatively constant over-time, the importance of institutional
investors declined during the 2002-2007 period, suggesting the boom was then led by retail
investors, but then quickly regained prominence in the post-crisis period, representing about
40About $17 trillion of funds assets are considered http://www.epfr.com/overview.aspx
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60% of total investments at the end of the sample period. Given their crucial importance, and
the focus of this dissertation, the following charts are focus on institutional investors only.
Figure 4.13: Proportion of retail and institutional investors
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Figure 4.14 and Figure 4.15 show institutional investors cumulative flows and allocations
to emerging markets equities and bonds41. The figures confirm the evidence considered so
far: the growth in emerging market assets has been remarkable, in both the 2004 - early 2008
period, and after the crisis. It can be clearly seen that emerging markets assets holdings
have continued to expand after their drop in 2008, roughly at the same speed in the case of
equities and really taking oﬀ in the case of bonds. However the expansion has been more
volatile than the pre-crisis period, as it can be seen in the flat cumulative flows line in late
2011, which possibly reflects the escalation of the eurozone crisis, and at the end of the sample
period in mid-2013, likely reflecting the early fears of the announced FED Quantitative Easing
“tapering”, as it will be discussed in section 4.3.
41The diﬀerence between the two being valuation changes.
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Figure 4.14: Institutional investors EM equities allocation and cumulative flows
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Figure 4.15: Institutional investors EM bonds allocation and cumulative flows
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What these figures also show is the importance of holding gains in driving allocations
to emerging markets. As both figures show there is an sizable gap between allocations and
cumulative inflows. Such a gap represents the capital and currency gains - the appreciation
of emerging markets currencies against the US dollar - made by investors on these assets.
While the gap widens over-time in the case of bonds, reflecting currency gains, its growth in
the case of emerging equities looks less pronounced in the post-crisis period, reflecting the
smaller impact of holding gains on asset allocations. This is probably due to the unimpressive
performance of emerging equity markets as it will be shown in section 4.3.
Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 confirm the growing magnitude of institutional investors portfo-
lio flows to and out of emerging markets. The capital flows swings have amplified considerably
over-time, especially after 2008. Interestingly the recent sell-oﬀ periods appear to be remark-
ably bigger than the one associated with the global financial crisis. For example, institutional
investors alone have pulled out $18 billions out of emerging equity and bonds markets in a
single month (July 2013), a sell-oﬀ that was twice as big as the one in October 2008. Con-
sidering the expansion in emerging markets assets holdings this is not surprising, but shows
nonetheless the macroeconomic relevance of institutional investors on the balance of payment.
When compared to allocation levels, the figures show that flows volatility does not seem to
decrease over-time, and rather seems to have increased for emerging markets equities, with
swings often exceeding one standard deviation from the average level over the sample period.
Figure 4.16: Institutional investors EM equities flows
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The grey area is one standard deviation above and below the mean flows over the period.
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Figure 4.17: Institutional investors EM bonds flows
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The grey area is one standard deviation above and below the mean flows over the period.
Figure 4.18 shows advanced countries allocation to emerging markets as a percentage of
total portfolio. This was calculated by taking data from quarterly financial accounts databases
for the US, the UK, the Eurozone, Japan, Canada, Australia for total holdings by Pension
Funds and Insurance Companies, converting the non-US dollar denominated statistics into
USD using IMF exchange rates reports, and sum up the resulting figures. Finally, the ratio
between the EPFR and such figures was taken to calculate the allocation.
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Figure 4.18: Institutional investors EM allocation
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The resulting figure shows quite clearly that not only holdings of emerging markets assets
have increased in absolute terms but also within the portfolio of institutional investors. It is
important to remember that while the resulting figures are still relatively small (about 2%
at the end 2012), the EPFR data only take into account the assets that are intermediated
by mutual funds, and the actual allocations may be higher if institutional investors invested
directly in emerging markets. Moreover the figures are an average for all countries and insur-
ance companies and pension funds combined, and the variability across sectors and countries
could give a more detailed picture. Nevertheless, these figures clearly show that the weight of
emerging markets assets has increased especially fast after the crisis - their level in the first
quarter of 2013 compared to the first quarter of 2008 almost doubled in the case of equities
and almost five-fold in the case of bonds.
All the evidence reviewed in this subsection strongly confirms to the relevance of the
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research hypothesis: institutional investors have considerably increased their allocations to
emerging markets, especially after the global financial crisis. With their demand (or lack
thereof) for emerging markets assets, institutional investors have therefore become a crucial
actor in determining capital flows to these countries. In the following sections, in line with the
discussion of made in chapter 3, institutional investors’ demand for emerging market assets
will be explored in relation to their behaviour, and the characteristics of such assets.
4.2 Changing balance sheets of institutional investors
As chapter 3 discussed, a key historical development in the financial system - and the econ-
omy in general - is the emergence of institutional investors. The previous section explored the
subordinate nature of emerging markets’ financial integration, and highlighted the importance
of private portfolio flows and institutional investors in particular in shaping such character-
istics. This section will relate these trends with the broader dynamics of the institutional
investors sector.
Firstly it will look a the evolution of institutional investors asset allocation. It will be
shown that over the past fifteen years their assets have shifted out of traditional domestic
equities, while the interest for international assets and “alternative” investments has grown.
Secondly it will look at the sectors’ liabilities, pointing out the growing fragility of the sector’s
balance sheets, in light of an environment of low interest rates and financial returns and
increasing fund maturity. Finally these will be linked together in light of the regulatory
and institutional mechanisms, among which the most important is the rise of liability-driven
investment. Emerging markets assets are part of the sector’s strategy to enhance returns,
while simultaneously containing as much as possible the overall allocation to risky assets.
4.2.1 Asset side
Institutional investors own a substantial share of the world’s financial markets. As shown
in Figure 4.19, at the end of 2014, they collectively held about 47 trillions of US dollars worth
of financial assets, equal to about 60% of global GDP or 30% of total world bonds and stocks
outstanding42. As shown in a report by McKinsey (Roxburgh et al., 2011) this makes them
42 Source: Sanyal (2014)
113
the second biggest wealth holders at the global level, after households’ direct asset holdings.
There is a high degree of geographical concentration, with the top three countries, US UK
and Japan, representing about 80% throughout all the period. Only the size of Japanese
institutional investors appears to have decreased, from 18% to about 9%.
Figure 4.19: Institutional investors - total assets and country shares
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The composition of institutional investors’ portfolio has been changing. As shown by
Figure 4.20, the trend over the past ten years has been one of declining equity allocations,
which dropped from about 30% of total assets in 2001, dropping to about 18% in 2013, with
cyclical movements, depending on the performance of equity markets - e.g. a modest increase
in the 2002-2007 period. While bonds have remained roughly unchanged at slightly above
35% over the whole period, allocations to “funds” increased from 10% to almost 29% over the
same period. Funds allocations eﬀectively reflect the increase in allocations to “alternatives”,
a number of diﬀerent assets, such as private equity or commodities, which do not fall in
the broad equity and bonds categories, as well as the increase in indirect holdings of equity
and bonds, through the acquisition of shares in externally managed funds. Diﬀerent asset
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allocations across countries remain, as Figure Figure 4.21 shows, with Japan and Norway,
whose institutional investors sector is mainly based on a few big state-controlled institutions,
allocating a substantially higher proportion to bonds. But no county has been immune to
the afore-mentioned trends, especially for what concerns the growth of allocations to external
funds within the portfolios.
Figure 4.20: Average asset allocation
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Figure 4.21: Asset allocation by country
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Not only institutional investors have rearranged their portfolio across asset classes, but
they also expanded their geographical reach. As Figure 4.2243 shows, over the past decade,
institutional investors’ portfolio of a few major countries has become more internationalised.
The share of foreign to total assets increased most notably in the UK and in Japan, which
have respectively the second and third biggest institutional investors sector in the world.
43As also pointed out in BIS (2007) relevant data for many countries, most notably the US, is missing. Only
a selection of major countries, for which data was cross-checked across diﬀerent sources, is therefore presented.
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Figure 4.22: Share of foreign assets - Selected countries
.1
.1
5
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Canada Japan
Sweden UK
share of total assets
Institutional investors - Foreign assets
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD IIS and Japan Flow of Funds data.
The data presented so far from the OECD institutional investors statistics give a broad
overview of the major trends in asset allocation. A more detailed analysis can be made for the
UK institutional investors, taken here as an example case. As mentioned, the UK institutional
investor sector is the second largest in the world after the US (Figure 4.19). As data for the
UK are substantially more detailed than for the US or Japan44, the country is taken here as
an example to better dissect some of the the trends discussed.
Figure 4.23 provides a detailed picture of UK institutional investors holdings over a longer
period of time. The overall financial holdings seem to follow the financial cycle over the
period, as the overall data shows a secular increasing trend, with visible stops in crisis years,
such as 2000-2001 and 2008. Equity holdings are unsurprisingly the most responsive of the
asset categories to the financial cycles. The figure also suggests the increasing diversification
44Thanks to the Oﬃce For National Statistics, which compiles detailed asset allocation data for US pension
funds and insurance companies.
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of UK institutional investors’ portfolio: the three UK asset categories - UK corporate bonds,
UK shares and gilts - in 2013 amounted to about the same level as in 1999 in absolute terms.
The expansion of asset holdings therefore has been been assets other than direct holdings of
UK securities.
Figure 4.23: UK institutional investors portfolio
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This is confirmed in Figure 4.24, which can almost be divided into two parts. In a first
phase (1986-1999) portfolios were dominated (around 45%) by UK shares, with the other
categories remaining roughly constant: UK (corporate and government) bonds and foreign
equities weighted about 15-17% each, and all others asset classes around 5%. The second
phase (2000-2011) is primarily characterised by a sharp fall in UK shares holdings, sharply
dropping 30% in 2002, as a result of the dot.com stock market crash, and then falling at a
slower but constant pace until another sharp drop in 2008, due to the global financial crisis.
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As of 2013, they account for about 15%.
Figure 4.24: UK institutional investors holdings, % of total
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Except for UK government bonds, whose share remained more or less constant throughout
the whole period at about 12%, all the others categories have risen. UK corporate bonds and
foreign equities increased modestly, respectively from about 5% to 9% and 15-17% to about
20%. More remarkable are the rise in holdings of funds, which rose from 6% to 16%, short-term
assets and derivatives, from 5% to 14%, from and foreign bonds to 3.6 to 7%.
Furthermore, Figure 4.24 documents the increasing importance of foreign assets into UK
institutional investors’ portfolios. From 1999, when they accounted for over 60% of total
assets, domestic assets have declined to about 38%, or from 65% to 50%, including short-term
assets45. Table 4.1 confirms that within the broad asset classes of bonds and equities, foreign
45It is reasonable to assume that short-term assets are mostly domestic deposits and other similar assets.
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assets have become more important over time: UK equities account for less than half of total
equities, and bonds account about two-thirds, down from 70% and 82% respectively.
Table 4.1: UK institutional investors holdings, geographical allocation
Asset type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
UK Shares 70.37 68.31 66.14 64.92 62.95 59.74 59.36 56.29 52.92 50.38 48.97 47.63 45.41 44.19
Foreign Shares 29.63 31.69 33.86 35.08 37.05 40.26 40.64 43.71 47.08 49.62 51.03 52.37 54.59 55.81
UK Bonds 82.90 80.39 81.76 81.99 80.19 79.87 75.51 72.86 69.95 67.31 67.97 69.62 67.92 67.87
Foreign Bonds 17.10 19.61 18.24 18.01 19.81 20.13 24.49 27.14 30.05 32.69 32.03 30.38 32.08 32.13
Source: Author’s calculation based on Oﬃce for National Statistics, MQ5: Investment by
Insurance Companies, Pension Funds and Trusts
Summing up, institutional investors, which are highly concentrated in a handful of advanced
countries, have seen important changes in their asset allocation over the past 15 years. Their
portfolio has become more diverse, both in terms of asset classes and geographical scope.
The case of the UK, the second biggest country by institutional investors asset holdings, is
representative of this trend. UK institutional investors portfolios’, previously highly skewed
towards to holdings of domestic equities, now contains substantial amount of indirect holdings,
through mutual funds and alternative assets, as well as much more internationalised portfolio.
It is therefore not surprising that, as reviewed in the previous section, portfolio holdings
of EMs in general, and by institutional investors in particular, have grown in importance.
This is part of the broader evolution of institutional investors’ asset allocation over the past
decade. Their portfolio is increasingly diversified internationally and includes funds, which as
seen through EPFR data, includes substantial amounts of emerging markets’ assets.
4.2.2 Liabilities and fragility
As the previous subsection has described, asset allocation shifts have been substantial for
institutional investors as a whole. However, as this dissertation has argued, portfolio choice is
closely linked to the conditions of liabilities. In this subsection the key trends and determinants
of institutional investors’ liabilities are described, pointing out the sources that led to their
However not much can be inferred as to the origin of mutual funds.
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increase and the resulting fragility of the sector’s balance sheet.
Diﬀerently from banks, for pension funds and insurance companies liabilities come in the
form of long-term cash flow obligations. Conceptually, liabilities represent the present value
of future payable pensions or insurance claim benefits. The calculations of such liabilities
is however not straightforward, as several assumptions have to be made with respect to the
evolution of future variables, such as wages, mortality rates, inflation and, crucially, the dis-
count rate. These institutions on the other hand do not need short-term liquidity to conduct
their business, and can focus on ensuring that their liabilities are covered in the long-run by
suﬃciently high returns but at the same time stable pools of assets. Given that liabilities are
eﬀectively a technical provision rather than debt, the market valuation of assets of a pension
fund need not be equal to its liabilities. The gap or ratio between asset and liabilities therefore
does not indicate bankruptcy, but is crucial indicator to measure the health of institutional
investors’ balance sheet.
The funding ratio, i.e. the assets/liabilities ratio, of UK and US pension funds is shown
in Figure 4.2546. Overall the trend is one of declining funding ratios, particularly since the
crisis. Pension underfunding, as it will be discussed in the next subsection, is a major issue,
widely discussed in policy circles, as well as in the pension industry itself. Both regulators
and pension managers have been trying to act as to revert this trend, and ensure pensions are
adequately provided for.
46 The UK figures liabilities are calculated by the Pension Protection Fund through the so-called s179 method,
that is estimating the cost of securing future benefits through an insurance contract. The Milliman indicator
estimates the funding status, by taking the actual quarterly balance sheet data of the 100 US large corporate
pension funds and projects their liabilities and assets monthly.
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Figure 4.25: Pension funding ratio
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From a systemic perspective, two factors directly aﬀect these ratios. Firstly, asset price
collapses during crisis, as in 2001 and 2008, evidently push pension funds to an underfunded
position. Similarly, asset price booms, such as in 2005-2007 and some of the post-crisis years,
substantially improve the funding status.
Secondly, falling interest rates, have a negative eﬀect on funding, by increasing the size
of the liabilities. Discount rates for liabilities are generally linked to bond yields, which are
behind the soaring liabilities in the post-crisis years. This in turn led to underfunding, despite
the good performance of stock markets, as liabilities increased by more than assets. Secular
declines in interest rates are therefore largely responsible for the long-run decline in funding
ratios on the one hand, and asset prices for their cyclical movements.
Aside from interest rates and asset price dynamics, demographic changes are behind the
dynamics of pension funds assets and liabilities. Due to population aging, and the policy shifts
towards individual pension accounts, traditional employer sponsored schemes are increasingly
“mature”, i.e. they have a higher proportion of members receiving retirement benefits compared
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to employees paying contributions. As a result, since 2008 benefits have exceeded contributions
payments in the US and the UK (Figure 4.26). While this may not be a new phenomenon,
as this was also the case in the early 2000’s, remarkably the balance has worsened despite
increases in contributions, shown in Figure 4.27. These have grown over-time as a result of
higher contribution rates, but not enough to compensate for the increasing payments to retired
members, a sign of their increasing maturity. As several pensions schemes have become closed
to new members in the UK47, these trends are going to become more pronounced in the near
future.
Figure 4.26: Benefits and contributions I
-1.00%
-0.80%
-0.60%
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Contributions	minus	benefits
%	of	total	assets
UK US
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD Funded pension indicators
47The great majority of defined benefit private sector pension funds in the UK does not allow new employee
to join them, although it often allows existing members of the scheme to accure new future benefits. See the
Purple Book for details
http://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/DocumentLibrary/Documents/purple_book_2014.pdf.
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Figure 4.27: Benefits and contribution II
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Similar dynamics occurred in the insurance sector. Figure 4.28 shows the balance sheet
of US and UK life-insurance companies. In the UK the long-run decline of capital margins is
particularly evident, as this balance has decreased from almost 25% in 1986 to as low as 3.3%
in 2013. Margins in the US have always but thinner, but are roughly stable throughout the
period, at about 5-6%. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 4.29, financial income in terms of
both yields and total returns has declined over-time. Similar trends aﬀected US insurers 48.
The fragility of insurance companies is therefore a growing concern. As it will be discussed
in the next subsection, new regulations have been put in place to contain such fragilities, and
prevent them from having negative systemic eﬀects on the financial system.
48No similar data are publicly available, but see page 16 of the report by the Federal
Insurance Oﬃce of the US Treasury at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fio/reports-and-
notices/Documents/FIO%20Annual%20Report%202013.pdf.
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Figure 4.28: US and UK Insurance companies balance sheet
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Figure 4.29: Financial income of UK life-insurers
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Overall these trends suggest declining margins, and increasing fragility for advanced coun-
tries’ institutional investors. In the case of pension funds this is reflected in increasing under-
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funding of liabilities and their growing maturity, while for insurance companies, this comes
in the form low capital buﬀers and declining investment income. Under such conditions, the
pressure to generate returns becomes more intense. At the same time, protection against
excessive volatility given by portfolio sensitivity to asset prices and interest rates becomes
paramount. Indeed as it will be shown, these conflicting goals, have become embedded and
institutionalised in institutional investors’ portfolio management practices.
4.2.3 Institutional changes and regulation
As discussed, institutional investors have changed substantially the composition of their
assets, and experienced at the same time growing pressure in order to be prepared face their
long-term obligations. The declining margins and funding ratios have painfully reminded
institutional investors of their exposure to asset prices and interest rates. Furthermore, the
global financial crisis has made the whole investors world aware of the limits to conventional
asset allocation practices. The shifts in asset allocation described in subsection 4.2.1 can be
located within the changing investment practice of these investors, in light of their increasingly
fragile balance sheets.
A first key element has been the adoption of liability-driven investment strategies. Instead
of focusing, as most financial investors, on benchmarks and peer-groups, institutional investors
increasingly put at the core of their investment process their liabilities. The goal of asset
allocation is therefore, not simply to maximise returns for a given level risk, but ensure that
assets adequately provide for the institution’s liabilities. As liabilities are aﬀected by interest
rates and inflation - as this increases wages and therefore benefit payments -, it is important to
invest in assets that would be equally aﬀected by such shocks. For example, long-term bonds
are good hedges against interest rate risk, since their value, like that of liabilities, is inversely
related with respect to interest rates.
In practice, liability-driven investment typically involves splitting assets into two portfolios.
The first is a return-seeking portfolio, whose purpose is generating suﬃciently high returns in
order to increase the asset size in line with the growth of liabilities. The second is a liability-
matching portfolio, whose purpose is protecting the funding ratio, by investing in assets that
hedge liability risk. Liability-matching portfolios typically consist of bonds, and to some extent
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derivatives, whereas return-seeking portfolios are typically much more diversified across several
asset classes.
The increasing maturity of pension funds described in the previous subsection, is also likely
to be behind the adoption of liability-driven investment strategies. As discussed, mature pen-
sion funds become cash flow neutral or negative, therefore becoming net sellers rather than
buyers of assets. This means having a slowly shrinking pool of assets to face obligations. Ap-
propriate asset allocation becomes therefore particularly crucial, as cash flow margins become
thiner. Mature pension funds are likely to invest a greater proportion of their assets in highly
liquid securities, which can be sold as this becomes necessary to pay out benefits, therefore
having to rely on a smaller proportion of assets to generate the necessary returns. As Engelen
(2003, p. 1366) puts it, “as soon as pension funds mature, their need to push the envelope of
existing investment norms and practices grows, resulting in increasingly speculative behaviour
and a frantic search for financial innovations”. The trends described in the previous section
can be rationalised in this sense, with equities being slowly replaced with a more diverse
range of assets for return generation, and short-term securities increasing in importance to
face short-term liabilities.
Secondly, aside from the adoption of liability-driven investment, institutional investors have
been aﬀected by changes in practice within the asset management industry at large. There
is widespread acknowledgment that modern portfolio theory was not of much use during the
crisis, and that diversification failed as a mechanism to avoid losses when all financial markets
became all of a sudden almost perfectly correlated, i.e. they crashed all together (IMF, 2011).
Some institutions have in fact started to adopt new asset allocations strategies, based on the
so call risk-factor approach, according to which portfolio diversification should be based on an
optimal combination of exposure to diﬀerent risk categories rather than asset classes (IMF,
2011; Page and Taborsky, 2011). This theory is based on the evidence of low correlation
between risk factors, an in particular their resilience during episodes of turbulence, as opposed
to traditional assets.
Whether this is a truly path-breaking new system of allocation or a slightly modified version
of the standard mean-variance framework remains nonetheless to be seen (Lee, 2011). However
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it is notable that the 300 Club, a group of leading investment professionals has strongly put
forward the view that financial investment practices need to go through more fundamental
changes. Rajan (2012) goes as far as to say that the CAPM and the eﬃcient market hypothesis
“promoted a world view detached from the on-the-ground reality... for they rode on the back
of the strong pro-market anti-regulation sentiment unleashed by the Thatcher-Reagan era in
which faith mattered more than facts.” Institutional investors have been advised to take a
more holistic approach to investment that acknowledges the inherently dynamic nature of
risk-appetite, which is a dynamic function of wealth and risk-premia, as opposed to the static
risk-averse utility functions employed by modern portfolio theory (Brown, 2013).
A third element has been changing regulation. Across several countries, marked-to-market
accounting has become the norm for insurance companies and pension funds (BIS, 2007, 2011).
Both assets and liabilities need to be measured at levels consistent with financial markets asset
prices and yields. In Europe, a regulation named Solvency II49 has recently been implemented,
according to which insurers need to comply with risk-based capital requirements, in a very
similar spirit of the Basel III regulation for banks. In some countries, notably the Netherlands
and Scandinavian countries, pension funds also need to comply with similar regulations (Pugh
and Yermo, 2008).
These three developments explain the changes in asset allocation described in section 4.2.1,
i.e. the reduction in traditional equity investments, and the substantial increase in “funds”
investments, in light of the liabilities dynamics discussed in section 4.2.2. Equities are not fit
for liability-matching purposes, and they represent a traditional class which is highly exposed
to common market risk factors. Furthermore they tend to be volatile and carry high capital
requirements. On the other hand investing in alternative assets and funds gives exposure to a
much more diverse range of assets and risk factors, thus potentially increasing returns without
the need to increase allocation to return-seeking assets as a whole. In general, the long-run
implication of these trends would be to engage in portfolio “de-risking”, i.e. reduce allocation
to risky assets in favour of liability-matching assets (BIS, 2011). Indeed, as documented by the
Bank of England (BoE, 2014), several corporate pension funds in the UK have been increasing
allocation to government bonds.
49http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:FULL&from=EN
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However, as described in section 4.2.1, while there has been a decisive move out of equities,
bonds allocation do not seem to have sizably increase across countries. The main reason
behind this is the low interest rates environment, which contributes to make the balance sheet
of institutional investors more fragile, as described in the previous subsection, and may have
induced institutional investors to take on risks in other forms through their expansion into non-
traditional asset classes. In other words, with low interest rates, institutional investors struggle
to earn suﬃcient returns, and cannot aﬀord to “de-risk”, but equally do not wish to remain
overexposed to assets that left them vulernable to shocks. The result is to keep their liability-
matching and return-seeking components roughly unchanged, while substantially altering the
composition of their return-seeking portfolio, in order to achieve their return targets.
Therefore, in spite or their implicit or explicit risk reduction goal, these trend may have
simply changed the nature of risk: “in the context of low interest rates, institutional investors
may be tempted to deviate from pure ALM50 [asset-liability-management] and search for
yield. They may adopt core-satellite structures in portfolio management, in which they cover
a large part of their liabilities with traditional portfolio allocation strategies (e.g. bond/equity
index tracking) and try to achieve “extra” returns by investing smaller parts of portfolios in
alternative assets (e.g. emerging market assets, hedge funds, commodities, credit derivatives
and infrastructure).” (BIS, 2007, p.27, emphasis added).
In this sense, regulations such as Solvency II may indeed create new vulnerabilities rather
than reduce systemic risks. These regulations tend to push pension funds and insurance
companies towards safer low-yielding government bonds, but, given the current low-interest
rate environment, they contribute to tilt their return-seeking portfolio towards riskier assets:
“The pressure to enhance yields in the low interest rate environment is growing,
and the requirement for insurance companies to hold the bulk of their assets in safe,
low-yielding assets may push them to become more aggressive with the remainder
of their portfolio and may shorten their investment perspective. Their investment
behavior regarding this risky part of their portfolio might well become more volatile,
leading to a risk of sudden reversals in some less liquid markets, including in
50i.e. Liability-driven investment.
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emerging economies.” (IMF, 2011, p. 80)
The growing interest in emerging markets assets by institutional investors therefore has to be
understood with reference to these trends. With fragile balance sheets and low interest rates,
institutional investors are looking for ways to increase their returns, while (seemingly) not ex-
cessively increasing risk exposures. Emerging markets assets must therefore have risk/return
characteristics that make them suitable for inclusion in the return-seeking portfolio of institu-
tional investors that follow liability-driven investment strategies.
4.3 The Emerging Markets asset class
Having explored the growing allocations to EMs and the evidence of institutional investors’
balance sheets evolution, this section explores the characteristics of the emerging markets’ as-
set class. While the discussion so far warrants an expansion into “alternative” assets, in the
daunting task to search for yield while reducing volatility, the inclusion of emerging markets
bonds and equities into this pool also depends on their characteristics. As discussed in chapter
3, beside traditional mean-variance metrics, emphasis should be given to “Keynesian funda-
mentals”, i.e. the systemic conditions of the asset class as a whole, both in terms of domestic
factors and exposure to global factors. The role of liquidity, in particular currency liquidity,
and its macro-determinants needs to be assessed.
Section 4.3.1 assesses the evidence on economic growth and financial market returns, and
finds it less remarkable than it would seem. Section 4.3.2 looks more closely at the “Keynesian
fundamentals”, pointing out those features that have led emerging markets to be perceived
as less risky, by eﬀectively enhancing the liquidity premium of their currency. Section 4.3.3
discusses these trends in relation to the global economic and financial environment.
4.3.1 Returns and growth
Returns in emerging markets are generally expected to be higher, given their perceived
higher riskiness. Figure 4.30 shows the comparative total return stock market performance of
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emerging markets compared to advanced markets in general (the “world” index). Emerging
stock markets have experienced a real rally in the 2002-2007 period, outperforming advanced
countries by a wide margin. They were heavily hit by the 2008 crisis but have recovered
relatively quickly since. However, their performance since 2011 appears less remarkable: as
Figure 4.31 shows, the EM index has been virtually flat since 2012, clearly underperforming
the World index. Higher volatility during this period was certainly not accompanied with
higher returns.
Figure 4.30: Stock markets
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Figure 4.31: Stock markets since the crisis
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The boom in institutional investors allocation to emerging markets equities during the 2002-
2007 came therefore with booming stock markets. The more sober post-crisis environment,
while potentially explaining the shift to emerging markets bonds, did not however severely
aﬀect their exposure. This may be caused by the good growth performance of emerging markets
vis-à-vis advanced economies: as Figure 4.32 shows, emerging markets have consistently grown
more than advanced economies since 2000, and are projected to continue growing at around
5% on average in the next few years. As a result, emerging and developing economies share of
global GDP will be higher than 40% and almost 60% in purchasing power terms by 2018. As
it is generally thought that high GDP growth will spillover to good equity performance, this
could provide a justification for continuous high exposure to stocks performing modestly since
2012.
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Figure 4.32: GDP growth
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Figure 4.33: GDP shares
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While advanced stock markets performed well compared to emerging markets in recent
years, the picture looks diﬀerent for fixed-income securities. As Table 4.2 shows, short-term
interest rates in advanced countries have always been lower than in emerging markets on av-
erage since 2000. Everywhere interest rates have been declining over time, but since the crisis
such a diﬀerence becomes particularly meaningful: while interest rates in all major advanced
countries below 1%, eﬀectively providing almost zero returns, interest rates in emerging coun-
tries range from 2.49% in South Korea to 10.86% in Brazil, therefore providing high returns
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even on a short-term basis.
Table 4.2: Short-term interest rates
1998-2000 2001-2003 2003-2005 2006-2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Canada 5.23 3.20 2.69 4.02 0.69 0.78 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.17
France 3.64 3.30 2.21 4.00 1.23 0.81 1.39 0.57 0.22 0.21
Germany 3.63 3.30 2.21 4.71 1.23 0.81 1.39 0.57 0.22 0.21
United Kingdom 6.30 4.21 4.31 4.94 1.20 0.69 0.89 0.84 0.49 0.54
United States 5.75 2.19 2.08 8.83 0.56 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.17 0.12
Brazil 24.45 19.98 19.58 8.28 10.06 9.80 11.67 8.53 8.18 10.86
China 4.37 2.43 2.42 4.20 1.59 2.64 5.14 4.31 4.98 4.80
Korea 9.70 4.81 3.91 7.17 2.63 2.67 3.44 3.30 2.72 2.49
Indonesia 25.77 13.86 8.37 8.55 9.28 7.02 6.93 5.95 6.26 8.76
Mexico 22.65 9.30 7.86 7.82 5.93 4.91 4.82 4.79 4.28 3.52
Russia 21.89 10.17 7.02 8.47 13.05 5.16 5.49 7.29 7.49 9.40
South Africa 13.17 10.50 8.37 9.11 7.85 6.42 5.49 5.29 5.08 5.80
Source: Author’s calculations based on OECD and Economist Intelligence Unit. These are
representative money-market rates at short-term (3 months) maturity.
Such diﬀerences are even more sizable when comparing long-term bonds returns. As Fig-
ure Figure 4.34 shows, emerging markets bonds have outperformed both advanced countries
and global bond benchmarks. From January 2002 until December 2013, local currency and
hard currency emerging market bonds yielded respectively 9.1% and 8.6% on a logarithmic
return basis, compared to 3.6% and 4.8% for advanced countries and global bonds. Even
including the substantial fall in the past two years, local currency bonds outperform advanced
countries’, at 5.3% compared to 4.1% throughout the period.
134
Figure 4.34: Emerging markets bond indexes
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Note: the GBI-EM tracks local currency sovereign bonds from major emerging markets, the
EMBI tracks hard currency sovereign bonds from a large number of emerging markets, the
GBI-Global tracks advanced countries government bonds, and the GABI is a global aggregate
bond index. All indices are in total return and US dollar terms.
The substantially higher volatility of emerging markets equities and local currency bonds,
has been mostly driven by the dynamics of the exchange rates. Exposure to local currency debt
and equities implies that exchange rate appreciation compared to the base currency translates
into currency gains for foreign investors. Indeed, as Kaltenbrunner (2011) documents, currency
movements have become a crucial component of returns on emerging markets assets, to the
point that currency itself becomes an investable asset class.
As Figure 4.35 shows, emerging market currencies per US dollars exchange rates have
been highly correlated with stock market prices, as well as local currency bond prices. The
substantial fall of the latter in the past two years has been at least partly driven by exchange
rate depreciation, which has been particularly pronounced for some the key components of the
index, e.g. Brazil and Indonesia.
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Figure 4.35: Exchange rates
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Overall, the long-run performance of emerging markets over the past fifteen years has been
mixed. Both equities and bonds have outperformed advanced countries remarkably in the
2002-2012 period, with a sharp but short-lived fall during the global financial crisis. Since
2012 however, their performance has been much less impressive, which may cast doubt about
their potential for higher returns. Economic growth may induce investors to endure these short-
term pains, in the hope that this may translate into higher returns in the future, but this has
also declined compared to the pre-crisis years. This shows that, although emerging markets’
returns remain attractive in relative terms considering the current low-yield environment, in
absolute terms they represent a less compelling story than they used to be.
4.3.2 The “Keynesian fundamentals”
Aside from growth, some other context-specific fundamentals may matter. As discussed in
chapter 3, a crucial element is the liquidity of the currency, which depends in turn on a number
of “Keynesian fundamentals” relating to the country’s systemic ability to face its liabilities. As
shown in section 4.1, emerging markets current accounts have improved, implying a smaller
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need for external capital flows to finance current transactions. However, in line with the
considerations made in chapter 3, current accounts in isolation do not say much about a
country’s financial fragility.
In general the “fundamentals” that matter are context and time-specific. Precisely what
matters for the systemic stability of emerging markets therefore changes over-time, depending
on the global context. In the context of increasing financial integration, new vulnerabilities
coming from foreign investment themselves generate potential for instability (Kaltenbrunner
and Painceira, 2015). A country’s central bank ability to intervene and contain such instability
becomes therefore increasingly important as a “fundamental”.
A very important phenomenon in these respects has been the accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves. As Figure 4.36 shows, this accumulation has been remarkable, both to
GDP and external debt. Foreign exchange reserves constitute an important systemic buﬀer,
as they provide a stock of liquid assets that the central bank is able to use to contain the
volatility of foreign exchange markets. Having accumulated high levels of reserves, emerging
markets are now, at least potentially, much more capable to cope with external financial
shocks. It has been argued that foreign exchange reserves can be considered as collateral that
countries provide to foreign investors, which represents a defining feature of today’s global
financial system (Dooley et al., 2004, 2014).
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Figure 4.36: Reserves accumulation
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Emerging markets have also become less vulnerable in terms of foreign debt. Figure 4.37
shows how external debt has been a shrinking component of GDP and total external liabilities
until the 2008 crisis. In the post-crisis period this trend has stopped, but the overall indebted-
ness profile of many emerging markets has not substantially worsened. Compared to advanced
economies, as shown in Figure 4.38, emerging economies’ governments remain less indebted
at 40% to GDP on average compared to 100% GDP in advanced countries, and still present a
primary budget surplus.
Furthermore, increasingly government debt is denominated in local currency (Figure 4.39).
Although more expensive in terms of interest payments, it does not carry the same potential for
balance-of-payment driven default that was typical of emerging markets in the 1990’s. Many
emerging markets may be slowly redeeming themselves from their “original sin” (Eichengreen
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and Hausmann, 1999), i.e. their inability to use their currency in international transactions,
and for long-term borrowing purposes in particular. The increasing importance of local cur-
rency debt is also a further sign of the increasing confidence of foreign investors in the liquidity
of emerging markets currencies.
Figure 4.37: External debt
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Figure 4.38: Government indebtedness
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Figure 4.39: Local currency debt
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These improvements are reflected in most emerging markets’ sovereign credit ratings have
improved Figure 4.40. As of 2012, sovereign debt securities in local and foreign currencies
across many emerging markets are “investment grade”, i.e. has a rating of BBB- or higher.
This is important as institutional investors, either due to regulatory constraints51 or their own
risk-management practices, often look at credit rating thresholds as a variable.
51E.g. Solvency II requires diﬀerent capital buﬀers for assets with higher credit risks, as measured by credit
rating.
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Figure 4.40: Sovereign ratings
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From a systemic perspective, emerging markets look much less risky than they used to.
They have accumulated vast amount of reserves, have become much less indebted and in-
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creasingly borrow in their domestic currency, all of which is reflected in their improved credit
ratings. Indeed, they endured the global financial crisis and recovered from it in a way much
quicker than advanced countries. As discussed in chapter 2, these factors enhance the ability of
emerging markets currency to fulfill their role as “money”. Improvements in the overall ability
of a country to face its liabilities at the aggregate level enhance the liquidity of its domestic
currency, and therefore the willingness of foreign investors to hold it, as the ongoing process
of internationalisation of emerging markets currencies testifies (Kaltenbrunner, 2011; Ma and
Villar, 2014). The risk/return profile of emerging markets assets considerably improves, in the
eyes of return-hungry institutional investors.
A final word of caution is however in order. While historically speaking, all indicators point
to a much more stable situation of EM “fundamentals”, the long-term improvement in these
trends seems to have slowed down in the post-crisis period. While this has yet to revert the
situation, it nonetheless signals that the booming allocations to EMs in the post-crisis period,
documented in previous sections, cannot be attributed simply to improvement in fundamentals,
as these have become rather stable.
4.3.3 Global factors
While domestic factors point to decreased risks in emerging markets, factors beyond their
control often aﬀect the profile of their assets, contributing to determine their attractiveness to
foreign investors.
One key global factor has been the decline of advanced countries’ government bond yields
Figure 4.41. As discussed throughout the chapter, low bond yields make institutional investors
balance sheets weaker, due to booming liabilities, and make it at the same time harder for them
to generate returns. Low-yields, especially when resulting from expansionary monetary policy
operations, also tend to be associated with higher liquidity provision in advanced countries.
How liquidity spills over from core bond markets into other financial markets as a result of
monetary policy operations, potential generating problems, has become a topical debate, as
discussed in chapter 2. While institutional investors are more directly aﬀected by liability-
driven investment framework, indirectly a vast pool of investors moving into “alternative” asset
categories increases the potential for herding behaviour and benchmark following, especially
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when investments are delegated to external managers.
Figure 4.41: The decline in long-term yields
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Furthermore, institutional investors, as discussed in chapter 3, can be aﬀected by global
shifts in risk-appetite. As documented in chapter 2, there is now ample evidence that low
interest rates and ultra-expansionary monetary policy have increased global risk-appetite (Rey,
2013; Shin, 2012; Bruno and Shin, 2015). A commonly used proxy of risk-appetite is the VIX
(Volatility-index), a measure of the implied volatility of global stock markets, calculated on
the basis of option prices of the S&P 500 index. A similar indicator exists for the FTSE 100,
named VFTSE.
Figure 4.42 indicates how stock market booms are accompanied by lower volatility expec-
tations, and conversely crises situations by fears of highly volatile prices. The VIX present
spikes in 1997-1998, during the East-Asian crisis and long-term capital management burst,
then remains at high levels spiking in 2002, with the burst of the dot.com bubble. During the
period between 2002 and 2008 the index has been low and steady, until reaching its greatest
historical peak in late 2008. The post-crisis era is characterised by a decreasing trend, but
through a highly volatile pattern suggesting a more unstable overall situation. What emerges
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from these pictures is a situation of higher general uncertainty in financial markets after the
crisis: 2008 marked the end of an era of optimism and financial market stability, but while
conditions have considerably improved from their negative peak in late 2008, markets react
quickly and nervously, and are more prone to panic. It is not surprising therefore that emerg-
ing markets have gone through several phases of pain during this period. So far however, as
these indices suggest, these phases have been short-lived, and investors risk-appetite remains
high, if volatile, justifying higher allocations to emerging markets.
Figure 4.42: Volatility index
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A final global factor that may aﬀect emerging markets is commodity prices. In some of
these countries, improvements in the current account were also led by trade surpluses, given
by high commodity prices. As shown in Figure 4.43, commodity prices seem to follow quite
closely the dynamics of exchange rates in emerging markets. The ultimate impact that recent
falls in commodity prices, especially oil, will have on emerging markets is however likely to
aﬀect each country diﬀerently, depending on whether the country is primarily an exporter or
importer of commodities. Coupled with the slowdown of China, a major commodity importer,
it is likely to generate, at least in the short-run, some problems for commodity exporters.
144
But low oil prices can equally boost global economic growth, thus potentially oﬀsetting these
trends. As the vulnerabilities of emerging markets have shifted to the financial side, trade
issues, while obviously very important in determining the economic and productive structure
of these countries, are likely to be much less crucial in determining their overall macroeconomic
stability.
Figure 4.43: Commodity prices
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4.4 Conclusion
This chapter has provided evidence on institutional investors demand for emerging market
assets. Emerging markets have become increasingly integrated into the global financial system,
but primarily as recipient for global investors, hedging these liabilities with foreign exchange
reserves. Institutional investors have been key actors in driving such integration, allocating
more of their assets to emerging markets, particularly to equities initially, and increasingly to
(local currency) bonds since the crisis.
These increasing allocations fit into the broader changes aﬀecting the institutional investors
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sector as a whole. Regulatory changes, evolving asset allocation mechanisms, and pressure
to generate returns in a low-interest rate environment and fragile balance sheets, have led
institutional investors to move away from direct holdings of domestic equity towards funds
and international diversification.
The evidence presented suggest emerging markets assets are part of the institutional in-
vestors’ strategy to search for returns from alternative assets. These assets still provide poten-
tially high returns, at least in comparison to advanced countries. More importantly emerging
markets, compared to the past, present very sound “Keynesian” fundamentals: their (govern-
ments’) external debt is low and increasingly in local currency, they have accumulated high
foreign exchange reserves and their currencies are increasingly internationalised.
In the post-crisis period, however, the risk/return profile have become less attractive: re-
turns have become lower, especially due to the fall in several EM currencies, and there are
signs that the long-run improvements in fundamentals has come to an end. At the global level,
the slowdown of economic growth in China for example may create some troubles for those
countries who are reliant on commodity exports to the Chinese industrial sector. Neverthe-
less, allocations and capital flows to EMs have continued to increase, although their volatility
has increased too. This serves to reinforce the idea that the “search for yield” by institu-
tional investors remains a compelling pressure, despite the weakening of the EM risk/return
attractiveness.
Overall, this chapter’s empirical findings establish the background for the theoretical frame-
work described in chapter 3, and the research questions defined in the introductory chapter.
Foreign institutional investors do seem to have a substantial and growing presence in emerging
markets. This seems to be induced by general trends in asset allocation, with liability-driven
investments playing a key role in driving the search for returns. Low global yields and lower -
from an historical perspective - external vulnerability in emerging markets have made emerg-
ing markets assets attractive. The next section will be devoted to test these observations with
econometrics methods.
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Chapter 5
A Panel autoregressive distributed
lags approach to the demand for
emerging market assets
Introduction
This chapter evaluates econometrically the theoretical framework proposed in chapter 3,
for which evidence in the data was found in chapter 4. As discussed, (portfolio) capital
flows are understood as the demand for emerging markets financial assets, resulting from the
portfolio decisions of foreign institutional investors. Chapter 4 located capital flows to emerging
markets into the broad process of financial globalisation, the evolution of institutional investors
balance sheets and investment practices, and the characteristics of emerging markets assets.
It was pointed out that emerging market assets are part of institutional investors’ demand for
alternative return-seeking assets, in light of their fragile balance sheets, and the improvements
of emerging markets “Keynesian fundamentals”.
Econometric evidence will draw further inferences on these relationships. Innovative econo-
metric techniques will be used for the estimation of asset demand equations for emerging
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market bonds and equities. In particular the chapter will use novel estimators, proposed for
dynamic macro-panel setting with cross-sectionally dependent errors, in a panel autoregressive-
distributed lags model.
The main contribution of this chapter lies in its findings about the determinants of asset
demand. In line with the discussions made thus far, the two main testing variables are the fund-
ing levels of advanced countries pension funds, measuring the impact of institutional investors
liabilities, and the level of foreign exchange reserves, seen as the key development enhancing
the macro-financial stability and therefore the liquidity of emerging markets currencies, as
discussed in chapter 3.
Moreover, the chapter contributes to expand the asset demand literature, by applying
new econometrics techniques and by extending it to the context of international financial
investment in emerging markets. This application moreover provides empirical backing to the
relationships which will be used in chapter 7 for the construction of the Stock-Flow Consistent
model.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 describes the asset demand approach,
starting from its origins in the Tobinesque tradition and the more recent Almost-Ideal asset
demand approach, and its application to the issue of international portfolio investment to
emerging markets. Section 5.2 describes the data and the variables. Section 5.3 discusses the
econometric framework and the model specification, in light of some tests results. Section
5.4 discusses the estimation results and perform some robustness checks. Section 5.5 gives an
interpretation of the results and some of their possible implications. Section 5.6 concludes.
5.1 Asset demand approach
This section tracks the evolution of the modeling framework of the econometric estimation,
the asset demand approach. It tracks its historical evolution from the work of Tobin and its
subsequent developments coming from of Angus Deaton’s Almost Ideal Demand Approach. It
finally discusses their application to the context of international demand for emerging market
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assets by institutional investors.
5.1.1 “Pitfalls” flow of funds models
The approach to asset allocation taken by this chapter is that of asset demand equations, in
the spirit of James Tobin and his colleagues (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Backus et al., 1980) and
more recently Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie in the Stock-Flow Consistent modeling approach
(Godley and Lavoie, 2012). In their original “pitfalls in financial modeling” paper, Brainard and
Tobin (1968) emphasised the importance of interdependencies of financial markets, particularly
financial accounting consistency, when modeling the economy, arguing that failure to respect
these results in serious issues for econometric estimation. They propose a model taking such
interdependencies into account, showing the relationships between three sectors (government,
banking sector and private sector) and seven assets. Demand for assets is modeled as a function
of wealth, income and rates of return on own assets and on all the other assets Smith (1975,
p. 510):
a⇤i
w
= bi0 +
qX
j=1
bijrj (5.1)
The desired share a⇤ of asset i relative to wealth w depends linearly on the returns rj on
q diﬀerent assets plus a constant b0. This formulation implies that households allocate assets
as to keep a fixed proportion b0 of their wealth in each one of them, but this is allowed to
vary according to the returns of diﬀerent assets. Positive/negative returns on one asset will
increase/decrease the desired allocation to that asset, while at the same time higher/lower
returns on other assets will decrease/increase such a proportion. Finally, the allocation is
sometimes considered to also be proportional to current income (e.g. Brainard and Tobin, 1968,
p. 107), which represents the transaction motive of asset demand. The wealth constraints are
essential to the model, in that they determine a constraint on the value of the parameters.
Since clearly the sum of desired holdings equals total wealth (i.e.
P
i a
⇤
i = w) it must be that:
nX
i=1
a⇤i
w
= 1 (5.2)
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with
X
i
bi0 = 1
X
i
bij = 0
The sum of all asset shares must by definition be equal to 1, for each asset i the sum of
the constant terms b0 must be equal to 1, and the sum of the return coeﬃcients must be equal
to 0. These constraints imply that parameters in the demand for asset i determines the sum
of the parameters the demand for other assets, ensuring consistency to the point that, with
n assets, parameters specifications for n-1 equations logically imply the n-th one. Moreover,
as Hendershott (1971) points out, for each asset, the sum of the parameters measuring the
positive impact of the “own” asset return should equal the negative sum of the parameters on
the alternative asset returns. This follows from the idea that “an equal rise in the yields on all
financial assets should not aﬀect demands for the assets” (Hendershott, 1971, p. 819)52.
This paper, along with Tobin (1969), gave rise to a vast literature estimating asset demand
equations, using data from flow-of-funds accounts53. Several authors attempted to estimate
demand equations of either a complete system of both sets and assets (Backus et al., 1980), or
a demand for a set of diﬀerent assets by a single sector (Hendershott, 1971; Hendershott and
Lemmon, 1975; Backus and Purvis, 1980; Walsh, 1981), or a demand for a single or a limited
set of assets by a complete set of investors (Friedman, 1977; Roley, 1980a). The literature was
particularly keen in respecting the parameters constraint that Brainard and Tobin (1968) had
emphasised, and further refined some of them. Additionally the literature typically assumed
that agents were unable to achieve their desired holdings immediately, so that asset shares
evolve through a partial adjustment mechanism (Smith, 1975, p. 510):
4ai = ✏i(a⇤i   ai, 1) (5.3)
Again, to ensure consistency, this implies that, unless ✏i = 1 for all assets (i.e. agents always
52This is analogous to what Godley and Lavoie (2012, p. 144-145) call the “horizontal constraint”.
53This research line was indeed part of the bigger research in flow-of-funds models and empirical application.
See Bain (1973); Roe (1973) for a survey.
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manage to fully adjust their holdings to their desired level), there should be at least one asset
absorbing the residual funds from the the gap between desired and actual holdings in the other
funds54. An equivalent formulation is:
4ai = ✓ij(a⇤j   aj, 1) (5.4)
where ✓ij “should be interpreted as the partial eﬀect on holdings of the i-th asset of a unit
increase in desired holdings of the j-th asset accompanied by an equal increase in” wealth.
This implies yet another constraint in the form of
P
i ✓ij = 1, which simply means that an
increase in wealth must be absorbed within the portfolio (Smith, 1975, p. 512). Estimation
based on (5.4) are also used by Backus et al. (1980) and Backus and Purvis (1980)55.
The empirical estimation faced problems. As the number of parameters to be estimated
increase, especially in the partial adjustment model, the high correlation between returns taken
from aggregate time-series data inevitably resulted in serious multicollinearity issues. Often
the models presented incorrectly signed or insignificant parameters. Researchers have tried to
overcome these problems by imposing restrictions on the parameters. One of such ways was to
impose “symmetry” in the values of the return parameters (Parkin, 1970; Hendershott, 1971;
Hendershott and Lemmon, 1975; Saito, 1977; Friedman, 1979; Taylor and Clements, 1983):
the impact of the return on asset j on the holdings of asset i should be equal to the impact
of the return on asset i on the holdings of asset j (i.e. bij = bji). This condition can find its
theoretical justification in neoclassical consumer demand theory, since it is analogous to the
54A similar mechanism applies to the (Godley and Lavoie, 2012) models. However, they assume that agents
are always able to achieve their desired holdings, so that the gap may arise as a result of errors in the expec-
tations of future wealth, rather than assets. Such a gap is absorbed by a residual asset, typically cash or bank
deposits.
55 Friedman (1977) further added to the adjustment process by emphasising the role of transaction costs.
The mechanism described by (5.3) and (5.4) implicitly assumes that the portfolio adjustment out of new net
savings and existing assets follows exactly the same patterns. Friedman argued that if transaction costs are
realistically considered, it is clear that allocating new funds is easier than reallocate existing funds, which
should be explicitly modeled in the adjustment equation. He therefore proposed a slight variation, so that new
savings are allocated according to the new desired holdings parameter, while existing assets follow the standard
portfolio adjustment process
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symmetry of the Slutsky substitution eﬀects (Roley, 1980b).
Imposing such a condition allows for a reduction in the number of the independently
estimated parameters, which can ease the problems of multicollinearity. For example, Taylor
and Clements (1983), in their study of holdings of four financial assets in Australia, find
that with the imposition of symmetry and homogeneity - the “horizontal” constraint - results
are significant and correctly signed, while without such restrictions many of the parameters
become insignificant or wrongly signed. At the same time these restrictions may be empirically
rejected, and imply further theoretical assumptions which may be unwarranted. Roley (1980b)
works out the theoretical implications of the symmetry, and shows that they imply a particular
behaviour, where agents have constant mean-variance risk aversion with respect to wealth. He
then proposes and applied statistical tests of such behaviour and finds that overall “the evidence
appears to favour rejection of the symmetry hypothesis”. Taylor and Clements (1983) also fail
to find statistical evidence confirming the symmetry restrictions.
An alternative methodology was formalised by Brainard and Smith (1976), and later em-
ployed in several other works (Backus and Purvis, 1980; Backus et al., 1980; Smith, 1981).
The authors suggest to estimate the parameters combining the data with a priori plausible
values in a Bayesian fashion. This can potentially be a formidable task, since it requires
to assign plausible values to the parameters but also to the variance and the covariance of
the errors of the priors, and requires simplifying assumptions56. This methodology has had
mixed outcomes: as Backus et al. (1980) show, adjustment coeﬃcients in the form of (5.4)
substantially improved with the adoption of mixed estimation, but interest rate parameters,
especially cross-rate parameters, do not. In conclusion, as Buiter (2003, p. 7) claims, “the
empirical implementation of complete systems of portfolio balance and flow-of-funds models
has been a mixed success at best”.
5.1.2 Almost-ideal demand systems
It is perhaps also due to this relative unsuccessful performance, that the development of an
alternative methodology quickly emerged at the beginning of the 1980’s and establish itself as
the most commonly adopted way to estimate demand equations. This is based on the “Almost-
56The typical assumption is to assume that the variance and the covariance are the same for each equation
Brainard and Smith (1976, p. 1306)
152
Ideal Demand System” (AIDS) approach, developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). This
is essentially an empirical implementation of a demand system based on neoclassical consumer
theory. In the case of portfolio choice, agents are assumed to maximise utility given by assets,
subject to the inter-temporal wealth constraint. By making use of the associated “dual” prob-
lem of cost minimisation, and choosing a PIGLOG cost function, one can show that Blake
(2004, p. 613)57:
sit = ai + biln(Wt(1 + rWt)) +
nX
j
cij ln(1 + rj) +
mX
j
hijZjt (5.5)
The portfolio shares si depend on the logs of wealth plus the return of the total portfolio,
the log-returns on n assets, and m additional variables Z. The model is similar to the original
“pitfalls” specifications, but adds the possibility of wealth eﬀects on shares, as well as poten-
tially additional variables58. For example, a typical variable which is often added is current
income or expenditure (Barr and Cuthbertson, 1992; Adam, 1999), which, as Blake (2004, p.
614) argues, can be thought as a liquidity constraint. Due to its origins in neoclassical demand
theory, the AIDS approach also implicitly assumes that homogeneity and symmetry hold, al-
though the validity of such assumptions can also be tested. In fact, typically the literature
assumes a general-to-specific approach, by initially estimating an unrestricted equations and
then adding restrictions, following successful tests.
The AIDS model has been employed in several studies, although its application to portfolio
choice has been much less common than in consumption studies. Weale (1986) is a first appli-
cation on the holdings of short-term assets in the UK. The papers by Barr and Cuthbertson
(1991, 1992, 1994) are the clearest example of the application of the AIDS system to portfolio
choice. They formally derive the equations to be estimated and apply them to diﬀerent portfo-
lio choice contexts, and are able to find satisfactory results, when homogeneity and symmetry
are imposed. The appropriateness of such restrictions is also confirmed in all of their studies.
57The procedure, described in the original chapter by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and then applied to the
context of portfolio choice by Barr and Cuthbertson (1991) involves the application of a specific logarithmic
functional form, and then, using Shepherd’s Lemma, its logarithmic diﬀerentiation with respect to price to
obtain portfolio shares, and then inverting the resulting “Hicksian” demand function to a standard Marshallian
demand function.
58It also specifies the independent variables in logarithmic terms, thus suggesting an interpretation of the
coeﬃcients in relative terms.
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While the focus of the early “flow-of-funds” literature was entirely on a complete set of
purely financial assets, a complete set of investors, or both in the more “complete models”
of (Backus et al., 1980), the AIDS inspired literature has concentrated on slightly diﬀerent
empirical questions. Some studies focus on a very specific set of assets and/or investors. For
example, Barr and Cuthbertson (1994) applies the methodology to the UK holdings by the
overseas sector. Since portfolio shares must sum up to one, total UK assets held by foreigners
is considered to be total wealth - implicitly making the assumption that the overseas sector as
a whole has a predetermined part of its portfolio dedicated to UK assets, and allocate assets
within it. Dinenis and Scott (1993) focus on UK pension funds asset allocation. Interestingly
for the purpose of this chapter, they do initially consider to give a role to wealth over liabilities
(the surplus or funding status of the pension fund) in determining portfolio allocation. They
however drop such a variable in the empirical implementation of their model, following the
successful testing for homotheticity of the demand functions, which leads to the parameter
measuring the impact of the fund surplus to be restricted to zero (Dinenis and Scott, 1993, p.
302)59.
Another line of studies based on the AIDS system focuses on a complete set of assets held
by households, but extends the set to non-financial assets. The most obvious example is Blake
(2004), who estimates portfolio choice between financial, housing and durables, pension wealth
(private and public) and human capital in the UK. Overall, his findings suggest that wealth
eﬀects - along with demographic variables - have a much greater impact on asset allocation
than relative returns. Interestingly similar studies were conducted in the context of developing
and emerging countries: Adam (1999); Moore et al. (2005); Al-Zu’bi and Murinde (2011) have
conducted studies respectively for Kenya, India and three middle eastern countries. All these
studies also take into account liabilities, typically netting them out from financial assets.
5.1.3 An asset demand approach for emerging markets
Generally speaking, the literature on asset demand equations, whether of the original “pit-
falls” kind or following the AIDS methodology, does not seem to be particularly flourishing in
contemporary economics. There are however some signs that the increasing attention to fi-
59This is due to the specific form of their short-term adjustment equation, following the assumption of equal
costs of adjustment.
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nance, following the financial crisis, is renewing interest in their estimation (Avouyi-Dovi et al.,
2011; Ramb and Scharnagl, 2011; Duca and Muellbauer, 2013; Ochmann, 2013). Moreover
the relative popularity of the Stock-Flow Consistent modeling approach (Godley and Lavoie,
2012), which models portfolio choice as in Brainard and Tobin (1968) may spark interest in
the econometric estimation of such relationships.
This chapter will adopt this approach, as it provides a clear link between investors’ portfolio
choice and capital flows to EMs, a key concept of this thesis. Portfolio investments in EMs
are, in this sense, analysed as the demand for EM assets from foreign institutional investors,
the aim being to uncover the direct link between the financial behaviour of investors and the
resulting cross-border asset positions.
In line with the considerations made in the previous chapters, two additional factors are
going to be introduced in the basic formulation of the model: the level of foreign exchange
reserves held by EMs and the funding level of advanced countries’ pension funds. The former
will be used as an indicator of the protection that EMs give to foreign investors against currency
risk, whereby the accumulation of FXR increases EM central banks’ possibility of intervening
in the foreign exchange market and stabilising the exchange rate. Higher reserves would
therefore encourage increased allocations to EM assets, by constituting the key “Keynesian
fundamental” that enhances the liquidity premium of EM currencies.
The funding level of advanced countries’ pension funds is used as a proxy for the balance
sheet conditions of institutional investors from advanced countries. As discussed in chapter 3,
funding levels represent the total asset over liability ratio, i.e. the net worth of a pension fund.
Underfunded pension funds have to enhance their portfolio return to have a suﬃcient pool
of assets to face their liabilities. In conditions of very low yields, a lower funding level may
increase the allocation to riskier investments. This would include EM assets, thus establishing
a negative relationship between asset allocation to EMs and funding levels.
Aside from the additional variables chosen, the application of the asset demand approach
in this chapter is innovative in three ways. Firstly, this is the first study adopting a panel
approach60. The demand for EM assets is analysed by pooling or grouping the observations
60A partial exception is Al-Zu’bi and Murinde (2011), who seeks to apply panel cointegration techniques but
reverts to SUR methods following unsuccessful statistical tests.
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for individual countries, to obtain parameters for the EM assets as whole. Two separate
single equations of asset demand for EM equity and bond portfolios will be estimated. The
restriction of parameters, typical of AIDS approaches, is therefore ruled out. Secondly, this
chapter applies the approach in the context of international portfolio choice, which is also novel,
as the literature typically focuses on a closed-economy, complete set of assets61. Finally, more
broadly, this chapter represents a contribution to the empirical grounding the relationships of
theoretical Stock-Flow Consistent models, since it provides econometric evidence which will
be used in chapter 7 for the construction of the model62.
5.2 Data and variables
All data are measured at a quarterly frequency or converted to it when the frequency is
higher63. The period considered is from the first quarter of 2003 for equities and the first
quarter of 2004 for bonds to the first quarter of 2013, although the panels may be unbalanced
as some countries’ series may be shorter. While this may seem a short time span, longer
datasets do not exist for constructing all the variables. The cross-sectional dimension is 20
countries for equities and 17 countries for bonds64.
The dependent variables, lem_alloc and lbem_alloc, are the logarithms of the portfolio
shares of EM equities and bonds held by institutional investors from advanced countries.
The allocation variables are constructed as the ratio between the Emerging Portfolio Fund
Research (EPFR) end-of-period holdings over the total wealth of institutional investors of
the Eurozone, Japan, the UK, the US, Australia and Canada, taken respectively from the
European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the UK Oﬃce for National Statistics, the Federal
61A possible alternative would be to follow Barr and Cuthbertson (1994), in considering EM assets holdings
as total wealth, and analyse the distribution of assets between bonds and equities, or across countries. This,
however, would not allow one to tackle the international dimension of portfolio allocation, including the push-
pull factors.
62As of now, Reyes and Mazier (2013) seems to be the only direct example of an estimation of portfolio
equations for utilisation in a Stock-Flow Consistent model. They empirically estimates all the parameters of
the balance sheet of the firms sector, which they then insert into their model and perform the usual dynamic
simulation experiments with it.
63As this happens only for the EPFR holdings variable, the end-of-month value is chosen for March, June,
September and December.
64The countries considered are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan Thailand
and Turkey. In the bonds equations, due to data availability and consistency issues, Taiwan, Argentina and
the Philippines are excluded.
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Reserve Economic Data, the Reserve Bank of Australia and Statcan. These represent the vast
majority of institutional investors world-wide. For all these countries, the end of quarter total
assets figures for insurance companies and pension funds are used, as a measure of institutional
investors total wealth. All individual countries figures are converted to US dollars, with the
exchange rate data used taken from the IMF Exchange Rate Report, and then aggregated to
create the denominator of the portfolio shares variables.
The EPFR dataset, which has already been used in other studies related to portfolio
investments in EMs (e.g. Fratzscher, 2012), collects flows and holdings data from a very large
number of mutual funds and ETFs. As discussed, this chapter uses the “Country Flows”
database, which extracts the information from each fund and aggregates it by recipient country.
The database, as shown in chapter 3, also allows to distinguish between institutional and retail
underlying investors clients, and in this paper only the former are used. The data used in this
chapter for the construction of the allocation variables are the estimated end of period holdings
for each of the countries included in the sample, which is used as the numerator of the ratio
between holdings and total wealth, as discussed. Although the fund coverage has increased
overtime, the database has been shown to be a consistent representation of both balance-of-
payment and fund-level data for the sample period considered (Jotikasthira et al., 2012; Pant
and Miao, 2012; Kroencke et al., 2015).
These variables have some limitations as indicators of asset shares. Firstly, they only cap-
ture the part of the EM holdings of institutional investors that is intermediated by funds, rather
than the total allocation. Secondly, while the advanced countries considered to construct the
variables constitute the biggest share of the of the global institutional investor sector, some of
the holdings captured in the EPFR database may still be held by other institutional investors.
Finally, the variable averages out portfolio shares over countries and sectors, since it is based
on the sum of the total holdings over the total wealth of insurance and pension funds, while
important diﬀerences may exist among investors both across countries and within countries.
Despite these limitations, as detailed data on the geographical breakdown of institutional in-
vestors’ portfolios is not available, the data are the best possible approximation to macro-level
portfolio weights for EMs allocated by foreign institutional investors.
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The following is a list of the independent variables with the expected parameter sign given
in brackets:
• lem_fx are the FXR oﬃcially held by EMs, in billions of US dollars on a logarithmic
scale, collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit. As discussed, this variable is used
to measure the collateral function of FXR, enhancing the liquidity of EMs currencies.
(+)
• lem_ret and lbem_ret are the logarithmic returns of EMs equities and bonds. Loga-
rithmic returns can be calculated from an index as log = ( ptpt 1 ), where pt is the value
of the index at time t. The indexes used are the Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI) total return index for equities and the JP Morgan EM-GBI index for bonds. The
EM-GBI, which tracks local currency bonds, is used rather than the EMBI, which tracks
hard currency bonds, due to its ability to capture the return eﬀects of the appreciation
and depreciation of the nominal exchange rate, which are likely to be an important deter-
minant of the returns, much as they are for equities. Four-period averages of the returns
are used, in order to avoid excessive return volatility and further reduce the problem of
endogeneity. (+)
• lwbret is the logarithmic returns of the JP Morgan GBI global index. The index tracks
sovereign bonds from the world’s advanced countries and is used as an indicator for
global “safe” returns. This is diﬀerent from what is commonly used as a “push” factor,
i.e. the US interest rate. This provides a more general indicator of low-risk assets, in
that, while US-dollar-denominated assets represent the safest alternative, all advanced
countries’ sovereign liabilities represent a qualitatively diﬀerent type of asset than EM
assets. This is consistent with the evidence that institutional investors typically use
advanced countries’ government bonds as liability-matching securities rather than as
return-seeking assets. Therefore, despite being a simplification, this variable allows for
a greater degree of generality than is commonly achieved. ( )
• lfg is the pensions “funding gap”. This is the weighted average of the diﬀerence from full
funding - i.e. a funding ratio equal to 1 - of the aggregate defined benefits pension funds
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sector in Japan, the UK and the US65. These are collected respectively from the Bank of
Japan flow of funds accounts, the Pension Protection Fund 7800 index, and the Milliman
Pension Funding Index. As discussed, this variable serves as an indicator of institutional
investors balance sheet fragility, denoting their potential incentive to “search for yield”
by investing in EM assets. (+)
The most notable exclusion from this list is GDP growth. Firstly, it does not fit the asset
demand approach very well: the approach is based on a direct relationship between asset shares
and their financial determinants, as well as the wealth of the investor. Asset allocation and
GDP growth are indirectly related, unlike balance sheet conditions and FXR. Secondly, the
rationale for the link is that higher GDP growth will yield higher long-run returns, but since
returns are already entered in the equation specification this could result in double counting
the same variable, possibly resulting in multicollinearity issues, in a framework that is already
known to suﬀer from this problem. Finally, if anything, the variable should be expected GDP
growth rather than current GDP growth, but long-run expectations data do not exist for
all variables, and would be subject to considerable heterogeneity across investors. Despite
these considerations, as a robustness check, estimation results with additional variables in the
baseline specification, including GDP growth, will be provided.
Figure 5.1 confirms allocation to EM bonds and equities has increased over the past decade,
roughly at an exponential pace, although equities allocation have increased more slowly since
the crisis. Funding ratios, as also discussed in chapter 4, have worsened since the crisis,
oscillating around a 10% gap. FXR also increased over the whole period, though the pace
seems to have slowed down since 2008. Table 5.1 shows basic statistics for the rest of the
variables: EM assets returns have been higher, with a correspondingly higher volatility. FXR
also increased over the whole period, though the pace seems to have slowed down since 2008.
Funding levels, on the other hand, show no similar trend. They improved substantially in the
period of 2003-2008 - i.e. the funding gap becomes smaller and negative - but then worsened
and have remained negative with a slightly higher than 10% funding gap since then. Most of
65Unfortunately suﬃciently long data series on a quarterly basis do not exist for other countries. These three
countries represent nonetheless the biggest three defined benefits sectors by portfolio size, as shown in section
2.
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these trends have already been described in the previous chapter.
Figure 5.1: Variables
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Note: All variables are on a logarithmic scale. Figures shown for lem_fx, lem_alloc and
lbem_alloc are averages across countries.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
lwbret 1220 .01189 .03712 -.048641 .10741
lem_ret 1260 .02033 .19407 -1.39260 .81344
lbem_ret 729 .02190 .07357 -.29291 .30402
Note: lem_ret and lbem_ret are averages across countries and over-time
Before moving to the estimation stage, one element should be checked for. Changes in
portfolio shares, rather than being the result of deliberate choice may be the result of the
changes in the assets valuation. Therefore, until the portfolio is rebalanced, portfolio shares
may just follow the market performance. The high correlation between market performance
and asset shares can be easily shown by means of this accounting identity66:
66This is very similar to the expression of Bohn and Tesar (1996), who used it to assess whether flows to
some assets were “chasing returns” or rather rebalancing portfolios.
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4ai = flowsi +Reti (5.6)
which simply states that changes in holdings of asset i are driven by either flows or return
into the assets. This can be rearranged as (see appendix for detail):
flowsi = 4( ai
W
)W( 1) + (
ai
W
)4W  Reti (5.7)
This expression shows that flows to a certain asset i are equal to the change in the portfolio
weight - whose determinants are indeed what is going to be assessed with the estimation - plus
the allocation of the changes in wealth according to the current portfolio weight for asset i,
minus the return. Analysing the correlation between these elements could provide several
insights about the relationship between flows and portfolio allocation. Firstly, the correlation
between flows and changes in portfolio weight represent the straightforward but important
link between changes in portfolio allocation and capital flows. Secondly, positive correlation
between returns and flows coupled with positive correlation between returns and changes in
portfolio weights, suggest that “return-chasing” may be a behavioural trait of investors: holding
gains on an asset induce investors to both let the corresponding portfolio weight grow, and
actively increase such an allocation by purchasing new assets.
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Table 5.2: Equities - Correlation
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary
Sample (adjusted): 1999Q2 2013Q2
Included observations: 1083 after adjustments
Correlation
Probability DWEALTH DWEIGHT EM_CG EM_FL
DWEALTH 1.000000
—–
DWEIGHT 0.628814 1.000000
0.0000 —–
EM_CG 0.709188 0.963956 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 —–
EM_FL 0.469255 0.601956 0.413469 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 —–
The data come from the EPFR allocation and flows, and the calculated total institutional
investors wealth.
The table shows the correlation coeﬃcients and corresponding p-values between the variables.
EM_CG is calculated as the diﬀerence between the change in holdings and the flows (EM_FL).
DWEALTH and DWEIGHT are respectively ( aiW )4W and 4( aiW )W( 1).
Table 5.3: Bonds - Correlation
Covariance Analysis: Ordinary
Sample (adjusted): 2004Q3 2013Q1
Included observations: 476 after adjustments
Correlation
Probability DWEALTH DWEIGHT BEM_CG BEM_FL
DWEALTH 1.000000
—–
DWEIGHT 0.448284 1.000000
0.0000 —–
BEM_CG 0.474447 0.953336 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 —–
BEM_FL 0.538522 0.680292 0.458735 1.000000
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 —–
The variables are analogous to the ones in Table Table 5.3.
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As Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 show, there is a very high correlation between the change in
portfolio weights and valuation changes for both bonds and equities. A change in valuation of
an asset is therefore extremely often accompanied by a change in the portfolio weight. Although
weaker, the relationship between flows and portfolio weights is also quite substantial, more so
for equities than bonds. With the exception of the relationship between changes in wealth and
valuation for equities, all the others, while significantly positive, are less remarkable. Overall
this shows that the change in portfolio weights is the key variable “absorbing” both increased
net purchases and valuation changes: capital flows to emerging markets are associated to
changes in asset demand rather than static allocations.
5.3 Econometric methodology
5.3.1 Macro-panel issues
Most of the works in the “pitfalls” tradition estimated long-run responses to interest rates
in the form of (5.1) or partial-adjustment models in the form (5.4) or both as in Backus
et al. (1980), and implicitly or explicitly use of a system of equations approach to estimate
the asset shares with either restrictions or mixed-bayesian estimators. However, beside the
described issues with multicollinearity, the literature does not deal with other potential sources
of problems in the estimation process. In particular, there are no references to the potentially
serious issues of non-stationarity in the variables. Returns and especially asset prices and
portfolio shares could however be non-stationary which could create issues, since it is well
known that this may lead to “spurious” inference, unless there is cointegration between the
variables(Granger and Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986; Engle and Granger, 1987).
The AIDS literature does on the other hand tackle these issues explicitly. The method-
ology followed is to estimate long-run parameters by pre-testing for cointegration between
the variables for each equation, and then estimate the model as a system of equations using
Zellner’s (1962) seemingly-unrelated-regression (SUR) method (Moore et al., 2005; Al-Zu’bi
and Murinde, 2011), or three-stages least squares (Zellner and Theil, 1962) to correct for en-
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dogeneity especially when estimating short-run dynamic equations (Barr and Cuthbertson,
1991, 1992, 1994; Adam, 1999; Blake, 2004). Since the models adopt a system of equations
approach, the cointegration tests are applied equation by equation, typically using Engle and
Granger (1987) residual-based test approach, except Moore et al. (2005), who complement it
with ?’s (1988) maximum likelihood test and the ARDL bounds test by Pesaran et al. (2001).
The chapter is also going to explicitly deal with the issues emerging from the growing
literature in panel-time series econometrics67. With macro-panels, where both the time-series
and cross-sectional dimension are equally “large”, several issues can emerge. First, as the time-
series dimension grows, the possibility of non-stationarity arises, which led to the formulation
of unit roots tests for panel data (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Breitung, 2000; Choi, 2001; Levin
et al., 2002; Im et al., 2003). The issue of non-stationarity naturally leads to the possibility for
panel cointegration. Similarly to the time-series case, panel cointegration tests can be either
based on the residuals of a cointegrating regression (Kao, 1999; Pedroni, 1999), maximum
likelihood procedures in a multivariate vector model (Johansen, 1988) or testing for error
correction (Westerlund, 2007).
In addition to these issues, which are common to time-series econometrics, panel data
presents two further complications. Firstly, as the time dimension grows and it becomes theo-
retically possible to individually estimate N time-series regressions, the possibility of obtaining
heterogeneous slope parameters arises. In the presence of such heterogeneity, pooled estima-
tors can produce biased results, while mean-group (MG) estimators, which estimate panel
parameters as averages of the N individual slope parameters, are consistent estimators (Pe-
saran and Smith, 1995). This also applies to the context of cointegration, where homogenous
cointegration represents a pooled cointegrated relationship between variables, while heteroge-
nous cointegration allows the possibility that individual cross-sections may cointegrate with
diﬀerent slope parameters and estimate the panel common parameter as an average of the
individual specific parameters (Phillips and Moon, 1999). Unit root and cointegration tests
have diﬀerent assumptions in these regards68. Cointegrating relationship can also be esti-
67The literature has been evolving extremely rapidly over the past fifteen years or so, what follows is a very
synthetic overview of the themes that are relevant for the purpose of this chapter
68For example, the Kao (1999) test assumes homogeneity, while Pedroni (1999) allow for both homogenous
and heterogenous cointegration.
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mated through pooling, e.g. the pooled fully modified-OLS (FMOLS) (Phillips and Moon,
1999), or MG estimators such as the MG FMOLS (Pedroni, 2000) or even combining pooling
with grouping, as in the dynamic error-correction specification pooled mean group (PMG)
estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999).
The second set of issues relates to cross-sectional dependence (CSD), that is the correlation
between the cross-sectional observations of a panel variable, giving rise to correlation between
the cross-sectional errors. Cross-sectional dependence creates serious inference problems: esti-
mation can be biased, and tests holding under the assumption of cross-sectional independence
can provide unreliable results (Phillips and Sul, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2004; Gengenbach et al.,
2006). To address this issue, researchers have a typically assumed factor error structure (Pe-
saran, 2006, p. 971):
yit = aidt +  ixit + eit (5.8)
eit =  ift + uit (5.9)
equation (5.9) states that the error term of a panel equation can be decomposed in a
common unobserved factor ft plus an idiosyncratic individual specific error term uit. CSD is
therefore driven by a common factor, which can be modeled as a stationary or non-stationary
variable. Since however the factor is unobserved, a method must be implemented to estimate it.
Three main routes have been suggested by the literature. The first one is to estimate the factor
directly as a principal component of the residuals or the variables of a first stage regression,
“decomposing” them into their idiosyncratic and common components (Bai and Ng, 2004). The
second is to approximate the factor by taking cross-sectional averages of the dependent variable
and the individual specific regressors, which are then added to the model specification as
variables. As shown by Pesaran (2006), these cross-sectional averages are a good approximation
of the unknown factors, and OLS estimation including those approximations - the so-called
correlated common eﬀects (CCE) estimators - is consistent. A third method has recently been
suggested by Eberhardt and Bond (2009). The authors propose a three-steps estimator, which
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they call the augmented-mean group (AMG): in the first step, a first-diﬀerence OLS regression
with time dummies is estimated; the coeﬃcients of the time dummies are then entered in N
level regressions as “common dynamic factors”; finally, the cross-sectional specific parameters
are averaged as in the MG estimators.
All these issues are relevant for this chapter. Emerging markets holdings have grown
considerably over the past decade, which is likely going to reflect in non-stationarity of the
asset shares. If other variables are also found to be non-stationary, then cointegration can
be tested. Cointegrating relationships could provide an understanding of the causes behind
the long-run emerging markets asset holdings increase. Similarly, cross-sectional dependence
is likely to be an issue, given the high degree of comovement between emerging markets asset
holdings and returns. Using factor error structures, tests and estimation can be made, taking
into account cross-sectional dependence. The issue of heterogeneity will also be taken into
account, as a “grouped” estimation - rather than pooled - will be used.
5.3.2 Tests and model specification
Before testing for unit roots and cointegration, a look at the CSD of the unit specific vari-
ables can give an idea of the extent of its importance in the estimation and testing. Although
the presence of some cross-sectionally invariant common variables (lfg vix lwbret) should itself
work as common factor and reduce CSD, the latter’s presence cannot be ruled out a priori. In
fact as table 4 shows, the cross-sections of all the variables are highly correlated, all failing to
reject the null of no CSD, according to the Pesaran (2004) test. This provides a good reason
to perform testing and estimation by taking CSD into account.
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Table 5.4: Cross-sectional dependence test
Average correlation coeﬃcients & Pesaran (2004) CSD test
Variable CSD-test p-value corr
lem_alloc 72.05 0.000*** 0.840
lbem_alloc 60.63 0.000*** 0.903
lem_ret 57.38 0.000*** 0.662
lbem_ret 21.44 0.000*** 0.322
lem_fx 58.83 0.000*** 0.877
Notes: Under the null hypothesis of cross-section independence CSD ~ N(0,1)
These are the results of the xtcd Stata routine (Eberhardt, 2011b).
A quick look at the figures hints that non-stationarity may be an issue for some of the
variables. For the panel cross-sectional specific variables, the unit root tests by Pesaran (2007),
which allow for the presence of CSD, is chosen. The test is based on an augmented version
of the Im et al. (2003) test, which is a panel version of an Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF)
equation. With p-lags this is:
4Yi,t = ai + biYi,t 1 + ciY t 1 +
pX
j=1
 ij4Yt j +
pX
j=0
dij4Y t j +  it+ uit (5.10)
The panel test statistic is based on a truncated average of the OLS t-ratios of bi. For the
non cross-sectional specific variables lfg, vix and lwbret standard time-series ADF tests are
used.
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Table 5.5: Panel Unit Root Test
Pesaran (2007) Panel Unit Root test (CIPS)
Variable lags Zt-bar p-value Variable lags Zt-bar p-value
lbem_alloc 0 0.415 0.661 lem_alloc 0 0.591 0.723
lbem_alloc 1 1.384 0.917 lem_alloc 1 0.824 0.795
lbem_ret 0 -14.849 0.000*** lem_ret 0 -19.731 0.000***
lbem_ret 1 -10.374 0.000*** lem_ret 1 -15.729 0.000***
lem_fx 0 0.584 0.720
lem_fx 1 0.335 0.631
Notes: The null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. The table shows the results for the
Pesaran (2007) unit root test, for the specification without a time trend. The multipurt Stata
routine was used (Eberhardt, 2011a).
*,** and *** denote rejection at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
As shown in Table 5.4 the asset shares and foreign exchange reserves do not reject the null
of unit root and are treated as non-stationary, while returns variables strongly reject the null
of a unit root, and are therefore treated as I(0).
Table 5.6: Time-series Unit Root Test
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
Variable No constant Constant Constant and trend
lfg 0.0531* 0.206 0.1689
lwbret 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
Note: The null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root. The time-series length is chosen in
line with the length of the estimated equations, and the sample therefore only considers values
from the first quarter of 2003.
*,** and *** denote rejection at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
The evidence for the common variables is less clear-cut. As Table 5.5 shows, global returns
are stationary. However, the test for lfg rejects the null at the 10% level in the case of no
deterministic variables, but does not do so when a constant and trends are added. The funding
gap should ideally fluctuate around 0, i.e. the fully-funded position, which could make the ADF
specification without deterministic component relevant. In practice, however, as it seems to
be the case in the period considered, pension funding may significantly and persistently diﬀer
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from full funding. For these reasons, lfg is treated as non-stationary.
The findings of the unit root tests present a challenge. As the literature review on asset
demand equations showed, economic theory suggest a relationship between the levels of return
and the asset shares. In the cointegration framework, long-run relationships can however only
exist between I(1) variables. As returns are stationary, this would imply that no long-run
relationship could exist between returns and asset shares.
However, as Pesaran and Shin (1998) argue, this is not the only possible way to investigate
long-run relationships. They suggest that economic theory should provide the background as
to whether a long-run relationship exists, rather than just statistical properties of the data.
Econometrically, such relationships can be represented by an autoregressive distributed lags
(ARDL) model. In the panel case, with p and q lags respectively for the regressors and the
dependent variable, this is expressed as
Yi,t =
pX
j=0
 
0
ijXi,t j +
qX
j=1
 i,jYi,t j + µi,t + ui,t
which can be conveniently reparametrised in an error-correction form:
4Yi,t =  iYi,t 1 +  
0
iXi,t +
p 1X
j=1
 ⇤i,j4Yi,t j +
p 1X
j=0
 ⇤
0
i,j4Xi,t j + µi,t + ui,t
 i =  
0@1  pX
j=1
 i,j
1A ,  0i = qX
j=0
 i,j ,  
⇤
i,j =  
pX
m=j+1
 i,m,  
⇤
i,j =  
pX
m=j+1
 i,m
As shown by Pesaran et al. (1999), the advantage of ARDL models of this kind is that
they can be estimated with I(0) and I(1) variables, provided that some assumptions, which
will be discussed below, are met. This seems to be particularly appropriate in the case of
asset demand equations, since it would allow for the inclusion of returns variables in the long-
run relationship. Moreover, as these models are autoregressive, they do not suﬀer from the
endogeneity bias (Chudik and Pesaran, 2013), which would otherwise be a serious issue in this
chapter, since causality between asset demand and returns or foreign exchange could run both
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ways.
In the panel case, ARDL models can be estimated with diﬀerent assumptions in terms of
heterogeneity: with heterogenous parameters, utilising the MG estimator (Pesaran and Smith,
1995). An alternative specification could be to assume that the coeﬃcients were homogeneous,
so that all coeﬃcients were equal for all the N cross-sections, which could be estimated with
standard panel estimators, such as in the fixed eﬀects model. An intermediate technique is
the pooled-mean group (PMG) estimator proposed by Pesaran et al. (1999), which imposes
homogeneity on the long-run coeﬃcients but allows the short-run dynamics to be heterogenous.
In order for the ARDL models, including the PMG estimator, to be consistent, some
assumptions must be met. The first one is the absence of serial correlation in the residuals,
which can be tackled by adding further lags to the specifications, so that the regressors become
exogenous. The second one is the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables of
interest, ensuring that the model is dynamically stable, and therefore  i < 0 .
There is no formal way to pre-test the existence of a long-run relationship in the panel
case. Therefore, aside from economic theory considerations, the long-run relationship between
the variables can be inferred in three ways. Firstly, the cointegration tests show that the
non-stationary variables are cointegrated in the traditional sense, suggesting that, at least
between them, a long-run relationship exists (table 7). Two tests are used, both accounting
for the possibility of CSD: the first one is based on the significance of the error-correction
term Gengenbach et al. (2008)69, the second on the stationarity of the residuals (Holly et al.,
2010)70. Rejection of a unit root indicates the presence of cointegration. Secondly, as the
CCE estimators are consistent “irrespective of the order of integration of the data observed”
69 As in the test of Westerlund (2007), the test statistic pools the individual t-ratios of the parameters of the
lagged dependent variable, with the null of insignificant error correction. The test is based on a factor error
structure, and is therefore robust to CSD, even in the presence of non-stationary factors. The authors suggest
augmenting the model specification with cross-sectional averages, as in the CCE estimators, to account for the
factors.
70 After estimating a relationship with the CCE pooled estimators, the residuals uit = Yit−b CCEPXit−↵ˆi
are collected and then tested for stationarity using the test fromPesaran (2007)
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(Kapetanios et al., 2011, p. 338), a unit root test on the residuals of a CCE mean group
(CCEMG) regression between the variables, in the spirit of Cavalcanti et al. (2011b), is con-
ducted, yielding the results of stationary residuals for up to five lags. Finally, the negative
sign and significance of the error-correction parameters are to be taken as a further indicator
of the existence of a long-run relationship (Cavalcanti et al., 2011a; Albuquerque et al., 2014).
A final condition to be met, in the panel case, is the absence of CSD. As shown above, this
assumption is most likely not met. However, suitable modifications to the estimators can be
made to estimate parameters in the presence of CSD. Panel ARDL models augmented with
cross-sectional averages have recently been proposed (Cavalcanti et al., 2011b; Chudik and
Pesaran, 2013; Chudik et al., 2013). For example, a CCE version of the PMG (CCE-PMG)
estimator has been used by Cavalcanti et al. (2011a) and Albuquerque et al. (2014). The
estimator used in this chapter for the baseline specification however is the AMG estimator,
which has also been used in the context of ARDL models (Albuquerque et al., 2014; Sadorsky,
2013; Elliott et al., 2014). This is due to its approach in dealing with the unknown source of
CSD, which, as discussed, is based on the estimation of a common-dynamic process based on
time dummies. As some of the variables in this chapter are not cross-sectional specific, there
would be fewer cross-sectional averages estimating the factor than independent variables. The
AMG approach to CSD, not being subject to this issue, is therefore preferred. The chapter
will, however, also use other estimators, including the CCE ones, to check for result robustness.
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Table 5.7: Panel Cointegration Tests
Error-correction test
(Gengenbach et al., 2008)
CCE
Residuals-based
test (Holly
et al., 2010)
CCE-MG
Residuals-based
test (Cavalcanti
et al., 2011b)
Panel t-test
(0 lags, 1 lag)
Panel t-test
trend (0
lags, 1 lag)
CIPS statistic (0
lags, 1 lag)
CIPS statistic (0
lags, 1 lag)
Equities -2.793**,-2.745**
-3.037*,
-3.003* -2.122*, -2.078
-10.839***,
-10.673***
Bonds -3.017***,-2.8**
-2.936,
-2.732
-2.407***,
-2.150*
-12.925***,
-11.226***
Notes: The first two columns show the panel t-test statistic specification of the Gengenbach
et al. (2008) test. This test was computed in Stata using the routine described by Prof. Markus
Eberhardt on his website (http://goo.gl/zBpLJM).
The third column shows the CIPS test statistic, resulting from the residuals-based testing
procedure used byHolly et al. (2010).
The fourth column shows the results of a CIPS test on the residuals of a CCE-MG regression
with all the variables included in levels, as done by (Cavalcanti et al., 2011b).
*,** and *** denote rejection at the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
5.4 Estimation results
5.4.1 Baseline results
The baseline specification of the equation is:
4Yi,t =  i(Yi,t 1    0iXi,t    0iWt) +
p 1X
j=1
 ⇤
0
i,j4Yi,t j +
p 1X
j=0
 ⇤
0
i,j4Xi,t j +
p 1X
j=0
✓
0
i,j4Wt j
+⇢i,tCDPt + µi,t + ui,t (5.11)
X =
266664
lem_fx
lem_ret
377775 andW =
266664
lfg
lwbret
377775
with X being the vector of cross-sectional specific variables and W that of common vari-
ables. CDP is the common dynamic process of the AMG estimator, calculated as discussed.
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In order to cope with the issues related to the lag augmentation, three diﬀerent model
specifications are estimated. The first two model specifications apply the same lag augmenta-
tion to all variables, respectively one lag for model (1) and two lags for model (2). Model (3)
allows the lag length to be selected according to the Schwarz information criterion, up to 3
lags71. This results in choosing the following lag structure: one for lfg, two for lem_fx, one
for lwbret, two for lbem_ret and lem_ret, and one for the dependent variables. Given the
relative short time dimension of the panels, longer lags specifications are unfeasible.
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9. In all models, the
error-correction terms are in the dynamically stable range, since they are strongly significant,
negative, and between 0 and -1. As stated above, this confirms the existence of a long-run
relationship between the variables. Also, there does not seem to be a major diﬀerence between
the speeds of convergence for bonds and equities
As expected, returns and asset allocation are positively related. For EM equities, a 1% return
Table 5.8: Estimation Results - Equities
ARDL model, dep. variable: 4lem_alloc
Model AMG (1) AMG (2) AMG (3)
Long Run
lem_fx 0.577* 0.683 0.807**
lem_ret 2.792*** 2.199*** 2.181***
lwbret -0.566 -0.44 -0.627
lfg 0.661*** 0.583* 0.593***
Short run
ec -0.535*** -0.681*** -0.556***
4lem_ret 0.827*** 0.878*** 0.829***
4lwbret 0.166 0.181 0.127
CDP 0.845*** 0.873*** 0.85***
Notes: Models (1), (2) and (3) refer to the diﬀerent lag augmentations described in the chapter.
CDP is the common dynamic process estimated by the augmented mean group; ec is the error
correction term. All models contain individual constants and time trends. Long-run standard
errors were computed using the delta method.
The following Stata routines were used: xtpmg (Blackburne and Frank, 2007), xtmg (Eber-
hardt, 2013), nlcom
increase implies a response of more than double that in terms of asset allocation, whereas for
71For the country-specific variable the information criterion were applied to the individual time-series, as
done by Pesaran et al. (1999).
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Table 5.9: Estimation Results - Bonds
ARDL model, dep. variable: 4lbem_alloc
model AMG (1) AMG (2) AMG (3)
Long Run
lem_fx 0.697* 0.897** 0.892***
lbem_ret 4.837** 3.623** 4.565***
lwbret -0.868 -0.091 -0.577
lfg 1.395** 1.528*** 1.317**
Short run
ec -0.551*** -0.724*** -0.591***
4lbem_ret 0.03 -0.024 0.098
4lwbret 0.213 -0.13 0.161
CDP 0.678*** 0.777*** 0.703***
Notes: Models (1), (2) and (3) refer to the diﬀerent lag augmentations described in the chapter.
CDP is the common dynamic process estimated by the augmented mean group; ec is the error
correction term. All models contain individual constants and time trends. Long-run standard
errors were computed using the delta method.
The following Stata routines were used: xtpmg (Blackburne and Frank, 2007), xtmg (Eber-
hardt, 2013), nlcom
bonds the response is even higher, ranging from just over 3.6% to more than 4.8%. While
these may seem implausibly big parameters, it has to be remembered that asset allocations
to EMs are still small, which implies that relative changes may in fact still imply relatively
small absolute changes in portfolio weights. The short-run parameters for equities are also all
positive and significant. The results for global returns are less decisive. All the parameters
are negative, but they are never statistically significant.
The parameters of FXR are always positive and significant. The values of the parameters
seem to be slightly smaller for equities, but there does not seem to be a major diﬀerence between
the two assets. The funding gap parameters are also positive and significant, thus suggesting
higher allocations to EMs in the case of underfunding. The impact on bond allocations seems
to be particularly notable, being considerably higher than 1% for each percentage point of
underfunding, while the impact on equities is smaller, ranging roughly between 0.5% and
0.6%.
The common dynamic process in the AMG models is positive and significant across all
models. As Eberhardt and Bond (2009) discuss, the estimator is designed to explicitly account
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for and interpret the estimated common factor72. In this scenario, it is hard to guess what the
process is in fact capturing. Its positive sign suggests it is capturing some unobserved factor
positively aﬀecting the growth of EM holdings. This could be, for example, a decrease in
risk-aversion regarding the asset class as a whole or the growing accessibility of these countries
due to their increasing openness and the creation of new EM funds.
5.4.2 Robustness checks
This section presents the results of alternative model specifications, in order to verify the
robustness of the results.
First of all, model (3) is estimated using the cross-sectional averages method, to deal with
CSD, as proposed by Chudik and Pesaran (2013). The cross-sectional averages lag length for
these CCE models is chosen to be the same as that of the variables. Hausman tests are used
to check whether long-run pooling is feasible; in case of rejection, the MG approach is chosen
over the PMG.
Secondly, as shown by Chudik et al. (2013), while consistent under very general assump-
tions, panel ARDL models may not always perform well when the sample considered is small.
The long-run relationships are therefore also estimated using more standard dynamic panel
techniques: the system generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator of Blundell and
Bond (1998) and the bias-corrected least squares dummy variables (LSDVC) (Bruno, 2005).
As shown in the comprehensive simulation exercise of Flannery and Hankins (2013), these
estimators perform well in the presence of (even second-order) serial correlation, and endo-
geneity. However, while the GMM estimator remains consistent even in the presence of weak
CSD, such as spatial dependence (Sarafidis, 2009), these estimators do not, in general, take
CSD into account. Moreover, the GMM techniques are designed for large-N-small-T panels,
clearly not the case in this chapter.
Finally, three variables are introduced to the baseline specification73. The first, the VIX
72The authors discuss for example the estimation of total factor productivity in a neoclassical production
function.
73Tests on these variables have also been conducted, but are omitted due to space limitations.
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index, which measures the volatility of the Standard and Poor index, is added in levels to
check for the impact of short-term risk appetite, which has been found to have a significantly
negative impact on capital flows in many recent studies (e.g. Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Rey,
2013; Ananchotikul and Zhang, 2014). The second, to check for the standard portfolio theory
contention that higher return volatility ceteris paribus should reduce an asset’s desirability,
is the four-period standard deviation of the return variable. This variable is added to both
the long-run and the short-run relationship. The third is GDP growth74, as it is often the
presumption that higher growth in these countries is a major “pull” factor for foreign investors.
These variables are added one at the time and all together to the baseline AMG specification,
with the number of lags included chosen according to the Schwarz Information Criterion.
The results of all these robustness checks are shown in Table 5.10 and Table 5.11. The
impact of the VIX is negative, as expected, for equities allocation, denoting a decrease in
allocations to EMs when risk-aversion is high. On the other hand, it is positive in the bonds
equation. This may result from the closer link between the VIX index and equity markets, thus
predicting higher demand for bonds, including EM bonds, when volatility in equity markets
is higher. Nevertheless, the values of the parameters are small at little over 0.01%, therefore
indicating a very small impact of short-run risk-aversion swings on allocations to EMs. These
results are not aﬀected by the inclusion of other control variables. The other two variables
have the expected sign, positive for growth and negative for standard deviation. However,
standard deviation is only significant in the equities equation, while growth is significant in
the bonds equation75.
The inclusion of the control variables does not substantially change any of the results.
In the equity equations, the only notable change is obtained when including the VIX, which
makes the global return variable statistically significant. In the bond equations, the notable
result is the statistical insignificance of FXR in the long run. However, the short-run FXR
variable becomes statistically significant and positive when the VIX is controlled for. This
could indicate that, in conditions of turbulence, increasing buﬀers of safety represented by
FXR become more important than the level of FXR per se.
74Quarter-to-quarter yearly real GDP growth was used.
75It is no longer statistically significant if entered with the other control variables. Neither is it statistically
significant if a time trend is added, although the time trend itself is not statistically significant.
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The alternative estimators used do not yield substantially diﬀerent results either.
Table 5.10: Robustness Checks - Equities
Dep. variable: 4lem_alloc for ARDL models, lem_alloc for GMM and LSDVC
Long Run
model AMG AMG AMG AMG CCE-PMG GMM LSDVC
lem_fx 0.684* 0.767* 0.981** 0.733* 0.942*** 0.168*** 0.122***
lem_ret 2.395*** 2.16*** 1.923*** 2.175*** 2.335*** 0.977*** 1.014***
lwbret -0.89** -0.576 -0.404 -0.522 -0.144 0.06 0.57
lfg 0.546*** 0.624** 0.487** 0.392* 0.627*** 0.34*** 0.375***
lem_sd -0.391*** -0.465***
growth 0.242 0.032
Short run
ec -0.594*** -0.564*** -0.582*** -0.643*** -0.266***
4lem_ret 1.023*** 1.101*** 1.145*** 0.961*** 1.797***
vix -0.014*** -0.014***
4lwbret 0.224** 0.102 0.07 0.07 -0.076
4lem_fx -0.05 -0.031 -0.156 0.000 0.256
CDP 0.932*** 0.855*** 0.868*** 0.973***
Hausman test 7.96 (0.093)
Notes: Lag structure of ARDL models chosen according to the Schwarz Information Criterion.
CDP is the common dynamic process estimated by the augmented mean group; ec is the error
correction term. The Hausman test reports the p-value in brackets: non-rejection allows long-
run pooling. All models contain individual constants and time trends. Long-run standard
errors for the AMG model were computed using the delta method.
The following Stata routines were used: xtpmg (Blackburne and Frank, 2007), xtmg (Eber-
hardt, 2013), nlcom, xtdpdsys and xtlsdvc.
5.5 Interpretation and implications
These results provide evidence for the hypothesised relationship. Institutional investors
seem to conform broadly to the asset demand specifications proposed. Several observations
can be made in terms of the interpretation and implications of this finding.
First of all, the size of the error correction is above 50% in the majority of the equations.
This implies that investors do not instantaneously achieve their desired portfolio shares, but
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Table 5.11: Robustness Checks - Bonds
Dep. variable: 4lbem_alloc for ARDL models, lbem_alloc for GMM and LSDVC
Long Run
model AMG AMG AMG AMG CCE-PMG GMM LSDVC
lem_fx 0.106 0.383 0.346 -0.109 0.543 0.246*** 0.155***
lbem_ret 3.912*** 3.519* 2.599* 2.175*** 2.174 1.827*** 1.346***
lwbret -0.936 -1518* -0.857 -1.969** -1.246 -0.708** -0.65**
lfg 1.037** 1.008** 1.256*** 1.125** 0.388 0.22*** 0.178
lbem_sd -1.173 -0.988
growth 2.535*** 0.007
Short run
ec -0.637*** -0.624*** -0.656*** -0.758*** -0.717***
4lbem_ret -0.174 0.165 0.668 0.885 0.271
vix 0.025*** 0.034***
4lwbret 0.414 0.439 0.07 0.885 0.076
4lem_fx 0.653* 0.609* 0.365 0.767** 0.454
CDP 0.603*** 0.575*** 0.609*** 0.757***
Hausman test 15.41 (0.004)
Notes: Lag structure of ARDL models chosen according to the Schwarz Information Criterion.
CDP is the common dynamic process estimated by the augmented mean group; ec is the error
correction term. The Hausman test reports the p-value in brackets: non-rejection allows long-
run pooling. All models contain individual constants and time trends. Long-run standard
errors for the AMG model were computed using the delta method.
The following Stata routines were used: xtpmg (Blackburne and Frank, 2007), xtmg (Eber-
hardt, 2013), nlcom, xtdpdsys and xtlsdvc.
are able to adjust to them relatively quickly, correcting half of the gap in one period. This
is in contrast to most of the AIDS literature, which often finds slow adjustment processes,
even for institutional investors (Blake, 2004; Dinenis and Scott, 1993). This finding suggest
that frictions, such as transaction costs, may not be a major obstacle to foreign institutional
investors reaching their desired EM asset allocations.
Secondly, FXR positively aﬀect asset allocations to EMs. This is in line with the ideas
discussed in this and previous chapters of this dissertation: FXR can be interpreted almost
as a protection provided by EMs to foreign investors, which reduces the overall riskiness and
thus increase demand for their assets.
Thirdly, the investor’s balance sheet also matters. The finding of the positive impact of the
funding gap on allocations to EM assets is perhaps the most relevant finding of this chapter.
In line with the hypothesis made in this dissertation, institutional investors’ demand for EM
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assets is increased when they are in need of higher returns to reinforce their balance sheets.
In policy terms, this may add to the list of important “push” factors that need to be taken
into account when assessing capital flows. The finding that the impact on bonds is higher
is particularly relevant, since the rise in the flow of bonds to EMs really exploded after the
2008 crisis. A recovery of institutional investors’ balance sheets may have important adverse
consequences on these patterns.
Returns on safe assets do not seem to be a major determinant of allocations to EM assets.
This could suggest that the allocation to EMs is not necessarily “pushed” by low interest rates
in advanced countries per se. However, two caveats are in order here. Firstly, the findings
could reflect a problem with the variable itself. It is hard to find a single variable for advanced
markets’ “safe” returns. In practice, portfolio choice is not a binary selection between the safe
government bonds of advanced countries and risky EM assets. Secondly, it is important to
point out that, while global safe returns per se may not have a direct influence on portfolio
allocation, they still matter indirectly through the balance sheet conditions. The funding gap
is influenced by the size of the pension liabilities, which in turn depend on a discount factor,
usually linked to the value of bond yields. As a result, ceteris paribus, an increase in interest
rates will decrease liabilities, thereby reducing the funding gap. In this way, an increase in
advanced countries’ bond yields may still generate a decrease in the allocation to EMs.
Finally, institutional investors seem to care about long-run returns. Only in the case of
equity are short-run returns positively related to allocations, which could also partially reflect
the eﬀect of increasing asset prices on the weights when the portfolio is not rebalanced on a
quarterly basis. The finding that the VIX has a very small impact further suggests that these
investors are not overly concerned with sudden shifts in global market volatility. However,
the statistical insignificance of GDP growth seems to indicate that investors, when seeking
returns, are not always mindful of the underlying real economic growth in EMs.
Overall, these findings indicate, on the one hand, a long-term approach taken by institu-
tional investors in their demand for EM assets, and a lack of concern over immediate returns
and sudden shifts in risk appetite. However, these investors respond to changes in their bal-
ance sheet conditions and the level of FXR in EMs, over a relatively short – i.e. quarterly –
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“long”-run, with rather quick adjustment to their desired levels, and this may be unrelated to
the economic growth of such countries.
This suggests that demand for EM assets over a medium-term horizon may decrease, should
funding levels start to improve. An increase in interest rates implemented by advanced coun-
tries’ central banks could cause allocations to EMs to decrease, as it could improve the funding
levels of pension funds, which would therefore be under much less pressure to generate high
returns by investing in EMs. This could also be procyclically reinforced by EMs’ decumulation
of FXR, therefore potentially generating issues for financial stability.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided evidence on the demand for EM assets from advanced countries’
institutional investors. It has applied innovative estimators for ARDL models to the estimation
of asset demand. This contributes, on the one hand, to the literature on the determinants of
portfolio investment by providing a link between international portfolio investment and the
behaviour of investors. On the other hand, it expands the application of the asset demand
approach to international portfolio choice, and to the demand for EM assets in particular.
The findings of the chapter broadly confirm the relationship hypothesised in this disserta-
tion. Institutional investors do care about long-run returns, but their demand for EM assets
is aﬀected by two additional factors: the amount of FXR that EMs hold and the conditions
of their balance sheets, proxied by the funding ratio of advanced countries’ pensions funds.
These results are robust to the inclusion of additional control variables.
These results provide evidence for two key hypotheses of this dissertation. Institutional
investors’ balance sheet fragility lead to higher allocations to EM assets in the long-run. The
same can be said for foreign exchange reserves, which therefore confirms the importance of
this crucial “fundamental”, which is interpreted in this dissertation as a key indicator of EM’s
currency liquidity.
Appendix
This appendix shows that (5.7) can be derived from (5.6).
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Multiplying 4ai for WW , and writing ai as a for convenience:
4a = 4aW
W
=
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a  a 1
W
◆
W , (5.12)
which, using W = W 1 +4W , can be rewritten as
4a = a
W
W 1 +
a
W
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W
W 1   a 1
W
4W . (5.13)
Writing the fourth term of 5.13term as  a 1W W 1 + a 1W W and simplifying:
4a = a
W
W 1 +
a
W
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⇢W . (5.14)
Multipliying the third term of 5.14for W 1W 1 :
4a = a
W
4W + a
W
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W 1 , (5.15)
which is equal to
4a = a
W
4W +4
⇣ a
W
⌘
W 1 . (5.16)
Combining (5.16) with (5.6) and rearranging, results in (5.7).
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Chapter 6
Semi-structured interviews with
European pension funds
Introduction
In the previous chapters, this dissertation has considered the various factors aﬀecting the
growth in institutional investors asset allocation to emerging markets. In particular, chapter 5
has explored quantitatively the importance of some of these determinants, by estimating asset
demand equations. The contention that, aside from returns, balance sheet conditions and the
level foreign exchange reserves matter for institutional investors demand for emerging markets
assets was by and large confirmed.
However, there are several reasons why gaining further insights through the assessment of
qualitative data is important. Firstly, as discussed, the asset allocation variables constructed
and examined so far are an approximation of the actual values, as they are constructed as
“macro” variables from the whole advanced world rather than micro-data from individual funds.
As discussed in the introduction, although the thesis is mostly concerned with a macroeconomic
understanding of the phenomenon of capital flows, the consistency of micro-level behaviour
with the macro-level findings of the previous chapters is deemed to be important. “Triangulat-
ing” the quantitative results with qualitative data, by focusing on diﬀerent levels of analysis,
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increases the reliability of the findings.
Secondly, as also discussed in the introduction, qualitative data may help uncover aspects
that are hard to capture with quantitative methods. Some factors aﬀecting the decision to in-
vest in emerging markets (EM) are just not quantitative in nature - e.g. political risk76 -. More
importantly, qualitative data also sheds light on the processes and institutional mechanisms
that underly the decision to invest in EM. The findings of this chapter contribute in locating
the demand EM assets within the actual process of liability-driven investment strategies. The
causal inference originating from the previous chapter therefore acquire a deeper meaning in
being located in the institutional and historical reality of pension funds.
Finally, while quantitative methods were key in providing a synthetic answer to the relative
importance of diﬀerent factors, interviews highlight the heterogeneity of such factors for diﬀer-
ent investors. Chapter 5, showed, econometrically, how lower pension funding ratios results in
higher allocation to EM assets. However this may depend on country-specific factors, such as
regulations and institutions, all of which can be more clearly captured with qualitative meth-
ods. Moreover the same broad factor can be subject to diﬀerent interpretation by diﬀerent
investors, leading to diversity in the implementation of investments strategies, which a purely
quantitative analysis may fail to capture.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 discusses the sample of and
interviews method. Section 6.2 provides an overview of the diﬀerent pension schemes insti-
tutional arrangements in the countries included in the sample. Section 6.3 deals with the
investors’ factors, particularly the role of liabilities in determining the asset allocation. Sec-
tion 6.4 discusses the role of EM assets in pension funds’ and the domestic factors and external
aﬀecting their risk/return characteristics. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.1 Interviews method and sample choice
The qualitative data-gathering method used is semi-structured interviews. This involves
asking a series of questions to the interviewees following an “interview guide”, listing themes
that the researcher is interested in exploring, but allowing interviewees to expand and touch
upon themes beyond such a guideline.
76Indices of political risk do exist, but the extent to which they are meaningful is questionable.
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Semi-structured interviews are a qualitative method, since the nature of the data gathered
is often not quantifiable for several reasons, most prominently the small sample size, which
does not allow the kind of inference typical of statistical methods. They diﬀer in this sense
from surveys or structured interviews, which, although not starting directly from numeric
data, are used to make synthetic inferential statements about the frequency of some answers.
At the same time they diﬀer from unstructured interviews, as the guide allows for “testing”
hypothesis rather than only having an exploratory nature.
The potential interviewees targets were selected out of a subsection of the advanced coun-
tries institutional investors’ population: the European pension fund sector. While the focus on
pension funds has been an overarching theme of the whole dissertation, the choice of geograph-
ical focus on Europe has been driven by two main reasons. Firstly, the assistance provided
by Investment and Pensions Europe77 made it possible to choose potential interviewee targets
from a large database of European pension funds. This allowed the sample to be chosen within
a large initial population. Secondly, European countries allow for an easier comparison of the
heterogeneity of pension funds across countries: as the economic conditions in which they
operate are very similar, diversity in their behaviour will reflect the country-level specificities
of their pension fund sector - e.g. regulation or institutional arrangements.
Within the European pension fund sector, interviewees profiles fall broadly into two cat-
egories: the first are oﬃcers and/or trustees of the pension funds, the second are investment
consultants and/or asset managers who work - not necessarily exclusively - with institutional
investors clients. This latter category was chosen with particular reference to the pension fund
sector of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, where often, as it will be shown in the
rest of the chapter, pension funds rely on external consultants for their investments allocation,
and sometimes asset management as well.
In order to test one of the main research hypothesis of this dissertation, the role of balance
sheets conditions and liabilities, the focus has been primarily on defined benefits (DB) pension
funds. As discussed, unlike defined contribution (DC) schemes, DB pension funds’ assets need
not be equal to liabilities at all times, and the sign and size of such a diﬀerence may have
77The author has been was awarded IPE scholarship grant in 2013 and has been in touch with the institution
since then.
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important implications for asset allocation. This led to focus primarily on those European
countries where the pension fund sector has a sizable DB component 78: UK, the Netherlands
and Denmark.
Most interviewees come from larger institutions, as smaller schemes often do not have
an independent investment management team. However this is unlikely to create a serious
bias, as in Denmark and the Netherland the sector is highly concentrated, while in the UK,
smaller schemes typically rely more heavily on external consultants and managers, which are
part of the interviewed sample. As a result the sample, while purposively selected, is fairly
representative.
Following these criteria, a sample of about 25-30 interviewees was chosen initially, with 14
eventually accepting to be interviewed. Three interviews were conducted in person, while the
rest were phone calls. All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The transcripts
obtained constitute the source for the analysis of the following sections79.
6.2 Organisation and institutional arrangements
The organisation of pension funds, from the provision of benefits to the asset allocation,
is quite complex. There is considerable heterogeneity across countries and sectors, on several
dimensions. This section will give an overview of the main characteristics.
The first is benefits provision. In the UK pension funds are traditionally defined benefits
(DB) final salary or career-average schemes, where the level of benefits depends on the years of
employment and the wage level. These funds are sponsored by employers - either a company
or the government in the case public sector employees - who are ultimately responsible for the
financial provision of the benefits. Decisions on these funds are taken by a board of trustees
in the interest of the beneficiaries. Although many DB funds in the private sector are now
closed to new employees, they still hold the majority of pension assets (BoE, 2014). The
remaining assets are kept in defined contribution (DC) schemes, whereby employees have an
individual contract with a pension provider, sponsored by their employer. In DC schemes the
78The definition of a DB used here is broader than what is commonly used, and it includes all schemes
where benefits are not exactly tied to the value of the assets. For example DC schemes with minimum return
guarantees, although diﬀerent from UK or US traditional “final salary” schemes, would be included in the
definition.
79Due to the anonymity of the interviewees, the quotations will only distinguish respondents by nationality.
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fund members bear the full risk of financial investment, with their retirement account being
equal the market value of the assets they own.
In both the Netherlands and Denmark pension funds there exist more hybrid regimes.
The Dutch system is mostly based on industry-wide funds and benefits are usually calculated
through DB-like accrual based rules - typically career-average salary based. However, unlike
standard DB schemes, employees and employers often share the risk of benefits provision, so
that in case of severe deficits pension entitlements can be lowered. Similarly, Danish pension
funds are usually organised as collective DC schemes with guaranteed minimum returns or
conversion rates of their pension pots into annuity contracts at retirement 80.
A second related element of diversity across pensions from diﬀerent countries is size. UK
pension schemes are company or government authority based, which makes the UK pension
fund system quite dispersed across several funds of varying size, reflecting that of the spon-
soring employer. On the other hand, the pension fund sector in the Netherlands is much more
concentrated into a smaller number of bigger collective and industry-wide schemes. Similarly,
in Denmark, large pension providers manage pension and investments of most occupational
schemes.
A third dimension concerns the relationships between the pension scheme, the consultants
and the asset managers. The traditional configuration in the UK, in the words of an intervie-
wee, is one where “the pension fund is managed by a group of trustees - the trustees are not
investment professionals they tend work at the company who is responsible for the pension
fund - these trustees have ultimate responsibility to set the investment strategy of the pension
fund, but they will usually get investment advice, from a specialist investment advisory firm,
[...] they would advise trustees on specific strategic allocations, and then they also usually ad-
vise the trustees on which funds to implement the investment strategy with” (UK interviewee
1).
An alternative arrangement is the “fiduciary management model”, which is widespread
in the Netherlands and has been introduced in the UK too in recent years. “The fiduciary
management model is where the trustees hand over their investment decision-making entirely
to a single provider. Now that might be the investment consultant, who eﬀectively become
80See Pugh and Yermo (2008) for an overview of diﬀerent kinds of DB arrangements across OECD countries.
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the asset manager and the adviser all in one, or it may be the asset manager, so the asset
manager may advise and also implement strategies. So you see a kind of a blurring between
the adviser and the asset manager or the implementer” (UK interviewee 1).
The Danish pension system is eﬀectively similar to this, since pension administration
providers, usually owned by the occupational pension funds themselves, eﬀectively manage
the whole pension fund activities, from benefits provision to investment strategy and asset al-
location. As these pension administration providers are quite large, often they would manage
their investments directly, rather than relying on external asset managers.
A final element of heterogeneity is regulation. Most importantly for this dissertation, this
concerns regulation on funding levels and/or solvency margins81. UK pension funds do not
need to be fully-funded at all times, and the recovery plan in case in case of underfunding
may take up to 10 years. Danish pension funds on the other hand need to respect a fully-
funded status at all time, and have to comply with a risk-based funding margins regulation:
riskier assets carry higher capital requirements, and therefore a anything else being constant
a higher funding level82. Dutch regulations are somewhat in the middle, with recovery plans
to full funding (105%) lasting up to three years, and newly introduced risk-based funding
requirements, which have however a long 15 years compliance period.
As it will be shown these diﬀerent institutional arrangements and regulations may have an
impact on pension funds’ asset allocation to EM. For example, bigger pension funds investing
directly could have a diﬀerent perspective towards EM assets and the role they play in a
portfolio than a smaller pension fund accessing EM assets through an externally managed
global equity fund. Similarly, diﬀerent regulations lead to a diﬀerent relationship between
funding levels and asset allocation, and the allocation to return-seeking assets - which include
EM assets - in particular.
81For a comprehensive overview of diﬀerent regulations across OECD countries see Pugh and Yermo (2008)
82 These regulation are very similar in spirit to the capital requirements regulations such as Solvency II for
insurance companies or Basel III for banks:
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6.3 Investors factors
As argued in this dissertation, while most of the literature has focused on local and global
factors aﬀecting EM assets, investors’ factors are a crucial determinant of asset demand. In
particular, the conditions of institutional investors’ liabilities can be a very important de-
terminant of institutional investors’ risk appetite, reflected in the split between “growth” and
“protection” assets. Aside from liabilities, some other behavioural factors, such as shifts in risk-
aversion and herding, whether rational or panic-driven, may also contribute to put pressure
on EM assets, especially in times of crisis.
6.3.1 Liabilities
The centrality of liabilities in the implementation of investment strategies came to the
fore prominently in the interviewees responses, regardless the heterogeneity of institutional
arrangements described in the previous section. Liabilities for pension fund trustees and
oﬃcers at the broad institutional level, are akin to benchmarks for asset managers at the
investment fund level: “Of course it [the condition of liabilities] is very important because
that’s almost a like benchmark you need to beat, because the regulator always gives a target
of a certain coverage ratio and that coverage ratio is very much tied to the liabilities and how
they are measured” (Dutch interviewee 3).
“Underperforming” in this context means not having enough assets to cover for long-term
liabilities, and requires a rethinking of the asset strategy. On the other hand, reducing volatility
is constrained by the need to generate returns to grow the portfolio in line with liabilities.
Liabilities are therefore central to the asset allocation strategy, but in a complex tension
between the need for hedging and the need for growth.
As discussed in chapter 4, this results in the portfolio allocation along the lines of Figure 6.1.
All interviewees that explicitly referred to such a distinction pointed out that EM equity or
debt are never used for liability-matching purposes, and are therefore part of the return-seeking
portfolio. This confirms the discussions made in chapter 3 and 4: emerging markets assets
remain a peripheral part of a return-seeking strategy, as their assets cannot be used to directly
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Figure 6.1: Portfolio split
match institutional investors liability. This is likely due to the currency of denomination, as
well as the marginal impact that these assets have on long-term bond markets which constitute
the basis upon which liabilities are valued. As a result changes in the demand for EM assets
within a pension fund’s portfolio can come from two sources. Firstly, the relative size of the
return-seeking and protection portfolio, which reflects the overall allocation to risky assets
by pension funds, i.e. their risk-appetite. The second, the EM assets characteristics, which
determine their risk/return tradeoﬀ and therefore their attractiveness vis-a-vis other “return-
seeking” assets.
Risk-appetite is itself dependent on liabilities structure. A clear message from the in-
terviews is that the impact of liabilities on asset allocation varies across countries, crucially
depending on the regulatory framework. In Denmark, risk-based funding regulations impose
an evaluation of risks and returns under an overall risk constraint determined for the portfolio
of the fund, which then determines the attractiveness of an asset:
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“The way this is managed and this goes for all of our investment is that we have
our own internal risk system that is kind similar to what we are going to have with
Solvency II. A stress system. So each investment we make is stressed based on the
risk of the asset ... We consider EM as one element in the investment strategy, we
think we put together the optimal portfolio compared to the overall risk level that
has been set for the pension fund” (Danish interviewee 1)
“There is risk weighting for all the assets, and so one decides how much risk you
can take totally. And then it’s about optimising your assets. And whether EM is
attractive depends” (Danish interviewee 2).
EM assets need therefore to have an attractive risk/return profile to be included in Danish
pension funds. Indeed the turmoil in the summer 2013, amidst speculation of unwinding of
expansionary monetary policy in the US, have led the interviewed institutions to decrease
allocations to EM equities.
Risk-based funding regulation therefore creates a tighter relationship between assets and
the liabilities. To the extent that low interest rates generate a “search for yield” behaviour
(OECD, 2015), this is constrained within the boundaries imposed by regulation, determining
the attractiveness of asset classes with respect to their impact on regulatory limits. If EM
assets were to severely underperform, the cost of holding them in terms of additional capital
buﬀers may be too high compared to the risk/return profile of the assets, warranting a lower
portfolio allocation. This may be particularly harmful in times of financial crisis, potentially
leading to pro-cyclical negative eﬀects on EM assets: “when a crisis hits people need to cut
down on the risk side and they would take down what is most expensive in terms of risk
budget, which tends to be the EM part of the portfolio” (Danish interviewee 1).
In the Netherlands, the regulatory structure is such that it implies an asymmetric response
by pension funds depending on funding levels. Regulations are strict in case of underfunding:
“If a fund gets underfunded (<105% in the Netherlands) it has to submit a
recovery plan to the regulator (DNB) on how it will achieve a funding ratio above
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the limit. Within that regime funds are generally not allowed to increase the
riskiness of their assets” (Dutch interviewee 1).
In a situation of underfunding, allocations to risky assets, which may include EM assets, would
not increase. Dutch interviewees pointed out that this a peculiarity of their country’s pension
system - “it’s not like in some other countries where if you are underfunded you look for more
for the return-seeking portfolios” (Dutch interviewee 1) - and how this depends on the special
risk-based regulations about funding and risk-taking. It is also due to these regulations that
Dutch pension funds are generally overfunded: “here if you go below 105% the regulator gets
in and gives strict rules and you have to obey them. So it is generally overfunded in the Dutch
system, when you compare it to the UK system” (Dutch interviewee 3). In other words the
relationship between risk taking and funding is asymmetric with a clear floor under which the
relationship changes or break down.
UK pension funds do not have, as discussed, the same type of regulations with respect to
funding levels. The relationship between asset allocation and funding ratios is much more in
line with the central hypothesis of this dissertation:
“if you are underfunded then you need to close that funding deficit, and you can
do that from earning money on your investments, or you can do that from cash
coming in from your sponsoring employer, so the contributions. And obviously
most schemes would rather earn the money from investments, than they would
from sponsoring employers, so if you got a deficit you need your investments to do
more work, and that means investing in things that have a higher expected return,
and would usually mean things like equities. If you get better funded, growth is
less of an issue, because once a scheme is fully funded, if you get overfunded for
example you can’t get that money back, it’s locked up. So it’s asymmetric, for the
schemes that get very well funded there is very little incentive to take investment
risk, so they tend to de-risk” (UK interviewee 1, emphasis added)
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For UK pension funds, the relative size of return-seeking and liability-matching portfolio is
closely related to their funding ratio: lower funding levels imply a higher allocation to “return-
seeking” assets compared to “protection” assets. Funding levels are in this sense the variable
governing the balance between the need for growth vis-a-vis the need for risk reduction. Search-
ing for returns in the UK is therefore less constrained by regulation, which may explain the
very substantial changes in asset allocation described in chapter 4.
While this general mechanism is at play, it is important to note how this fits in the specific
historical context of UK-DB pension schemes. In the long-run “you see a general trend that is
reducing the allocation to things like equities, and that would include EM equities, in favour
of things such as fixed-income” (UK interviewee 1). UK pension funds have increased the size
of their liability-matching assets, creating a tighter connection between the variability of their
assets and that of their liabilities, thus containing the volatility of their funding ratio. This
is due, at least partially, to the fact that many private schemes are closed to new members,
which results in a situation with “a lot of maturing schemes, which were cash flow positive and
now are turning cash flow neutral, ... and so the types of assets they are looking to hold will
start to look more like insurance companies and bit less like endowments” (UK interviewee 2).
As discussed in chapter 4, mature pension funds place a greater importance in having a stable
funding ratio increases and this is reflected in their higher allocation to liability-matching
assets.
However, “the [de-risking] trend is fairly slow moving. ... we are on the whole expecting
allocations to equities to reduce in the future. But the pace of that will depend on a number
of things in particular the price bonds and funding levels of pension funds in general” (UK
interviewee 1). In the meanwhile, the lower yields and funding levels may result in an increasing
- or non-decreasing - allocation to growth assets in general, and EM in particular: “if you got
a large deficit and you have a ... a big bridge to build to full funding, then you need to make
your assets work harder, and generally may allocate more to growth assets, which would result
in higher allocation to EM, if you keep a fixed proportion of your growth assets to EM” (UK
interviewee 3). The allocation to EM does not necessarily have to be proportional to overall
size of the return-seeking/growth portfolio. As de-risking plans start to pick up, EM equities
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may decline less than proportionally than the overall risky portfolio allocations: “rather than
just take down EM, [de-risking] may be bringing down the overall equity, so the allocation
across the board for equities comes down but not proportionally for developed markets and
EM”. (UK interviewee 6).
In the long-run however, the de-risking trend is likely to reduce allocations to EM:
“In general, de-risking is definitely a trend, most of the schemes we deal with
when they are de-risking, they de-risk into UK bonds strategies and not EM debt,
though they might increase their allocation to multi-asset credit or absolute return
bond funds, but I would say probably more it is going to result in an outflow from
EM, because you are getting out of your global equities and your DGF [diversified
growth funds]. So yes de-risking is a trend and will result in fewer assets being in
EM” (UK interviewee 3)
So overall the interviews confirm the very important relationship between liabilities and risk-
appetite of investors. However, this relationship crucially depends on the country-specific reg-
ulations and institutions. Countries with risk-based funding rules, or strict requirements about
underfunding recovery plans, do not seem to present a straightforward positive relationship
between risk-taking and funding ratios. In countries where these rules are not implemented,
the combination low funding ratios create a pressure to generate returns, which results in an in-
creasing - or non-decreasing within a de-risking strategy - proportion to return-seeking assets.
“The search for yield” driven by the current low-interest rate environment plays out diﬀerently
in diﬀerent countries, crucially depending on their regulatory structure. These heterogenous
results represent a caveat to the findings obtained in the econometrics estimation of chapter
5. The positive relationship between the funding gap and allocations to EM likely reflects the
much bigger size of pension funds from countries with no risk-based funding regulations, such
as the UK, Japan and the US.
Aside from this heterogeneity, it is clear that the demand for EM assets by European
pension funds is contingent on the situation of their liabilities. Substantial improvements in
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their liabilities may lead pension funds from countries such as the UK and the Netherlands
to “de-risk”, thereby leading to decreasing allocation to EMs. In Denmark, risk-based funding
regulations may lead to decreasing allocations to EMs in case their risk/return profile worsens
in such a way that they would not oﬀset their costs in terms capital buﬀers. Overall, it is highly
likely that with higher interest rates in advanced countries, the attractiveness of EM assets
will decrease through their impact on liabilities. How liabilities evolve over time is therefore
crucial for tracking demand for EM assets by institutional investors.
6.3.2 Other behavioural mechanisms
While liabilities arguably represent the most crucial determinant of pension funds’ risk-
appetite, their investment behaviour may be aﬀected by other factors.
Shifts in overall risk-aversion remain an important determinant even for long-term insti-
tutional investors: “Well I think that most investors tend to look at EM as a very risky asset
class. So when the crisis hits, the first thing that people do is trying to get out of the most
risky asset classes. So this is really the main argument” (Danish interviewee 1).
These shifts may result from rational considerations, about the actual riskiness of these
asset. In a crisis situation, EM assets are expected to fall more then other assets, and this
may induce investors to shift away from EM: “whenever there’s a crisis people will expect that
EM will underperform DM, so they would have a tendency to cut their positions first and put
them back in the DM in the short term and when markets start to improve or recover they go
back into the EM again. “ (UK interviewee 5)
The informational asymmetry explanation of herding and contagion also seems to be con-
firmed: “[these countries are] Far enough away that if there’s going to be people closer to the
ground they would know more than you will so if they are going down real fast probably better
to be out of it” (Other interviewee 1). Information about EMs is less transparent and more
diﬃcult or costly to obtain. As the asset class starts to fall, this will induce people to follow
the tide, as other - local - investors are perceived to be better informed about the situation.
This pattern may be rational from the point of view of the investor but is clearly suboptimal
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for the asset class.
Aside from these rational mechanism the evidence of other “less rational” behavioural mech-
anism is mixed:
“We all know people overreact and oversell and become negative and the oppo-
site end things appear to be going well people become overoptimistic so I guess if
something is perceived to be ‘a’ more risky and ‘b’ more volatile and it’s hard to
quantify those risks inevitably when people become pessimistic and cautious overly
anxious then these are the areas that tend to suﬀer the most” (UK interviewee 6).
This highlights a “pure panic” channel of transmission. Regardless of informational asym-
metries that might exist, panic selling and herding behaviour are always present, “and you
have good companies, good securities, being totally sold out just because investors are very
scared to lose all of their capital, irrationally” (UK interviewee 3). This may be reinforced
by non-professional nature of pension funds trustees: “as I said trustees are not really that
professional in the investment markets, so when they see the pain and when they see the fall,
they don’t want this to happen again” (UK interviewee 5).
On the other hand most interviewees pointed out how pension funds do in fact remain
less panic-prone and more stable investors than individuals. They make strategic investment
allocation plans over the long-run, and tend not to be overly aﬀected by short-term trends
“pension funds are always long-term investors and they don’t make asset allocation change due
to market events or something” (Dutch interviewee 3), “pension funds in the most traditional
model are very slow moving, and don’t tend to make very big knee-jack asset allocation changes
in any circumstances to be honest. Even in June 2008, the changes to investment strategy
were fairly limited in the UK” (UK interviewee 1).
As short-run moves are likely to be uncommon in the pension fund sector, tendencies for
herding behaviour come in a more indirect way, and tends to depend on the institutional
structure of each country. In the UK, given the industry structure discussed in the previous
section, with many funds reliant on the advise of a few investment consultancy companies, “the
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advices tend to be common and those consultants are mostly saying the same thing, and also
there is sort of an intellectual ideology about what is a sensible thing for a pension scheme to
do, which is kind of diﬃcult to break away from” (UK interviewee 2). The overall attitude to
EM assets is therefore likely to find common themes, so that investment strategies including or
excluding them are likely to be common across several funds, which could promote a form of
long-term herding. Being for-profit businesses competing for pension fund clients, investment
consultants and asset managers can on the other hand look at the practices of other companies
in order to maintain or expand their market shares. Pension providers in Denmark, the large
fiduciary management companies in the Netherlands and investment consultancies in the UK
can therefore be subject to forms of herding behaviour in a more traditional sense.
It would therefore seem that, while certain elements of panic spread or rational shifts in
risk-aversion remain, pension funds do seek to conform with their “long-term” nature. Shifts
in their risk-appetite are much more likely to follow from regulation and liabilities rather
than irrational “mood” or tactical decisions. Indeed short-term investment horizons, such as
pro-cyclical selling of EM assets during a crisis, tend to be present only in countries where
risk-based funding allocation force pension funds to act in such a way. Herding behaviour may
nonetheless be present even within the pension fund sector, a situation that the reliance on
external asset managers or fiduciary managers may worsen, to the extent that these are likely
to compete with each other around common measures.
Figure 6.2: Investors’ factors
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6.4 Emerging Markets Assets Characteristics
The previous section discussed which investor’s factors emerge as determinants of EM asset
demand. These factors primarily aﬀect the appetite for risky assets as a whole, including EM
assets. In this section the factors aﬀecting EM markets asset characteristics will be discussed.
These will include both EM specific factors aﬀecting risk and returns of their assets, and global
“push” factors.
6.4.1 The complex relationship between returns and economic de-
velopment
“Clearly, the long-term case for investing in this area, the reason why we do so,
is to generate attractive returns, and as things currently stand clearly EM oﬀer
relatively to the developed world reasonably good long-term growth prospects”
(UK interviewee 4)
As part of the return-seeking portfolio, EM assets are expected to deliver higher returns to
pension funds. Such returns are linked to the higher economic growth and development that
emerging economies are supposed to achieve in the long-run, as they catch-up with developed
economies.
There are however several possible ways through which economic development will translate
into higher returns, and therefore diﬀerent possible strategies that institutional investors may
adopt. Some investors may follow a simple argument directly relates high economic growth to
high returns: “I think the most common reason probably is individual investors clients want
to gain access to high growth rates they see in EM. Typically investors equate higher growth
rates with higher equity returns for example” (UK interviewee 3). Typically this is in the form
of share appreciation: “I think what we generally see in what most people think is that the
higher economic growth which leads to higher profits within the corporations therefore lead
to higher share prices” (Dutch interviewee 2).
However interviewees were sceptical about this argument, as “historically economic growth
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is not the best indicator of stock market returns and it’s a limited indicator of bond returns”(UK
interviewee 3). Economic growth may therefore generate interest in EM assets in other, more
indirect ways.
Firstly, in pure scale terms, economic growth has made these countries too large to simply
be ignored from a financial point of view: “they are about 44% of the world GDP, ... so you
have to have a very good argument against EM, because you would be excluding a large part
of the world”. Since economic growth has often been accompanied by processes of financial
liberalisation in many of these EMs, the investable EM spectrum has grown very rapidly and
very quickly:
“Ten years ago the equity market wasn’t really open in a lot of ... EMs. Due
to the fast growing economic nature of those countries, the market cap or the
market value of those companies in the equity and also debt markets have increased
quite substantially in the last few years ... So, the first reason to include them is
opportunity: the opportunity set is getting bigger and bigger, markets are getting
bigger” (UK interviewee 5).
A second way through which economic growth in EM may deliver attractive returns is currency
appreciation:
“.. but what we see when we research it is that all the structural changes in
EM that become more and more developing leads to appreciation of the foreign
exchange of the currencies. So I think most of the returns is made on the foreign
exchange side side” (Dutch interviewee 2).
This view originates from the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect (Balassa, 1964; Samuelson, 1964),
which predicts an appreciation of the real exchange rate in developing countries as a result
of higher productivity gains: “if you believe in that convergence principle then you have to
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buy into the fact that you should inevitably get some strengthening from the currency” (UK
interviewee 6). Many interviewees pointed out that precisely to capture these FX gains,
currency hedging is less common than investments in developed markets assets: “over the long
term having currency exposure to EM currencies ought to be a net positive than net negative
... So it’s a sort of another reason for not getting too much into hedging” (UK interviewee 2).
Finally, the growth prospects of EM is also believed to translate into potential for higher
returns through the general low valuations of EM assets. Although this is arguably an impor-
tant factor for all assets, the low starting valuations are very often a key element in explaining
the rise of allocations to EM during the 2002-2008 period, and remains a point of attraction
of EM assets in both the debt and equity markets:
“So I think that the basic point, relatively to the developed world, although
EM are more mature and are growing more slowly than they were in the 80’s and
90’s, you still have a combination of attractive growth and reasonable valuations”
(UK interviewee 4).
“For example in EM debt we see we can get yields, which we can’t get in
developed markets” (Danish interviewee 1).
Beside these common themes, the interviewees point to a rather complex relationship relating
economic growth and development and returns in emerging countries. It is therefore not
surprising that, at least for what concerns equities, funds may have very diﬀerent types of
strategies to capture EM returns:
“you got very top-down macro-orientated strategies which may just look at
the growth prospects of diﬀerent companies, you might have thematic approaches,
which may look for things such as demographics or natural resources, that sort
of thing, and you got bottom-up approaches, which would actually look at the
companies first and foremost in making investment decisions”. (UK interviewee 1)
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Indeed, when looking at EM assets, it is very important to be able to distinguish between
the diﬀerent companies and sectors. What may matter is the type of economic growth that
EMs are having, and how this is reflected in the financial markets, as often these tend to be
dominated by companies that are less likely to deliver consistent returns to investors. As a
result, an active asset management strategy is generally preferred:
“[EM stock markets] tend to be dominated by state-owned particularly in banks
and resource stocks and what you get is a big concentration among resource-heavy
companies, and this tends to be reflected in the market cap index. And when
you get an index that is concentrated particularly on what you would characterise
as less good quality companies, the oversight that you would get from an active
perspective is what we’d like to see” (UK interviewee 6).
While the precise ways through which pension funds invest in EM depends on their size, with
the bigger and more sophisticated funds having dedicated allocations and the smaller funds
typically accessing them through global or multi-asset funds, an actively managed portfolio
seem to be widely accepted as best practice across the board for both equities and bonds. Dif-
ferent fund managers implement the fund-specific strategies, which may significantly diﬀer as
discussed, but rarely follow simple market-capitalisation weightings. The increase in EM asset
holdings by foreign institutional investors has grown in parallel with the growing importance
of EM financial markets into the global financial markets, but does not seem to be a pure
passive consequence of it.
In sum, European pension funds consider EM assets as part of their return-seeking strategy,
and overall associate these expected returns to the good economic prospects of these countries.
However, while common themes exist, especially with respect to long-run currency apprecia-
tion and low valuations, there is no single EM growth/returns narrative. As a result, most
pension funds access these economies through actively managed funds, whose managers follow
a wide range of diﬀerent strategies. Moreover, as they develop, emerging countries diﬀerentiate
themselves from one another, making the growth-returns links even less generalisable:
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“These countries are becoming quite big in terms of size and markets. So it’s
a very diverse asset class, therefore it’s becoming harder and harder to generalise
things, you cannot talk about one EM class” (Dutch interviewee 3)
It is therefore likely that, in seeking returns from EM, investors will look for even more diﬀer-
entiated strategies in the future.
An important caveat to this statement is however, while diverse, all these strategies ulti-
mately depend on these countries growing in the long-run. The oﬀset is that a general growth
slowdown in EM is perceived as a potential threat for the asset class in the future: “if growth
does disappoint in some of these economies then you could see some of these parts of these
markets sell oﬀ” (Danish interviewee 2)
These findings highlight that investors have an idea about fundamental underlying factors
driving their returns. However, the ways through which these fundamentals generate returns
for investors are extremely complex, which generate a substantial diversity in the practical
strategies adopted to achieve them. Nevertheless, if these fundamental factors would sub-
stantially change for the worse, or perceived to be so, interest in the asset class will likely
decrease.
6.4.2 Domestic risks: Keynesian fundamentals and non-economic
factors
As with any financial investment decision, the other side of the coin of potentially higher
returns are the additional risks that EM assets bring. Standard risk/return considerations,
such as market volatility certainly apply. However, as discussed in chapter 3, a monetary
understanding of the process of international financial investment would point to a number of
“Keynesian fundamentals” as determining the liquidity premium of EM currency, and therefore
the attractiveness of EM assets. The interviewees seem to point broadly to three major areas
of risks: financial markets risks, macroeconomic and macro-financial stability risks, and non-
economic country risks.
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Within the first group, there is unsurprisingly a standard financial argument about higher
volatility of EM assets:
“I did the analysis looking at the volatility of EM from 1994 to 2010 and what
I found was that EM during that period were as volatile as they had ever been.
Maybe the 2000’s period was less than the 90’s period if you break that down
by decade, but what I found was that there were sill very high levels of standard
deviation, very high levels of volatility, especially compared to developed market”
(Other interviewee 1).
In order to be attractive, therefore EM need to produce high returns to justify these high
levels of volatility. When in recent times, EM financial markets started to underperform, this
quickly reduced the interest for these assets.
Another financial market concern is liquidity83. EM assets are in general perceived to be
less liquid, which is also one of the reasons why they are more aggressively sold oﬀ during
crises: “I think liquidity is one thing. Getting trapped into the asset class. EM are not as
liquid as developed markets” (Other interviewee 2). Liquidity however changes within the
asset class, with some areas clearly being less liquid than others, generating concerns:
“Liquidity is clearly worse, the markets are less liquid. But it depends what
you’re doing. If you want to you can buy and sell Vanguard EM ETF or Ishares
ETF for more or less nothing, so to get exposure in aggregate to EM is not an
expensive or particularly illiquid thing to be doing. But clearly if you are buying
individual stocks in frontier markets then it’s a completely diﬀerent question” (UK
interviewee 2)
83It is noticeable how this was pointed out by all UK interviewees but none of the non-UK ones. It is not
clear, by looking at the interviews, if and how this factor actually represent something concretely diﬀerent
across the diﬀerent countries.
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However, given their long-term orientation, market liquidity may not be a top concern for
pension funds:
“I think most pension schemes would like to think of themselves as reasonably
long-term investors, who don’t need short-term liquidity particularly. We are not a
bank who suddenly needs to change its exposure, or a mutual fund that is suddenly
going to be hit by lots of redemptions, we have a very clearly perspective as to
what our cash flows are likely to be over the next 20 or 30 years, so we might want
to change our mind on some things, and you might want to have some flexibility
to do that. But ultimately we don’t need that (UK interviewee 2)
A second class of risks that is closely monitored is macroeconomic and macro-financial stability.
A first element within this category is represented by currency risk: EM currencies are more
volatile and this volatility does in fact constitute most of the risk on EM bonds, according to
some interviewees. As noted however, currency risk is not hedged against, partially because of
the currency gains that would be lost, and partially because of the additional particularly high
costs of hedging. In the case of EM bonds, hedging currency risks would not be a meaningful
strategy given the existing alternative of investing in hard currency bonds: “If you buy a local
currency bond and hedge out the currency risk then the returns would be literally almost the
same as an equivalent hard currency bond. And you would think, what’s the point to buy
that?” (UK interviewee 5).
Beside currency swings, the overall external financial vulnerability of EM is closely mon-
itored. This is a particularly important issue especially when looked from an historical per-
spective, as that used to be the defining vulnerability of EM, as it led to their financial crises
in the 1990’s. But the situation seems to have changed:
“So if you compare with them now debts are way lower, and not only that but
also throughout the years, also with the assistance IMF and the World Bank, they
also learned how to be proactive and how to put some reserves on the side and
they have accumulated a lot of reserves. When you look at them, some of those
countries are net creditors rather than borrowers” (Dutch interviewee 3)
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“Central banks that are managed in a more sound way, and especially we have
foreign exchange reserves that compared to GDP are three and six times what they
were in the 90’s in many countries” (Other interviewee 2)
There seems to be general agreement with the view that EM have become much less fragile
to traditional external shocks originating in high external debts. The reforms and policies
implemented allowed EM to “shift a substantial part of their issuance into local currency,
borrowing in their own currency, and that gives a lot of leeway to manipulate their debt
“badly”, but at least they will be never forced to not to be able to pay” (Danish interviewee
2). These shifts have contributed to substantially alleviate the perceived systemic riskiness of
these countries:
“Systemic risk is still very very low. And that’s something you have created
over the last 10-15 years. And it’s still there. If you start to play with that,
then it will go. If you suddenly erode the reserves of Brazil or Indonesia, and you
start questioning the governments’ ability to pay their dues, then things will look
remarkably diﬀerent. And that has never come up, not even in 2013, that you
could actually go to a point in time where they couldn’t pay their dues. You will
have some companies going bust, you will have a couple of banks going under, but
the general story wouldn’t totally dissolve. But in the 90’s you had survival crises,
when you had sovereign defaults in a lot of these countries, and you don’t have
that and I don’t foresee that either” (Danish interviewee 2).
An exception to this could be the risk posed by high dollar-denominated debt accumulated by
the corporate sector, especially as this interacts with global factors such as the USD appre-
ciation. “There’s a fear that EM corporates have borrowed too much US dollar denominated
debt” (Other interviewee 1). This factor on the other hand can also be interpreted as a sign
of financial maturity by EM: “now the corporates can borrow instead of the government, but
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that’s not necessarily a bad thing. They should, if they can borrow at a better rate and create
growth” (Danish interviewee 2).
A third class of risks that emerges and really distinguish EM from developed markets are
non-economic country risks. This can be divided into two subcategories. The first is political
instability, which some interviewees pointed out as being a key risk when it comes to EM:
“It really depends on what particular emerging market you are looking at, but of course the
political risk is a risk that is very often high on the list and of course we have seen several
cases where political issues have been become a problem for investments” (Danish interviewee
1). Political risks are unpredictable and can aﬀect even core EM and override other risks, as
interviewees pointed out by referring to the current situation in Russia:
“what scared markets is the political and military escalation of the situation
in Ukraine, now the sanctions, and the possibility of greater isolation of Russia.
Despite the fact that Russia, among EM, is one of the countries with the highest
GDP per capita, with the lowest external debt, with the highest FX reserves, with
a record CA surplus - until last year - despite all these positive factors, it’s been
the worst EM currency” (Other interviewee 2).
The second non-economic risk factor that many interviewees referred relates to the lower
quality of economic institutions of EM. Particularly when investing in equities, additional
risks with respect to corporate governance or legal protection become important factors to
consider. Indeed the increasing transparency of EM regulations and institutions has been an
historically important factor contributing to the development of those countries. Choosing and
finding the right manager is in this sense a more complicated task, which could be regarded as
a risk itself: “one thing is how attractive is the underlying investment another thing how we
implement this exposure to EM, and that sometimes involves elements of risk, finding the right
manager and managing the exposure in the most optimal way is much easier in the developed
world compared to EM” (Danish interviewee 2). These findings can be broadly interpreted as
a confirmation that informational asymmetries and transaction costs are indeed an important
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friction for foreign investors allocating their portfolio to EM.
However most investors agreed that non-economic risks, while extremely important, are
very hard to to measure and therefore to “price”:
“A part of that is really how you judge geopolitical risks, and I think opinions
diﬀer very much: there are some managers who think that fundamentally Russia is
undervalued, and if the situation normalises somewhat, then you should absolutely
overweight Russia, whereas some others think that the geopolitical risk is so hard
to judge that we rather go neutral or even underweight because we don’t feel
comfortable to make a call and that’s due to geopolitical risks” (Dutch interviewee
2).
Indeed this reinforces the importance of having actively managed portfolios:
“... corporate governance and additional risks, such as environmental issues
as well as the extra volatility that’s associated with EM because of issues around
currency volatility, the importance of the role of policy makers in these regions
and I guess the potential for corruption, there’s a lot more risks at play that
we think need to be captured, and they can be captured by an active managers
who understands and knows the market and meet with managers and/or has the
ability to analyse and understand companies’ financial statements and that can be
quantitative or qualitative mechanism or a combination of both” (UK interviewee
6).
These findings give credit to the view of EM asset risks as determined by factors that broadly
overlap with post-Keynesian theories of asset prices and exchange rates, and the theoretical
framework developed in chapter 3. The notion that currency volatility is a crucial risk factor in
EM is in accordance with the idea of currency hierarchy: the lower position of EM currencies
206
in the hierarchy makes them more subject to volatile changes, a risk that investors expect to
be rewarded with higher returns. The preoccupation with lower financial market liquidity, as
the fear of being “trapped into the asset class”, is also very closely connected to the Keynesian
concept of liquidity, and the rise of liquidity preference during turbulent times.
Furthermore, it is very clear that what changed historically and determined a substantial
increase in interest for EM assets is their improvement of their macro-financial stability. This
view echoes clearly what Kaltenbrunner (2011, 2015) sees as a liability-side driven liquidity
premium of EM currencies, and by extension EM assets: the accumulation of reserves, the
reduction in external - especially foreign currency - debt, the reduction of government and
current accounts deficits, all contribute to the ability of a country to “pay its dues”. A gener-
alised sell-oﬀ of EM assets could therefore result from a substantial reversal of these situation.
Finally, as for economic growth, while institutional investors do seem to care about three
broad categories of fundamentals, which define the risk characteristics of EM assets, in practice
these cannot be directly linked to unique indicators. In accordance with what discussed in
the rest of this dissertation, foreign exchange reserves do seem to be a crucial variable in
determining a country’s macroeconomic stability. However, they are looked in conjunction
with other variables such as “terms of trade, fiscal and monetary outlook” or current accounts.
And even in their own terms, “what matters the internal flow dynamics, so it’s never the
just stock but the flow” (Other interviewee 2), i.e. it is not a simple snapshot indicator that
matters, but its change over-time, its trend, and its relationship with other variables. Political
risks, which seem to be a crucial factor, being non quantitative in measure are subject to even
more interpretative troubles.
All this confirms the “Keynesian” nature of such fundamentals: the precise ways in which
they are measured and considered changes over-time, according to market conditions and
conventions. In these respects, the exercise of pinning down exchange rates and asset prices
to single “fundamentals”, as commonly done in macroeconomic models, is questionable.
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6.4.3 External factors
Aside from domestic conditions, EM are also susceptible to external shocks, which may
play an important role in investors’ outlook about the attractiveness and future performance
of the asset class.
Most interviewees referred to the Quantitative Easing and more in general the monetary
policy outlook of the FED as a primary concern. This aﬀects pension funds views about EM
in a number of ways. The first is a standard comparison of the potential returns:
“in relative terms the risk/return profile of EM has worsened compared to the
risk-free. Because obviously with a 5% return with a volatility of 6-7% with the
alternative of 0-1% returns is one thing, but if now the FED is saying that rates will
have to increase to their natural levels within 2-3 years at around 3%, then of course
3% risk-free in dollars, so the global reserve currency and also the most stable one,
makes 5-7% average returns of EM much less attractive” (Other interviewee 2)
US interest rates are the quintessential global risk-free returns and as a result of Quantitative
Easing (QE) were eﬀectively almost zero. A future with higher US interest rates makes EM
much less attractive, as the troubles seen amidst the QE tapering announcements in 2013
showed: “So when the FED does decide to, not taper QE which has happened, reverse QE or
when rates rise, that is going to knock on eﬀect on EM. So with a rate rise scenario interest
rates are going to go up and that’s going to have a big eﬀect on the global financial system.
Money could and will flow out of the EM countries” (UK interviewee 3). On the other hand,
some interviewees pointed out that, given the relatively slow transition into a period of higher
US interest rates and lower global liquidity, this phenomenon “in a way has already been priced
in, it’s already happened. They started to withdraw QE in October 2013 so it’s more than a
year now” (UK interviewee 5). Nevertheless, investors remain concerned by a rate rise.
A rise in advanced countries’ interest rates may impact on EM asset demand in several
ways. Firstly directly, as the return spread becomes smaller and safe assets start yielding
return after years of zero-interest rates, investors may simply revert to safer assets. This is
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likely aﬀect all risky assets, from equities and high-yield bonds, and include EM assets.
A rate rise may also have important indirect eﬀects in EMmarkets. For example, the above-
mentioned concern about US dollar denominated debts of EM companies becomes even more
serious if coupled with rising interest rates and dollar appreciation: “as the dollar continues
to appreciate and interest rates begin to rise, ... then that’s going to put a big strain on EM
corporates” (Other interviewee 1). Similar caveats however apply: “we have seen this coming
for a while and therefore enough measures have been put in place and debt has been eased
slightly so it won’t have too much of a negative impact” (Other interviewee 1). These views
echoes the contention of Fernández-Arias (1996) that credit-worthiness of a country is not
purely determined by domestic fundamentals, but is itself dependent on external factors.
Another indirect eﬀect of global interest rates, as it has been discussed throughout the
thesis, is the interaction of low interest rates with pension funds liabilities. As discussed,
higher interest rates are likely to increase all bond yields and thereby increase the discount
rates used in the calculation of pensions’ liabilities. Improved funding of pension funds around
the world is going to have an impact on the exposure to risky assets, including EM assets.
In addition to the country-specific opportunities and concerns about economic growth, a
more general growth slowdown will aﬀect EM. Given the reliance on external trade, and their
increasing integration in the global world markets, EM are likely to suﬀer from low growth.
For example, a slowdown in China may quickly spill over to other EM: “China is one of the
big issues that we see, because it is now 15% of global GDP and their trading partners are
very much aﬀected and there’s a really big slowdown, and if our view on China changes that
could change something” (Dutch interviewee 3). As reviewed, sustained growth is considered
to be a crucial determinant of EM returns, so that a global slowdown is likely to reflect in a
less positive outlook on EM.
Finally, EM remain exposed to commodity prices. The recent decline in oil prices impacts
on EM growth and balance of payment prospects. Although the economic development of
EM has allowed them to create an internal market and therefore diversify away from a purely
export oriented growth strategy, many of them are still reliant on commodities as either net
exporters or importers. Overall lower oil prices add to global growth, which improves the
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collective outlook. However interviewees pointed out that the impact of such a factor does not
aﬀect all countries in the same way:
“Oil has changed a lot of the equations in the world, when the price came
down from about 100$ to now about 40$. A lot of the countries got aﬀected by
this. But then some countries were badly hurt and some countries had a very nice
boost, because they have been oil importers. Therefore, if you look at EM, the
commodity exporters vs commodity importers, the equations have changed, some
for the better some for the worse but does that change our outlook on overall EM,
no it has changed markedly within the EM. But it doesn’t change our view because
this low oil price will add to global growth, although it will create risks in certain
countries that are oil producers” (Dutch interviewee 3).
Overall, the evidence suggest that the traditional “push” factors - US interest rates, global
growth, commodity prices - are important elements in European pension funds’ assessment
of EM assets. However, the overall impact of these factors depends on their interaction with
country-specific conditions and investors risk-aversion. While higher interest rates in advanced
countries are, directly or indirectly through a variety of channels, going to lower interest in
EM assets, commodity prices may aﬀect countries heterogeneously.
This once again underlines the complexity in interpreting the impact “push” and “pull”
factors at the macroeconomic level. “Domestic fundamentals” are very often the combination
of domestic conditions and global factors, e.g. a current account deficit may be the result
of both the structure of the domestic economy and US interest rates or commodity prices.
External factors and domestic factors are therefore often hard to be independently analysed,
which serves as a reminder to not excessively engage in the separation of the competing impacts
of “push” and “pull” factors.
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Figure 6.3: Asset characteristics factors
6.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented empirical evidence on European pension funds considerations
when investing in EM assets. It has done this through the examination of semi-structured
interviews with pension funds oﬃcers and investment consultants and managers working with
pension funds in Europe.
These interviews confirm the centrality of liability-driven investment strategies in institu-
tional investors’ portfolio choice. Allocation to EM assets depend both the relative size of
return-seeking vis-a-vis liability-matching assets, and the specific attractiveness of EM assets
themselves. The former is eﬀectively a measure of pension funds’ risk appetite, which, as it
has been argued throughout the dissertation and confirmed in the respondents answers, is
crucially determined by liabilities themselves.
The way liabilities determine risk-appetite is however mediated by regulation. In Denmark
and the Netherlands, where risk-based funding regulations are in place, there seems to be a
non-linear relationship as underfunding implies on the one hand a higher need for returns,
but on the other hand a smaller margin for increasing allocation to risky assets. In countries
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with no such regulation, such as the UK, the relationship is more straightforward, and in line
with the evidence of chapter 5: underfunding implies a higher need for return, and therefore
a higher allocation to risky assets.
Other factors may aﬀect risk-appetite of institutional investors, including panic and be-
havioural biases, a situation likely to become more serious as more pension funds rely on
external managers to for an increasing part of their portfolio management functions. In this
sense herding and short-term investments horizons may grow to the extent that EM assets
become part of an increasingly “return-seeking” portfolio that is increasingly delegated in its
daily management to firms that try to outcompete each other.
To be included in the return-seeking portfolio, EM assets also need to present an attractive
risk/return profile. While economic growth seem to have a crucial but highly complex way
in driving the attractiveness of emerging markets, liquidity at both the financial markets and
macro-level factors seem to be closely monitored by European Pension funds. This is in line
with the idea of “Keynesian fundamentals” as determinants of emerging market’s currency
liquidity, discussed in chapter 3. Indeed, it is on the improvements in macro-financial stability
and their retention in the future that the continuing interest in EM as a return-seeking asset
rests.
A crucial insight - and caveat - emerging from these interviews is the view that all these
processes are rooted in the historical and institutional conditions of institutional investors.
Regulation in particular, and the long-run maturity of many defined-benefits pension schemes,
influence the way in which liabilities aﬀect portfolio choice. Similarly the “Keynesian funda-
mentals” that matter for emerging markets are, since the crisis, closely related to monetary
policy, given the “exceptionality” of the low-interest rates environment. Therefore, it is im-
portant to highlight that while the impact of liabilities and the importance of macro-financial
stability are likely to be general results, the precise positive causal relationship, tested in the
previous chapter, between underfunding and foreign exchange reserves levels and investments
in emerging markets, may change in the future.
In the following chapter, the evidence presented in this and the past two chapters, will
inform the construction of a theoretical Stock-Flow Consistent model, which will be used to
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assess the macroeconomic implications of this dissertation theoretical and empirical observa-
tions.
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Chapter 7
A Stock-Flow Consistent model of
institutional investors and
emerging markets
Introduction
This chapter presents a Stock-Flow Consistent (SFC) model of the interaction of emerging
markets and institutional investors. As discussed in chapter 3, the approach is very well suited
to understand the systemic implications of the evidence presented in the preceding chapters.
SFC models are intrinsically monetary, explicitly tracking the balance sheets dynamics of the
various macroeconomic sectors. This allows these models to take into account an explicit finan-
cial sector, which behaves according to behavioural rules of thumbs related to their financial
conditions.
The model will therefore be used to assess the macroeconomic implications of institutional
investors portfolio choice on emerging markets. Particular importance will be placed on the
channels hypothesised and for which evidence was found, namely the funding levels of insti-
tutional investors and foreign exchange reserves as a measure of confidence in the currency
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stability of emerging markets.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, the purpose of this model is to gain insights on
the implications of the theory, research hypothesis and the empirical evidence presented so
far. It is therefore not aimed at describing a general theory of capital flows and emerging
markets economies, but rather to exploit the logic of SFC models to assess the importance
of the empirical findings for the macroeconomic analysis of the demand for emerging markets
(EM) assets by foreign institutional investors.
7.1 Stock-Flow Consistent models and the open-economy
As discussed in the rest of the dissertation, the integration of emerging markets into the
global financial system has become ever more important in the past ten years or so. As reviewed
in chapter 2, dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) have been developed to tackle
such issues. These models, collectively fitting in the category of “international macro-finance”,
feature substantial innovations compared to the standard DSGE models, such as multiple
assets in open-economy models, incomplete financial markets and informational asymmetries84.
These models are able to capture some of the features of international financial conditions EMs,
such as the simultaneous expansion of two-ways gross capital flows, which earlier models were
not able to capture given their focus on current accounts. Devereux and Sutherland (2009)
in particular find that EMs with a long-position in foreign bonds and a negative position
in domestic portfolio equities and direct investments from abroad achieve a good degree of
international risk-sharing.
DSGE models of this kind however typically have a Real Business Cycle core and therefore
largely assume away monetary and financial considerations, with the resulting implications on
the money supply and the exchange rate 85. There is also no explicitly modeled financial sector,
since the portfolio choice is made by households seeking to insure their consumption, nor a
central bank, which leaves interest rates to be determined by what is eﬀectively a loanable
84The inclusion of such features required the development of new techniques (Tille and van Wincoop, 2010;
Devereux and Sutherland, 2011). See Pavlova and Rigobon (2010b) for a survey of the literature
85Devereux and Sutherland (2009) for example assume that the money supply of the home country grows
at a constant rate and determines the price level through a quantity theory of money relationship, with a
stochastic velocity term. There is no independent nominal exchange rate determination, as the money supply
determined price level therefore also represents the ratio of the home country price to the foreign country price,
i.e. the real exchange rate.
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funds mechanism.
This is particularly inconsistent with the approach taken in this dissertation, which is
based on a monetary and financial understanding of capital flows, and the portfolio choice by
institutional investors in particular. Remarkably, this is also at odds with recent developments,
discussed in chapter 2, in the literature on financial intermediaries as actors and risk-aversion
and monetary policy as determinants of capital flows to EMs and global financial stability in
general (Rey, 2013; Shin, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2015).
For these reasons, this chapter develops an open-economy two-country Stock-Flow Consis-
tent (SFC) model. These models, unlike real-business cycle models, are monetary from the
start and explicitly include a financial sector, evaluating its role within a macroeconomic sys-
tem. In the open-economy a key assumption is that financial assets are imperfect substitutes,
so that asset allocation need not be equal across the world. As discussed in chapter 3, given
the lower liquidity of EM currencies, it is likely that EM assets will be demanded in smaller
quantities compared to those issued in advanced countries, something that cannot readily be
featured in DSGE models which assume away money86.
The standard reference for SFC models with open capital accounts is chapter 12 in Godley
and Lavoie (2012), while several additional models have been developed to analyse diﬀerent
open-economy issues87. While this model draws substantially on the basic formulation, it
presents several elements of novelty. Firstly, the relationship between the two countries is ex-
plicitly modeled as asymmetrical: aside from choosing diﬀerent starting values for stocks and
flows88, only the advanced country invests in EM financial assets, whereas the EM foreign in-
vestments are confined to the central bank’s holdings of foreign exchange reserves (FXR). This
is in line with the evidence presented in chapter 4, where EM financial integration was found
to be mostly driven by the liability side, i.e. investments from abroad, and their corresponding
foreign holdings mostly held as FXR were largely a consequence of it.
Secondly, and most importantly, the advanced country features an institutional investors
86As discussed in chapter 2, imperfect asset substitution could be introduced as the result of informational
asymmetries, other imperfections such as credit risk.
87See for example Lavoie and Zhao (2010); Lavoie and Daigle (2011); Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012);
Bortz (2014). See Caverzasi and Godin (2015) for a more comprehensive survey of the SFC models literature,
including open economy models.
88E.g. National income in the EM at the beginning of the simulation period is half the size of the advanced
country.
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sector. To the best knowledge of the author this is the first time this is included in a SFC model.
As it will be shown, the sector works as a financial intermediary for the household sector,
promising a fixed return on the claims households hold on them, and investing in financial
assets to face those obligations. Their financial behaviour is characterised, amongst standard
portfolio choice considerations, by the search for returns as high as to ensure their assets are
enough to fulfill their long-term obligations. In other words, in line with what discussed in
previous chapters, institutional investors seek to achieve and maintain a fully-funded status.
Moreover, the role of FXR as a variable enhancing the perceived stability of a currency is also
established. It is through institutional investors that international financial flows take places.
Their portfolio choice is therefore a crucial variable determining the international financial
dynamics of the model.
Finally, EMs’ central banks invest in FXR, but in a way that does not result in either
completely pegged nor flexible, exchange rate regime, but rather a managed float. This is
similar to what is done in Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012), and is very much in line with
the empirical reality of EMs, which in most cases have a managed/dirty floating exchange rate
regime with the accumulation of vast FXR as a buﬀer of safety89.
It will be shown that the combination of these elements can result in large swings in
exchange rates and capital flows. As institutional investors responds to shocks that have
an eﬀect on both their financial assets and liabilities, their allocation EMs assets vis-à-vis
advanced countries change which, considering their relative sizes, can result in notable changes
in exchange rates. The macroeconomic implications on income and current accounts are also
stressed. Moreover the simulation will highlight the stabilising impact of CB’s in a floating
exchange rate regime.
7.2 Accounting structure and general model features
Table 7.1 describes the balance sheet of the two countries. As discussed, there are five
sectors in the advanced (ADV) country and four in the EM country. The additional sector in
the ADV country is the institutional investor (Inst). Households in both countries only hold
domestic bills and high powered money, issued respectively by their domestic governments and
89See for example Calvo and Reinhart (2002); Aizenman et al. (2010)
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central banks. Central banks hold domestic bills, and FXR in the EM country as discussed.
The production sector is highly simplified, as in the chapter 12 model of Godley and Lavoie
(2012): it does not represent an explicit firm sector and therefore it does not hold fixed capital
goods.
The institutional investor sector allocates its assets between domestic Badv_inst, foreign
Bem_inst bills and cash - the residual asset - , and they also have the opportunity to invest
in an additional advanced country bills Badv2_inst, which oﬀers a higher interest rate than
the regular bills. These bills eﬀectively take the role of of “risky”90 domestic assets held
by institutional investors, the implications of which will be discussed in the next section.
Institutional investors’ liabilities are in the form of accounts Acc held by households. These
accounts yield benefit payments from the institutional investors sector to households.
Table 7.2 shows the flows between sectors occurring in one period. Given the simplified
production structure households receive the whole national production as income, i.e. the sum
of consumption, government expenditure plus the trade balance (Y = C + G + X   IM).
There is no investment, as there is no fixed capital in the model, which implies that the model
is a stationary state rather than growth model. Households also receive interest payments
on the bills they hold. In addition to that, households receive benefits Ben from the institu-
tional investor sector and pay contributions Cont to it. The sum of these terms plus national
income minus taxes represent households’ disposable income, which it is used to finance con-
sumption. The rest is saved and allocated across assets: domestic bills ( 4Badv_advh) and
cash ( 4Hadv_advh). Every year they also acquire (or lose) value in their accounts held with
institutional investors ( 4Acc). This acquisition, as it will be shown, is connected to con-
tributions made, and to avoid double counting the term is therefore added between brackets,
meaning that it is not included in the column sum adding up to 0, but it is just a remind of
the accounting change associated with it.
The governments of both countries behave in a standard way for SFC models. The receive
tax revenue from households and central bank profits’, and they use it to finance government
expenditure and service their existing debt. They issue new bills to finance any deficits arising.
90The SFC approach so far has not substantially developed stochastic features, which could be applied to
this context to give a numerical implication to this “risk”. The risk on EM bills does on the other hand come
into the model as exchange rate risk.
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Similarly central banks receive interest payments on the bills they hold, which they give to
governments, issue cash and purchase government bills. The EM central bank, as discussed,
purchase both ADV bills as FXR and EM bills. The only source of capital gains/losses are
exchange rate swings. An appreciation of the EM currency vis-à-vis the ADV currency (i.e.
an increase in xr), results in capital gains for ADV institutional investors on the bills they
hold, and a capital loss on the EM central bank’s FXR. For this reason a full revaluation
matrix would be redundant. Institutional investors receive contributions from households,
and interest payments on their domestic and foreign bills. They then purchase/sell across
those assets. Once again, their liabilities from accounting standpoint increase by an amount
that is exactly equal to the net acquisition of accounts by households.
The very simple structure of the real side of the economy of this model means that eﬀec-
tively many issues typical of post-Keynesian models, which SFC models are broadly part of,
are missing. For example, assuming away a well specified firm sector implies that the issue
of income distribution between capitalists and workers, and the associated issues of inflation
and productivity are eﬀectively assumed away. And similarly, the absence of firms and banks
means that credit and “inside-money” issues are also absent. This clearly limits the realis-
ticness of the set-up. However, as shown in Godley and Lavoie (2012), with open-economy
models the number of equations starts to grow very quickly, greatly increasing their complexity
at the expense of clarity. Furthermore, there are examples in which making similar assump-
tions about fixed prices and comparing the results after relaxing such assumptions did not
result in substantial changes (Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti, 2012). Insofar as the model has
a theoretical-logical purpose and is not used for policy analysis, it is therefore preferable to
make a few simplifying assumptions to gain on clarity and tractability.
7.3 Sectoral equations
7.3.1 Households
Consadv = ↵0adv + ↵1adv · Y dexpadv + ↵2adv · Vadv, 1 (7.1)
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Consem = ↵0em + ↵1em · Y dexpem + ↵2em · Vem, 1 (7.2)
Y dadv = Yadv +Ben  Cont  Tadv + radv ·Badv_advh, 1 (7.3)
Y dem = Yem   Tem + rem ·Bem_emh, 1 (7.4)
Cont =   · Yadv (7.5)
4Vadv = Y dadv   Consadv (7.6)
4Vem = Y dem   Consem (7.7)
Bdadv_advh = µadv · Vadv (7.8)
Hdadv_advh = Vadv  Badv_advh (7.9)
Bdem_emh = µem · Vem (7.10)
Hdem = Vem  Bem_emh (7.11)
As discussed households consume, and allocate their non consumed income to diﬀerent
assets. Households’ consumption depends on expected disposable income (Y dexp) and lagged
wealth (V 1), as shown in equation (7.1) and (7.2). Disposable income is total national income,
minus taxes, plus interest payments, and in the case of advanced countries, contributions minus
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benefits from institutional investors (equation (7.3) and (7.7)).
Households’ wealth only changes as a result of net saving, since households in both countries
do not hold any variable price assets, and therefore experience no capital gain/losses (equa-
tion (7.6) and (7.7)). They allocate wealth in fixed proportion to bills and cash (equations
(12)-(15))91.
Contributions in ADV are determined by the dynamics of the economy. equation (7.5)
states that contributions are equal to a proportion   of current national income. It is easy
to conceive such a relation in terms of a funded pension system: the proportion   is the
contribution rate out of income that current workers have to pay in to their pension fund in
order to accrue benefits. Much like taxes, this is an automatic deduction to current income.
For this reason it is best to treat this as a cash-flow concept that is imposed onto households
rather than part of their portfolio choice.
7.3.2 International trade and production
log(Xadv) = ✏oadv + ✏1adv · log(xr) + ✏2adv · log(Yem) (7.12)
log(Xem) = ✏oem + ✏1em · log(1/xr) + ✏2em · log(Yem) (7.13)
IMadv = Xem · xr (7.14)
IMem = Xadv · 1/xr (7.15)
Yadv = Consadv +Gadv +Xadv   IMadv (7.16)
Yem = Consem +Gem +Xem   IMem (7.17)
91Superscript s and d indicate demanded, and supplied.
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In line with most SFC models, exports are determined by prices and income in logarithmic
terms, so that parameters represent elasticities (equation (7.12) and (7.13)). However in this
model, as the production process is simplified so that it does not feature flexible prices, the
only relevant price is the nominal exchange rate92. As it is a two-country model, imports of a
country are exactly equal to the exports of the other countries, as represented by the imports
equations (7.14) and (7.15), which ensure the consistency of the accounting.
By construction the balance of payments of each country is as follows:
CAadv = Xadv   IMadv + rem ·Bem_inst, 1 · xr   radv ·Badv_emcb, 1 (7.18)
KAadv = 4Badv_emcb  4Bem_inst · xr (7.19)
CAem = Xem   IMem + radv ·Badv_emcb, 1 · 1
xr
  rem ·Bem_inst, 1 (7.20)
KAem = 4Bem_inst  4Badv_emcb · 1
xr
(7.21)
CAadv = KAadv CAem = KAem
The current account is the sum of the trade balance plus the net balance of interest pay-
ments on foreign assets and liabilities, while the capital account is the diﬀerence between the
net purchase of assets minus the net incurrence of liabilities. Foreign holdings are only in the
form of EM bills held by institutional investors, and FXR held by EM central banks.
7.3.3 Government and central bank
4Bsadv = Gadv + radv ·Bsadv, 1 + radv2 ·Bsadv2   Tadv   Fadvcb (7.22)
92The same is done in Mazier and Tiou-Tagba Aliti (2012, p. 364)
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4Bsem = Gem + rem ·Bsem, 1   Tem   Femcb (7.23)
Gadv = Gadv (7.24)
Gem = Gem (7.25)
Tadv = ✓adv · Yadv (7.26)
Tem = ✓em · Yem (7.27)
Fadvcb = radv ·Bsadv_advcb (7.28)
Femcb = rem ·Bsem_emcb + radv ·Bsadv_advcb · 1/xr (7.29)
Bdadv_advcb = H
s
adv  Bdadv2_advcb (7.30)
Bdadv2_advcb = B
s
adv2  Bsadv2_inst (7.31)
4Bdem_emcb = 4Hsem  4Bsadv_emcb · 1/xr1 (7.32)
Bsadv2 = B
s
adv2 (7.33)
Equations (7.22) and (7.23) represent the government budget constraint: government ex-
penditures plus interest payments, minus tax revenues and central bank profits, is equal to the
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net issuance of government bills, which are assumed to be the only financing mechanism for
governments93. Government expenditures are fixed (equations (7.24) and (7.25)), and taxes
are a fixed proportion on current national income (equations (7.26) and (7.27)). Central banks
receive interest payments on government bills they hold, and these profits are then transferred
to governments (equations (7.28) and (7.29)).
Central banks balance sheets identities are expressed in equation (7.30) and (7.32). From
equation (7.33), it can be seen that the high-yield asset’s existing stock is constant, with
the central bank acting as a dealer of last resort, depending on institutional investors’ demand
(7.31). Realistically, these securities should represent private sectors’ liabilities, such as equities
or corporate bonds. But under the simplified framework of this model, where the production
sector has no fixed capital holdings, liabilities can only be issued by the government. The
high-yield government bills could represent securities with a long-term maturity94, or issued
by other public sector bodies - e.g. agencies or local authorities-, which, given the higher
default and/or holding risk, could justify the higher the higher returns.
7.3.4 Institutional investors
Acc = Acc 1 + Cont    ·Acc 1 (7.34)
Ben = Acc 1 · rˆinst +   ·Acc 1 (7.35)
Vinst = Vinst, 1 + CFinst + CGinst (7.36)
CFinst = Cont Ben+ rem ·Bsem_inst, 1 · xr + radv ·Bsadv_inst, 1 + radv2 ·Bsadv2, 1 (7.37)
93This choice is made to avoid the complication of bond prices, which in the open economy would have
considerably complicated the determination of exchange rates and asset prices.
94Indeed the addition of this bill has the same impact of long-term bonds in Godley and Lavoie (2012)
chapter 4’s model, at least for the case where central banks act to keep the price of such bonds fixed.
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CGinst = 4xr ·Bsem_inst, 1 (7.38)
rinst = (rem ·Bsem_inst, 1 ·xr+radv ·Bsadv_inst, 1+radv2 ·Bsadv2, 1+CGinst)/Vinst, 1 (7.39)
Institutional investors are the key innovation of the model. As previously discussed, they
receive contributions from the household sector and give them in return an account balance.
Such accounts therefore accumulate with new contributions from households minus a propor-
tion   that is returned to households ((7.34)). Similarly, benefits are equal to the previous
period outstanding balance in the accounts times a guaranteed return rˆinst, plus the same
proportion   ((7.35)).
The logic behind these equations is the following. Current workers pay contributions to
build up their accounts with institutional investors. Institutional investors pay benefits to
households, both by delivering the guaranteed returns, and by returning part of the account
balance that workers have hitherto accumulated95. This latter element is again easily exem-
plified by a funded pension scheme: workers accumulate benefits entitlements, but these are
drawn down as benefits are paid. Therefore, as a whole the household sector accumulates
claims on institutional investors whenever their current contributions exceed the level of re-
payments, formally when Cont =   · Yadv >   · Acc 1. It is easy to see that this eﬀectively
occurs whenever national income increases from one period to another, i.e. in conditions of
economic expansion: as contributions are directly proportional to current income, in a station-
ary setting they will increase above drawdown of past accounts only if income increases above
the previous period’s level. Equivalently, if the national income falls the level of contributions
will keep falling, and as a whole the households sector will be losing its claims on institutional
investors, as benefits are paid out96.
Institutional investors assets are the sum of the previous period’s assets, plus the net cash
95Logically this is very similar to a loan with repayments on the principal, with households being the lender
and institutional investors the borrower.
96This suggests an interpretation of   as a measure of longevity of the population: the higher it is the longer
it takes for accounts to be drawn down.
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flows balance, plus/minus capital gains/losses (equation (7.36)). The cash flow of institutional
investors is the balance between benefits and contributions, plus investment income, i.e. in-
terest payments on their domestic and foreign bills holdings ( equation(7.37)). Capital gains
only occur as a result of exchange rate swings (equation (7.38)). The actual rate of return
of institutional investors is equal to investment income and capital gains over previous period
wealth (equation (7.39)). It is intuitive to see that institutional investors assets and liabilities
can diﬀer, insofar as their rate of return rinst diﬀers from the one they guaranteed rˆinst 97.
PBO = Acc · (1 + rˆinst)
tpbo
(1 + rpbo)tpbo
(7.40)
rpbo = radv + ⌧ (7.41)
fg = 1  Vinst
PBO
(7.42)
Equations (7.40), (7.41) and (7.42) define the accounting valuations of institutional in-
vestors’ liabilities. Institutional investors such as pension funds and insurers, typically estimate
their liabilities by discounting the future value of benefits. Aside from making assumptions
about the future value of benefits/premia to be paid, a key variable to be chosen is the dis-
count rate. This is very often closely related to a highly-rated bond yield. In this model
the benefits calculation is simplified, and only depends recursively on the previous year ac-
counts’ balance. Projected benefits obligations (PBO) therefore are approximated with a
10-year forward looking rule-of-thumb, calculated as end of period’s accounts, carried forward
by maturing tpbo years at the rate rˆinst and discounted back with the rpbo discount rate (equa-
tion (7.40)). The discount rate is a simple markup over interest rates on bills (equation (7.41)).
97This can also be shown formally. By merging (7.34) and (7.35) the following is obtained:
Acc = Acc 1 · (1 + rˆinst) + Cont Ben
and likewise by replacing (7.37) and (7.38) into (7.36), and making use of the relationship expressed by
(7.39), the following is obtained:
Vinst = Vinst, 1 · (1 + rinst) + Cont Ben
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The funding gap (fg) measures the magnitude of the deviation from full funding, i.e. when
current assets are equal to PBO (equation (7.42)).
Bdadv_inst
V expinst
=  0    1fg +  2 · radv (7.43)
Bdem_inst
V expinst
= [(1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv]·
"
(1   01) +  02 · rem    03 · radv2 +  04 ·
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
(7.44)
Bdadv2_inst
V expinst
= [(1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv]·
"
 01    02 · rem +  03 · radv2    04
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
(7.45)
Hdadv_inst = Vinst  Bsem_inst · xr  Bsadv_inst  Bsadv2_inst (7.46)
Equations (7.44), (7.43) and (7.46) define the asset allocation of institutional investors.
The general structure is the standard Tobinesque portfolio choice mechanism typical of all
SFC models, with a decomposition of EM returns into a interest rate plus expected exchange
rate appreciation (dxrexp). However, in line with this dissertation, the portfolio choice follows
a liability-driven investment mechanism98.
As discussed in previous chapters, a primary consequence of this framework is to split the
portfolio into two parts, a liability-matching portfolio, whose goal is to protect the current
value of the fund’s assets from risks - e.g. changes in interest rates -, and a return-seeking
portfolio, with the purpose of generating returns suﬃcient to fulfill those obligations. While
government-bonds are typically the only asset included in the liability-matching portfolio,
any risky asset can potentially be included in the return-seeking portfolio. In this model the
return-seeking portfolio consist of high-yield bills and emerging market bills.
Portfolio choice is in this sense a two-step procedure. In the first stage institutional investors
decide how much to allocate to domestic bills and how much to the return-seeking portfolio,
98See Appendix for further details on the equations.
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which depends on two factors. The first is the impact of their funding gap fg, which has a
positive impact on the allocation to return-seeking assets99. The higher the gap, the higher
the need for returns to fill such a gap and therefore the higher the allocation to higher-
yielding assets. The second is the level of base interest rates - what is measured by the
impact of  2 -, which can be interpreted as both a return factor, which makes domestic bills
more attractive by definition, but also as a risk-appetite factor: as the literature reviewed in
chapter 2 discusses, monetary policy is the crucial determinant of the overall level of investors
risk-appetite, generating an in inverse relationship between the policy rates and risk-taking.
In the second stage they decide the composition of the return-seeking portfolio, i.e. they
allocate assets between EM and high yield ADV bills, depending on their relative character-
istics. Such characteristics are the usual linear combination of returns, plus the component is
the element in brackets after  4, which represents the impact of FXR. As discussed throughout
the dissertation, FXR are seen as an element that increases the systemic liquidity of EM cur-
rencies, and therefore accumulating them makes EM bills more attractive vis-a-vis high-yield
advanced countries’ bills. The positive parameter  4 is supposed to capture this relationship:
whenever FXR are higher than a set level - ¯Bsadv allocations to EM increases.
Realised cash holdings, as in all SFC models, are the residual element from asset allocation.
7.3.5 Asset supplies and exchange rate regime closure
Hsadv = H
d
adv_inst +H
d
adv_adh (7.47)
Hsem = H
d
em_emh (7.48)
Bsadv_advh = B
d
adv_advh (7.49)
Bsadv_inst = B
d
adv_inst (7.50)
99This is implicitly assuming no risk-based funding regulation.
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Bsadv2_inst = B
d
adv2_inst (7.51)
Bsem_emh = B
d
em_emh (7.52)
Bsadv_advcb = B
d
adv_advcb (7.53)
Bsem_emcb = B
d
em_emcb (7.54)
Equations (7.47) to (7.53) describe asset supplies. Households and institutional investors
achieve their desired levels of domestic bills holdings, and cash is supplied on demand. Central
banks also purchase as much bills as they need.
xr =
Bdem_inst
Bsem_inst
(7.55)
Bsem_inst = B
s
em  Bsem_emcb  Bsem_emh (7.56)
4Bsadv_emcb =  1 ·4Bdem_inst (7.57a)
4Bsadv_emcb =  2 ·4Yem · xr (7.57b)
Bsadv_emcb = B¯
s
adv_emcb (7.57c)
The above equations define the exchange rate, and FXR accumulation by the EM central
bank, and together determine the closure of the system. The exchange rate is determined in the
EM bills market, depending on the relative excess demand or supply by foreign institutional
investors (equation (7.55)). The supply of EM bills to institutional investors Bsem_inst depends
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on the total supply minus domestic demand, and therefore crucially depends on the holdings
of the central bank, and its FXR level. Therefore the three diﬀerent closures of the system are
determined by equation (7.57), which represent diﬀerent behaviours by the EM central bank
with respect to its accumulation of FXR. Equations (7.57a) and (7.57b) show two diﬀerent
versions of a managed floating regime: in the first one, which represent the baseline scenario,
the central bank simply tries to counterbalance part of the private capital inflows coming from
abroad, eﬀectively trying to avoid excessive volatility of the exchange rate and create a buﬀer
against the new liabilities of the country; in the second one the central bank FXR increase with
GDP expressed in foreign currency100. Equation (7.57c) represent a pure floating exchange
rate regime, where the level of FXR is constant.
A fixed exchange rate regime has been deliberately discarded as it is a non-realistic de-
scription of current exchange rate arrangements for the great majority of EM economies101.
A pure float is also quite uncommon in EM countries, but it is used as a control case to see
the eﬀect of foreign exchange intervention.
7.3.6 Expectations
V expinst = Vinst, 1 + CFinst, 1 (7.58)
Y dexpadv = Y d
exp
adv, 1 +  (Y dadv, 1   Y dexpadv, 1){7.59} (7.57)
Y dexpem = Y d
exp
em, 1 +  (Y dem, 1   Y dexpem, 1){7.60} (7.58)
dxrexp = ¯dxr
exp{7.61} (7.59)
Expectations are treated in a rather simplified way. Institutional investors’ wealth expec-
tations are equal to the previous period’s value plus the previous period’s cash flow (equation
100This is chosen for convenience, diﬀerent values such as a fixed ratio to imports, showed no substantial
diﬀerences.
101See Ghosh et al. (2015)
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(7.58)). Households’ disposable income expectations follow a standard adaptive process (equa-
tion (7.57) and (7.58)). Following chapter 12 model in Godley and Lavoie (2012), there are
no specified expectations about the exchange rate value, but only expectations about appre-
ciation/deprecation, which is zero on average.
7.4 Initial values and stationary steady state
The structure of the model is now complete. With 60 equations (excluding a number
of “control” equations which have no causal role but only serve to track the evolution of
other variables) and 104 variables, the model is relatively compact, considering it features two
economy and the addition of new sector 102. This is mostly due to the simplifications on trade
and production, with no separate equations for ’real’ values, which would eﬀectively almost
double the amount of existing equations.
As with all SFC models, values for parameters, exogenous variables and the initial values
for the endogenous variables had to be chosen. What follows is a brief overview of some of
these choices, also presented schematically in Table 7.3. As a general choice method, most
parameters were chosen with values in line with those of the SFC literature, or using stylised
facts from the empirical evidence. Moreover, these values have to comply with the stationary
steady state of the model, which forms the baseline scenario.
102The model in chapter 12 of Godley and Lavoie (2012) has over 90 equations.
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Table 7.3: Parameters and variables values
Parameter Value Exogenous variables Value
↵1adv 0.8 G¯adv 300
↵2adv 0.15 G¯em 150
↵1em 0.8 radv 0.025
↵2em 0.14 rem 0.05
  0.05 rˆinst 0.033
µadv 1/6 Initial values
endogenous variables
µem 0.2 Yadv 1000
✓adv 0.3245 Yem 500
✓em 0.31 Bsadv 1200
  0.075 Bsem 400
⌧ 0.005 Bsadv2 166.667
 0 0.6 Hsadv 500
 1 3 Hsem 300
 2 5 xr 1
 01 0.625 Acc 666.667
 02 4.2 Vinst 666.667
 03 5 ¯dxr
exp 0
 04 0
 1 0.5
 2 0.4
  0.3
✏1adv = ✏1em 0.7
✏2adv = ✏2em 1
In a stationary state there should be not changes in balance sheets, and therefore no net
saving. As a result, the ↵ parameters determining consumption are chosen with values very
close to Godley and Lavoie (2012), but slightly higher to ensure that Y d = Cons in both coun-
tries. Asset allocation of households was chosen to consist mostly in cash holdings, since ADV
households hold much of their financial assets indirectly through institutional investors, and
EM households being from a non-advanced country do not invest much in financial markets.
The portfolio allocation of institutional investors has been chosen to be heavily skewed
towards advanced countries bills - 60% to Badv, 25% to Badv2 and 15% Bem. These parameters
result in a 60-40 allocation to liability-matching vs return seeking assets, and also reflect
the well known phenomenon of home-bias. The behavioural parameters   determining such
allocation were chosen to values close to 5, as in Godley and Lavoie (2012). The funding gap
parameter  1, was chosen to be smaller than the returns parameter.  4 was chosen to be zero
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in the baseline case, but will be activated in alternative scenarios to assess its impact.
Parameters   and   were chosen to be 0.05 and 0.0875. This was a rather arbitrary choice,
but reasonable considering it implies a stationary pension fund balance sheet - i.e. a funding
gap equal to zero - with a 5% contribution rate in the baseline steady state. Tax to GDP
parameters ✓ are higher than those chosen by Godley and Lavoie (2012), but are actually
much closer to the OECD average level of 33.7% as of 2012103. Chosen values for elasticity
parameters to trade ✏ are the same as in Godley and Lavoie (2012).
Interest rates were chosen to be 2.5% in ADV, 4.2% for the high-yield ADV bill, and
5% in EM. Again this is to reflect the existing reality of bonds issued in emerging markets
promising a higher yield. The guaranteed rate of return rˆinst on institutional investors’ account
is 3.3%, chosen to ensure a higher rate than domestic government bills. The parameter ⌧ is
0.05, a spread over the ADV’ interest rate. This implies that in the baseline steady state
rˆinst = rinst = rpbo and likewise Vinst = Acc = PB.
Values chosen for  1 is again rather arbitrarily chosen expressing that the EM central bank
will purchase FXR by exactly half the amount by which EM’s foreign liabilities increase in
foreign currency terms in the baseline scenario. The value chosen for  2 on the other hand is
very much in line with the data, e.g. the average of developing Asia FXR to GDP was 40% in
2008 (Park and Estrada, 2009).
The supply of financial assets was also chosen to respect existing stylised facts. Public
debt to GDP levels are higher in ADV than in EM, although government expenditures are
more or less the same. ADV’s GDP is twice as big as EM’s. The size of the institutional
investors sector is slightly smaller than in the real world, e.g. the OECD average for pension
funds’ assets to GDP is 86%104 compared to 66.67% of the model. This is essentially due to
the absence of a production sector supplying equities, which would be otherwise push up the
holdings of institutional investors105.
103Source: OECDstat
104Source: OECDstats
105 Without changing the structure of the model, increasing the size of the institutional investors’ sector
would also be unfeasible, as it would require the increase in the supply of either cash, or bills, which would
make the model asset to GDP levels implausibly high, or reduce institutional investors return below the base
interest rate.
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In the simulation exercises, the value of some of these parameters will be changed, as means
of a robustness check. Especially those parameters expressing the most crucial and/or novel
relationships, such as  1 and  1 will be tested with diﬀerent values, as to ensure the model’s
result are not only a reflection of the initial choice of the parameters’ values.
7.5 Simulation
Three diﬀerent scenarios are generated, where the baseline model - the stationary case -
is shocked by modifying the value of exogenous variables or parameters. All the scenarios
are simulated for 500 periods. The main variable of interest will be the exchange rate, as it
eﬀectively summarises how most of the other variables will change.
7.5.1 Scenario 1: emerging markets’ growth story
In the first scenario, the  01 parameter is shocked downwards, thus increasing the allocation
to EM bills within the return-seeking portfolio. The interpretation of such a change is that
institutional investors see potential in the EM assets, following for example a new positive
outlook for the future of the country, or simply because they find information about it more
accessible, and therefore are induced to increase their allocation to EM bills.
The initial eﬀect on the exchange rate is straightforward: as shown in Figure 7.1, there is
an initial spike in the exchange rate, since the higher allocation to EM bills generate excess
demand and, through (7.55), an appreciation of the EM currency. The appreciation generates a
trade deficit (Figure 7.2), which in turn generates a government deficit, increasing the supply
of government bills. The excess supply of government bills generates a depreciation of the
exchange rate, and over time improves the trade balance and eventually the current account
balance, which registers a surplus. As a result the excess supply of government bills reverses,
the exchange rate appreciates until it stabilises at a new lower equilibrium level.
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Figure 7.1: Exchange rate and funding gap
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Response of the exchange rate and EM current account after an increase in desire to hold EM
bills
At the new lower level for the exchange rate, the trade balance is in a surplus, and as a result
GDP is also at a higher equilibrium level (Figure 7.2). As the current account is in balance,
the trade surplus is oﬀset by a net factor income deficit. Despite the higher level of reserves
held by the central bank, the increased allocations to EM by foreign institutional investors
generate a higher foreign debt level, therefore worsening the net factor income surplus.
Figure 7.2: GDP and current account components
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Response of GDP, trade balance and net factor income after an increase in the desire to hold
EM bills
A key force shaping the dynamics of the system is the funding gap on portfolio choice
(Figure 7.3). The initial increase is allocation to EM bills is mitigated by the eﬀect of the
funding gap: the higher returns initially earned by institutional investors, due to exchange rate
appreciation and higher income returns as a result of the portfolio shift, improve the funding
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levels of the sector. The result of this process is that the exchange rate initially appreciates
by less than in it would have been with households investors, therefore generating a smaller
current account deficit. After the initial shock however, due to the lower funding gap levels
institutional investors starts selling their EM positions, thus putting downward pressure on the
exchange rate. This improves the trade balance, which, despite being smaller than it would
have been in a situation without institutional investors is able to push the EM current account
into a surplus. This is due to the lower debt levels originated at the beginning of the shock
period, which generated a much smaller debt servicing burden, thereby lowering the borrowing
requirements of the government, and lowering the increase in foreign debt payments. The
resulting current account surplus eﬀectively induces a shortage of EM assets, which increases
the exchange rate through (7.55). Notably, the new equilibrium level has a negative funding
gap, i.e. a funding surplus.
Figure 7.3: Funding gap and share of EM bills
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Eﬀect on the funding gap and the share of EM government bills in the portfolio of institutional
investors, after an increase in the desire to hold EM bills
Given the importance of the funding gap, it is important to study the sensitiveness of
the system the value of the parameter  1. This is shown in Figure 7.4. The result is clear:
the higher the value of  1 the smaller the magnitude of the swings in the short-run and the
lower equilibrium level of the exchange rate. A higher  1 represents a higher willingness of
institutional investors to closely stick to a full funding level (fg = 0), as a result any action
resulting in a deviation from it will induce counterbalancing moves, hence dampening their
impact. Therefore with a very high  1 the asset allocation will change little in both the short
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and the long-run, and the funding gap will remain closer to zero. It is not surprising therefore
that, conversely, with  1 = 2 the magnitude of the swings is bigger, therefore amplifying
the chain of events describe in the previous paragraph, and ultimately inducing a higher
equilibrium exchange rate level.
Finally note the comparison with the  1 = 0, the case where institutional investors act as
simple intermediaries distributing all returns as they achieve them106. The case shown with
the  1 = 0 in Figure 7.4, shows eﬀectively the same chain of events that can be obtained as a
result of a similar shock in Godley and Lavoie (2012): after a liquidity preference shock, the
initial response of the system is the same, with a sudden spike in the exchange rate and then a
depreciation following a current account deficit. However the exchange rate falls to a stabilise
at a lower level, compared to all the other cases. This is due to the higher initial appreciation,
giving rise to higher external debt, which in turn requires a lower exchange rate and a higher
trade surplus to face the higher net factor income deficit. The counterbalancing force given by
the funding levels, which contains the initial increase in allocation to EM bills, results in less
sharp movements of the exchange rate, both in the short-run (the initial appreciation) and the
long-run (the higher new steady state exchange rate).
106This is obtained by simply replacing rinst = rˆinst = rpboin all equations, and  1 = 0.
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Figure 7.4: Exchange rate
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Response of the exchange rate under diﬀerent assumptions for  1, the portfolio choice sensi-
tivity to funding levels, after an increase in desire to hold EM bills
So far the simulations have been made under the exchange rate regime described by 7.57a,
with the baseline parameter values. Figure 7.5 shows what would happen under diﬀerent
values for  1, under a FXR accumulation regime targeting GDP growth as in 7.57b, and under
a flexible exchange rate regime.
Qualitatively the results are very similar under the three regimes. However the EM central
bank seems to be more successful at realising its intents when accumulating FXR according
to 7.57a, i.e. targeting capital inflows. Under this regime, the exchange rate movements are
substantially dampened compared to the flexible exchange rate regime, and the adjustment
quicker. Unsurprisingly, this stabilizing impact is higher the higher parameter  1 is. The GDP
target seems to be on the other hand less successful as a stabilising working rule for central
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banks: in the short-run it fails to substantially contain the initial appreciation, and even
amplifies the subsequent fall, although it does stabilise the exchange rate at a less depreciated
level than in the pure floating case.
Figure 7.5: Exchange rate under diﬀerent regimes
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Response of the exchange rate, under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes after an increase in desire
to hold EM bills
The advantage of having a managed floating exchange rate regime is clear by looking at
these dynamics. It gives the central bank the opportunity to accumulate FXR, without having
to resort to a pegged exchange rate, which may be risky for EM central banks that are facing
balance of payments deficits. Following a simple rule of thumb, like purchasing and selling
FXR in accordance to capital inflows and outflows may well be useful policy strategy: as
the simulations suggest a “path-dependence” for the system as a whole, and in particular for
exchange rate movements - the smaller the initial appreciation, the smaller the subsequent
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depreciation - containing the short-run volatility of exchange rates results a good strategy to
contain the volatility of exchange rates in the long-run.
Intermediate exchange rate regimes also are perfectly consistent with an interest-rate tar-
geting monetary policy. Although no equation directly relates Hdem and Hsem, the supply and
demand for cash balances in EM, the two are equal in all the simulations, while at the same
time, the central bank’s balance sheet identities remain true. Just like Godley and Lavoie
(2012) find for the fixed-exchange rate case, in a managed floating exchange rate regime the
EM central bank is still able to keep its interest rate fixed, without losing control on the high-
powered money supply. This is perfectly consistent not only with a flexible exchange rate, but
also with a managed float.
It is interesting to note, that under such a regime, the accumulation of FXR does not seem
to be particularly correlated with current account movements. As shown in Figure 7.6, when
the EM central bank choose to target capital inflows, FXR accumulation is entirely driven by
them, with current accounts leaning in the same direction as reserves to oﬀset capital inflows.
When the EM central bank targets GDP, FXR are much more stable - which explains why
under this regime the exchange rate is much more volatile -. But even in this case, FXR seem
to mostly respond to capital flows rather than current account changes.
These figures show the important point made in chapter 3 that in a monetary economy,
such as that depicted by SFC models, there is no necessary link between current accounts and
FXR accumulation. Two-way gross capital flows very often dwarf net flows, represented by
current accounts, and it is therefore wrong to attach any particular flow to current accounts.
“In fact, causality between the current account and the accumulation of reserves is more likely
to run the other way: the accumulation may reflect the wish to resist the appreciation of
the currency, when the authorities face strong foreign demand for domestic currency assets,
manifested in gross capital inflows” (Borio and Disyatat, 2011, p. 12). This is exactly what
occurs in this model, even with a highly simplified two way gross flows system, with only one
asset traded internationally by private agents.
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Figure 7.6: Balance of payments components
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Response of the balance of payment components, under diﬀerent exchange rate regimes, after
an increase in desire to hold EM bills. The figure on the left shows the cases of FXR accumu-
lating according to equation (7.57a) respectively. The figure on the right shows the cases of
FXR accumulating according to equation (7.57b). Kflows shows private capital inflows, that
is net purchases of institutional investors of EM bills.
As a last simulation exercise for this scenario, the parameter  4 representing the positive
impact of FXR on allocation to EM assets is activated. The figures, shown in Figure 7.7,
present two clear results. Firstly, the higher the value of the parameter the higher the volatility
and the longer the adjustment to the equilibrium level. A positive  4 gives a pro-cyclical twist
to allocations and the exchange rate, as allocations to EM bills increase as new capital inflows
generate accumulation of FXR, and decrease as FXR falls fall as a result of capital outflows,
which amplifies the exchange rate swings. Secondly, the equilibrium level is lower the higher
the value of the parameter. Eﬀectively at the new equilibrium level, allocations and FXR are
higher, but the net factor income has worsened due to the higher external debt, which results
in an exchange rate depreciation.
This suggests that FXR, which as argued in this dissertation work as a “fundamental” that
improves the perceived macro-financial stability of EMs, are a rather volatile anchor for foreign
investors. Indeed to the extent that FXR accumulation follows foreign capital inflows, they
tend to be a rather destabilising pro-cyclical force. In line with the empirical evidence shown
in previous chapters, lower demand for EM assets can generate vicious cycles of lower FXR
and allocations to EMs.
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Figure 7.7: Exchange rate with active  4
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Response of the exchange rate, under diﬀerent values of  4 after an increase in desire to hold
EM bills
7.5.2 Scenario 2: a “search for yield”
The second scenario presents multiple shocks to radv, the interest rate on ADV bills. The
interest rate is first decreased from 2.5% to 1% for forty periods and then is brought back
up. This is supposed to simulate a scenario similar to what investors have been facing since
2008, with bond rates dramatically falling as a result of ultra-expansionary monetary policy
by advanced countries’ central banks. The increase of interest rates represents the ongoing
“tapering” process, and forthcoming interest rate reversal.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 7.8. The overall chain of events is similar
to that described in the previous scenario. As a result of the interest rate shock, institutional
244
investors allocate more to EM bills, which appreciates the exchange rate. This generates a
current account deficit, which sparks higher supply of EM bills, due to higher borrowing needs
from the government. This pushes the exchange rate downwards, therefore improving the trade
balance. When interest rates are increased back, the exchange rate drops a little more, and
this time the trade balance starts to improve substantially as to bring back to current account
closer to balance. Indeed, with the rates back to their initial level, the correction is such that
economy experiences a current account surplus, such that it cancels the net additional debt
previously accumulated. The exchange rate therefore initially overshoots its long-run target,
before the economy goes back to initial equilibrium levels.
Figure 7.8: Exchange rate and current account
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Response of the exchange rate and EM current account, with a double interest rate shock
It is useful once again to compare this to what would happen in the absence of institutional
investors107. In such a situation, shown in Figure 7.9, the dynamics are similar to the previous
scenario. The economy experiences an initial appreciation of the currency due to the lower
returns on ADV bills and the subsequent change in asset allocation. This generates a deficit
in the current account, due to the same higher financing needs of the EM government, which
is slowly corrected by a depreciation and an improvement in the trade balance. However, after
the second interest rate shock, the exchange rate simply adjusts back to equilibrium. Indeed
for the case without an explicit behavioural mechanism for institutional investors, this scenario
produces exactly the same results as the previous scenario: a change in interest rates has the
107Again this is done by putting rˆinst = rinst = rpbo so that eﬀectively institutional investors are pure
intermediaries for households.
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same eﬀect as a change in liquidity preference, just like in the model of Godley and Lavoie
(2012).
Figure 7.9: Exchange rate and current account - no institutional investors
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Response of exchange rate and EM current account, with a double interest rate shock, under
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Once again the key role in aﬀecting the dynamics of the system is played by the funding
gap (Figure Figure 7.10). Since a lower value of radv generates a positive funding gap - both
through assets reductions and liability increases -, it amplifies the initial shock on the exchange
rate, contains its subsequent fall, and slightly amplifies the second interest rate shock. This
eﬀectively results in a higher buildup of a current account deficit and foreign debt. As a result
the exchange rate needs to depreciate even further in order for the system to be brought back
to balance.
Figure 7.10: Funding gap and share of EM bills
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investors, with a double interest rate shock
246
Importantly, the process is enhanced for higher values of  1, as Figure 7.11 shows. The
higher the value the higher the initial appreciation and the sharper the subsequent depreciation.
This can be explained by the fact that with higher values for  1 investors care more about
their initial higher underfunding, and therefore invest more aggressively in EM bills and retain
the higher allocation for longer, so long as they remain underfunded. When interest rate
rise, the rapid improvement of funding levels generates a bigger selloﬀ of EM assets, which
combined with the higher buildup of imbalances generates a much sharper depreciation and
adjustment process. Unlike the previous scenarios therefore, the impact of the funding levels
on institutional investors portfolio choice, has a destabilising rather than stabilising role on
exchange rates.
Figure 7.11: Exchange rates under diﬀerent parameter assumptions
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Overall the process shows how lower interest rates, when increased back to “normal” levels,
generates a process akin to an EM cycle. As rates are lowered, capital inflows appreciate the
currency, generating a current account deficit (Figure 7.12). The high foreign indebdtedness
generates a net factor income deficit, and forces the currency to depreciate, despite the fact
that capital keeps flowing in. The longer and larger the debt buildup the longer and larger
the subsequent fall in the exchange rate will be to bring back the system to equilibrium.
Indeed the increase in exchange rates and their subsequent deterioration since the 2008
crisis, as was shown in chapter 4, is similar to the initial phases of the simulation of this
scenario. It is indeed well known that a number of EM, known as the “fragile five” (Johnson,
2015), have faced sharper depreciations since the “tapering” announcements, coupled with
higher foreign indebtedness and current account deficit pressures.
Figure 7.12: Balance of payments components
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Response of the balance of payments components, with a double interest rate shock
Finally, in this scenario as in the previous one, the intermediate exchange rate regime,
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which sees FXR accumulated as a share of capital inflows, is able to contain the exchange rate
swings. As clearly shown in Figure 7.13, the higher the parameter  1 the higher the reduction
in exchange rate volatility, and the quicker the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. Once
again, a GDP target does not seem to be as successful.
However it is important to notice that, despite their action, central banks are not able to
fundamentally change the patterns. They can contain the volatility of the exchange rates, but
its long-run movements are determined by the asset allocation choice of EMs.
Figure 7.13: Exchange rate under diﬀerent regimes
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7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has developed an open-economy Stock-Flow Consistent model, representing
the relationship between advanced and emerging markets developed throughout the disserta-
tion. The model features an advanced country with an institutional investor sector, allocating
its assets between safe and “return-seeking” assets. The sector promises a certain guaranteed
return, thus generating the possibility of gaps between asset and liabilities. The sector follows
a liability-driven investment, responding to funding gaps with increasing allocation to “return-
seeking” assets, which include EM assets, and likewise increases allocation to safe advanced
country’s bills, when funding levels improve.
The two scenarios presented in the chapter show the importance of the liability-driven
investment mechanism in determining the dynamics of the model. The funding gap acts as
a crucial determinant of portfolio choice, and therefore of the exchange rate, which is the
key macroeconomic variable of this simple model. The eﬀect of institutional investors on EM
financial stability is mixed, depending on how the funding-gap interacts with the shocks and the
other variables. In the case of a shock positively aﬀecting the allocation of EM - or equivalently
a rise in the EM interest rate - it acts as a countercyclical variable, dampening the eﬀects
of capital inflows that such shocks generate and containing the exchange rate movements.
However, when a negative shock to interest rates in advanced countries, it plays a destabilising
role, amplifying the cycles. To use the standard macroeconomic terminology, institutional
investors that have funding targets act procyclically with respect to “push” factors, and counter-
cyclically with respect to “pull” factors.
The model also shows the importance and consistency of managed floating exchange rate
regimes. A central bank accumulating reserves as a fixed proportion of capital inflows is
successful at containing exchange rate movements, achieving a quicker stabilisation, and also
containing the changes in the long-run equilibrium exchange rates, when these are produced
by the model. This may explain why so many EM resort to these exchange rate regimes.
However it is important to stress that while eﬀective, these measures only contain the in-
stability and do not manage to change what ultimately drives the mechanisms of the model:
the portfolio choice of institutional investors. Furthermore, to the extent that reserves accu-
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mulation itself acts as an attractor, being interpreted as a sign of financial strength by foreign
investors, the dynamics of FXR may still generate instabilities.
The overall message of the model confirms the riskiness of the current situation in EMs. The
boom in EM allocation by institutional investors following the 2008 crisis has been nurtured
by the low yields in advanced countries. Such a situation is however conducive of a buildup
of imbalances and vulnerabilities in EMs, and as a matter of fact a few EMs have been facing
current account deficits and deteriorating external balance sheets in very recent times. An in-
terest rate rise in advanced countries could trigger further depreciation, which may ultimately
correct these imbalances, but may create substantial harm in the meanwhile. Emerging mar-
kets therefore remain under the threat of interest rate rises in advanced economies, a situation
which unfortunately long-term institutional investors do not seem to improve in the current
circumstances, and EM central banks can only smoothen but not fundamentally change.
Appendix
In this model, low-rate bills represent the liability-matching portfolio, whereas high-rate
and emerging markets bills constitute the return-seeking portfolio. The key variable represent-
ing allocation between the two is the funding gap. Equations (7.43) (7.44) and (7.45), which
represent the portfolio choice mechanism of institutional investors, are the result of such a
paradigm. This can be shown in a few mathematical passages. Institutional investors split
their portfolio into a liability matching and a return-seeking portfolio, with weights wLM and
wRS , so that wRS + wLM = 1. In case of full funding (fg = 0), then:
wLM =  0 +  2 · radv wRS = 1   0    2 · radv
with  0 being the parameter which makes institutional investors’ returns equal to the one
promised to households - and thus maintains the fully funded status:
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rˆinst = rinst = rLM · ( 0 +  2 · radv) + rRS · (1   0    2 · radv)
 0 =
rˆinst +  2 · radv(rRS   rLM )  rRS
rLM   rRS
where rRS and rLM are the returns of the returns-seeking and liability-matching portfo-
lios108.
If there are deviations from the fully-funded status the portfolio is supposed to respond
linearly on the funding gap term:
wLM =  0    1fg +  2 · radv
wRS = (1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv
The allocations to each individual asset class in the total portfolio, are determined by the
relative size of the two portfolios (wLM , wRS) as well as their weights within each one of the
portfolios:
wi = wi,LM · wLM + wi,RS · wRS (7.60)
where wi,LM and wi,RS are the portfolio weights to asset i within the liability-matching
portfolio and the return-seeking portfolio.
Be wadv,LM the allocation to low-yield advanced country’s bills within the liability-matching
portfolio. Since the liability-matching portfolio only contains this type of assets wLM,adv = 1,
and therefore:
wadv =  0    1fg +  2 · radv
Assuming that, within the return-seeking portfolio, assets are allocated according to the
108 0 in the model is kept exogenous, for the parameters that solve the relationship in the baseline steady state.
Endogenising it according the expression above does not change substantially any of the results, especially if
in a dynamic context returns are taken as long-term averages rather than only previous period returns.
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tobinesque principles, plus the FXR impact discussed in the chapter:
wadv2,RS =  01    2 · rem +  3 · radv2 +  4
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!
wem,RS = (1   01) +  2 · rem +  3 · radv2 +  4 ·
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!
with wadv2,RS and wem,RS being the allocation to the high-yield and emerging market bill
within the return-seeking portfolio. Replacing into (7.60):
wadv2 = ( 0 +  1fg    2 · radv)·
"
 01    2 · rem +  3 · radv2 +  4
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
wem = [(1   0) +  1fg    2 · radv]·
"
(1   01) +  2 · rem    3 · radv2 +  4 ·
 
Bsadv_emcb   B¯sadv_emcb
B¯sadv_emcb
!#
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Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Research summary
This dissertation has been divided into eight chapters. The first chapter discussed the back-
ground, research hypothesis, and methodological considerations. In chapter 2, the “main-
stream” literature on the determinants of capital flows was surveyed. It was argued that the
literature’s main points could be summarised into two main categories: fundamental factors
- plagued by market imperfections - and investors’ risk-appetite. The chapter has argued
that the literature is limited in its understanding of the nature of investors and portfolio
choice, being based on representative agents optimising over risk/return considerations, and
fundamentals - and deviations from them - as main explanatory factors behind their actions.
Furthermore, it is theoretically rooted on a real rather than monetary analysis of the economy.
The recent developments focusing on risk-appetite and monetary policy suggest that renowned
scholars are taking steps to move beyond these limitations.
Chapter 3 moved from the considerations of what constitutes an explicitly monetary anal-
ysis of the economy, based on post-Keynesian monetary theory. If capital flows are understood
as monetary flows resulting mainly from asset purchases and sales, the analysis should therefore
focus on portfolio choice - or better “asset demand”- from investors, rather than the conditions
of the current account. In these respects a crucial role is given to currency liquidity, which
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needs to be understood as the capability of such currencies to work as “money”, and in par-
ticular their usage to face liabilities. Emerging markets are therefore at a disadvantage, since
their currency cannot readily be used to face liabilities, and are therefore at a constant risk
of volatile swings in international liquidity preference, although their currency liquidity is also
determined by a number of “Keynesian fundamentals” that aﬀect the macro-financial stability
of a country. The chapter argued that liquidity preference is not just an a-priori theory but
needs to be related to the historical development of the financial system and its institutions.
Institutional investors in particular have become pivotal actors, so that a substantial part
of financial investments, including cross-border, is originated by their behaviour. The chap-
ter concluded by proposing a number of channels aﬀecting institutional investors’ behaviour.
Aside from standard portfolio considerations - i.e. risk/return tradeoﬀs-, the analysis should
focus on factors aﬀecting the liquidity of emerging markets’ currency, such as the accumulation
of foreign exchange reserves. Even more importantly the overall liquidity preference of institu-
tional investors - or risk appetite to use a more “mainstream” term - is likely to be substantially
influenced by the conditions of their liabilities. The following three chapters constitute the core
of the thesis. Based on the insights developed by the critical review of mainstream theorising
and the relevance of post-Keynesian theories, they explore, in a triangulation of methods, the
fundamental aspects that need to be addressed for a more in-depth understanding of the role
of institutional investors.
Chapter 4 provided empirical evidence on several of these aspects. It was shown that
emerging markets’ financial integration mainly comes from the liability side, i.e. from capi-
tal inflows, while the expansion of their international assets is mainly in the form of reserves
accumulation, and that the institutional investors have a increasingly important role in these
trends. Institutional investors themselves have seen important shifts during the past fifteen
years. Their asset allocation, previously skewed towards domestic equities, towards interna-
tional assets and indirect asset holdings through funds. Changing regulation and the historical
experience of the dotcom and global financial crisis have made them more conscious of the
centrality of liabilities in determining their investment strategy, culminating in the paradigm
of “liability-driven” investment. Low funding ratios, indicating an insuﬃcient coverage of as-
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sets over liabilities, coupled with low interest rates have pushed them towards riskier assets,
including emerging market assets. Emerging markets assets at the same time become more
attractive, primarily in terms of lower vulnerability to external debt shocks - chiefly by accu-
mulating foreign exchange reserves, as well as high economic growth and returns. However, in
very recent years some of these trends have slowed down or even reverted, as it can be seen in
the decline of foreign exchange reserves to GDP ratios and the unimpressive performance of
equity and bond markets. Investments in emerging markets assets has become more volatile,
but allocations are yet to substantially fall, contributing to the explanation that the “search-
for-yield” behaviour, rather than only improving fundamentals, is a powerful force behind
capital flows to emerging economies.
Chapter 5 tested such contentions econometrically. Based on a Tobinesque asset demand
approach, the chapter has used an autoregressive distributed lags panel specification, to ex-
plore the determinants of institutional investors’ allocation to emerging markets assets. The hy-
potheses of the dissertation were largely confirmed. Lower funding ratios in advanced countries
induce a higher demand for emerging markets bonds and equities, in line with the liability-
induced search for yield behaviour. Higher levels of foreign exchange reserves also attract
foreign investments, in line with the idea that these serve as to lower the risk of exchange
rate and macro-financial volatility and therefore enhance the liquidity of emerging markets’
currency.
Chapter 6 presented the results of semi-structured interviews with European pension funds
on the subject of their investment to emerging markets. This chapter sheds light on the
investment choice mechanisms of institutional investors. Everywhere, emerging markets assets
are part of a “return-seeking” strategy, although the ways through which this is aﬀected by
economic fundamentals is complex. Economic growth, for example, is supposed to translate
into higher returns, but it less clear how it will do so, and similarly political risk is closely
monitored, but is very hard to operationalise in practice. On the other hand, liquidity, both
at the financial market and systemic - especially currency - level, emerges as a key concern,
in line with the theories exposed in chapter 3. The chapter also confirms once more the
crucial role of liabilities as a determinant of institutional investors asset demand. The precise
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way in which liabilities aﬀect asset allocation to emerging markets however depends on the
regulatory structure, and in particular its stringency on allocations to risky assets for a given
funding level. Finally, it is likely that the growing reliance on external managers and fiduciary
companies may create additional instabilities, especially in terms of herding behaviour.
Chapter 7 developed a Stock-Flow Consistent model, aiming to represent the relationship
between an advanced and an emerging country. The model is innovative in a number of
ways, chiefly in its introduction of an institutional investors sector in the advanced economy,
that allocates assets according to a liability-driven investment strategy: as funding levels
go down, the sector responds by investing more in assets with a higher expected rate of
return, including emerging markets bills. Under such conditions, institutional investors seem
to provide a counter-cyclical role in allocating assets to emerging markets, when these are
driven by “pull” factors, but a pro-cyclical force when their investment is driven by low-interest
rates that inflate the value of their liabilities.
8.2 Message and significance
In today’s globally interconnected financial system, institutional investors have become pivotal
actors. Indeed it can be argued that the process of financial globalisation is partially driven by
the institutionalisation of savings themselves. Their portfolio choice is a crucial determinant of
capital flows in a monetary economy. Institutional investors will invest in financial assets across
the globe primarily driven by the conditions of their liabilities, i.e. the extent to which they
need to generate these returns, and the macro-financial conditions determining the liquidity
of the assets’ currency of denomination.
Institutional investors operationalise this in the framework of “liability-driven investment”,
which leads them to keep a sizable part of their portfolio into domestic bonds while at the same
time expand into non-traditional asset classes to enhance their returns. Emerging markets
assets are therefore included in the strategy, because they - potentially - yield good returns,
and present substantially improved “fundamentals”, particularly as a result of the accumulation
of foreign exchange reserves.
In the current context, the pressure to generate returns is substantial. Due to low yields,
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combined with the continued long-run structural factors and regulatory pressures, institutional
investors liabilities are growing faster than their assets, which in a liability-driven strategy,
means that institutional investors cannot “de-risk” their investments, and look for assets that
can deliver higher expected returns. To the extent that these conditions still exist, the demand
for emerging market assets is likely to continue. And indeed allocations have continued to
increase, despite the fact that the risk/return tradeoﬀ of emerging market assets has become
less attractive, as returns have fallen, “fundamentals” stopped improving, and economic growth
declined.
This story, which represents in a nutshell the message of this dissertation, stems from the
understanding of the behaviour of institutional investors, which are at the heart of the global
financial system. As cited in chapter 3, Braasch (2010, p. 104) argued that “gaining a better
understanding of institutional investors’ market behaviour will be one of the key analytical
tasks in the next few years, [...] if the behaviour of key global market players is not understood,
it will be impossible to understand the process of financial globalisation or to achieve significant
progress in analysing the causes and implications of financial crises”.
The primary significance of this dissertation is therefore to explain the operations of insti-
tutional investors. Since this process is neither a purely microeconomic nor a purely macroeco-
nomic phenomenon, the usage of multiple methods was essential. Quantitative methods served
to assess the significance of the macro-level hypothesised relationships. Qualitative methods
were crucial to uncover the actual operations and structure behind such relationships. The
modeling strategy allowed a better understanding of the implications of such relationships for
capital flows.
The contribution of this thesis aims in this sense to expand the literature on the determi-
nants and stability of capital flows. It does so by uncovering the “black box” of risk-appetite,
the key emerging theme from the contemporary literature in chapter 2, by rooting it in the be-
haviour of institutional investors, and by reaﬃrming the need to have an explicitly “monetary”
framework of analysis. It also aims to contribute directly to the post-Keynesian literature, by
addressing the implications of a “monetary” framework for the analysis of capital flows, and
its relationship to the rise of institutional investors.
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8.3 Implications
The processes described throughout this dissertation may create vulnerabilities in emerging
markets. Given their role as part of a “return-seeking” strategy, emerging markets assets
are likely to be highly susceptible to changes in their risk/return profile. Because of their
lower position in the currency hierarchy, emerging markets need to remain an “attractive”
destination, by maintaining high levels of foreign exchange reserves, high economic growth and
political stability. As exemplified by Russia in 2014, political issues can quickly transmit into
sharp drop in allocations, which at the macro-level often lead to currency depreciations. These
actions can also be self-reinforcing: if a more bearish attitude to emerging markets assets was
to translate into deteriorating domestic conditions - e.g. decreasing levels of foreign exchange
reserves - then it may validate investors’ concerns and translate into capital outflows. The
process may be further amplified by behavioural factors, which while less pronounced than
individual investors, appear to be present even within the pension funds sectors, especially
when external asset managers are involved.
More fundamentally, lowering pressures to search for returns will aﬀect emerging markets
negatively. An increase in advanced countries’ bond yields for example, would substantially
reduce the need for institutional investors to look for alternative assets, as their liabilities fall
and their liability-matching assets start yielding positive returns. Although some heterogeneity
across countries exists, due to diﬀerent regulatory structures, higher advanced countries bond
yields are likely induce institutional investors to “de-risk”, i.e. decrease allocations to all the
riskier asset classes to safer and more liquid assets, as a result of which emerging market assets
will inevitably be sold in large quantities. On top of this, increasing interest rates are likely
to create also short-term spikes in risk-aversion, as investors adapt to “normalised” market
conditions, after years of very low yields. The repeated waves of panic in the past three years
amidst speculation of monetary policy tightening clearly testify to such shifts in risk-appetite.
Institutional investors are unlikely to be immune to these phenomena, which may create panic
and contagion episodes, resulting in sharp depreciations and asset prices collapses. In such
a scenario, good “fundamentals” would shield some countries, but not completely save them,
especially as many of these “fundamentals”, such as the level of foreign exchange reserves, will
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deteriorate endogenously.
To the extent that the current situation reflects a threat to financial stability, issues can
therefore be raised as to what could be done to avoid major problems for both emerging
markets and institutional investors stability, upon which an households’ savings and income
depend. Although drawing precise policy implications is beyond the scope of this dissertation,
three broad areas of focus can be pointed out.
The first refers to the issue of capital mobility. The highly unstable nature of capital flows,
which institutional investors do not seem to change, and the increased frequency of financial
crashes have cast questions about the process of financial integration itself. The global fi-
nancial crisis was a major strike against the consensus about the beneficial eﬀects of freely
moving capital. As columnist Martin Wolf states “if global finance does little more than bring
catastrophe in its wake, it becomes almost impossible to defend existing, let alone increased,
levels of financial integration” (Wolf, 2010, p. 1). Indeed prominent economists have argued,
that the benefits of financial integration, for which evidence is at best modest, are far out-
weighed by its costs, and stressed the need to change the global financial architecture (Rodrik
and Subramanian, 2009; Obstfeld, 2009; Lane, 2012). This view is shared by post-Keynesian
economists, as claimed by Bibow (2008, p. 24): “there is no good sense for developing countries
in granting foreign pension funds, hedge funds, or other foreign portfolio investors or bankers
free access to participating in the rewards of developing countries’ catching-up process”.
If so, then clearly there may be a case of introducing some form of capital controls. The
IMF (2012), formerly one of the most important supporter of international capital market
liberalization, is now adopting an “institutional approach to capital flows”, which recognises
the risks of financial globalisation and that “there is no presumption that full liberalization is
an appropriate goal for all countries at all times”, opening at the same the possibility for capital
flows management - i.e. capital controls - on a case-by-case basis109. The issue with capital
controls, aside from the debate on their eﬀectiveness, if implemented by individual countries,
they may simply deflect capital inflows to other countries, given that these are driven by
common factors (Forbes et al., 2012; Giordani et al., 2014). Implementing capital controls,
as it is often the case with country-level policies, should therefore be part of a coordinated
109See however Gabor (2010, 2015) for a critical account of the IMF’s new position.
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strategy.
Secondly, there is a need to rethink the eﬀect of monetary policy and macro-prudential
regulation on institutional investors. The eﬀect of monetary policy on the behaviour of in-
stitutional investors, as shown in this dissertation, comes most directly from its impact on
their liabilities. It is therefore clear that ultra-expansionary monetary policy is an important
factor behind their “search for yield”. And indeed Borio (2014) has powerfully argued that
the monetary policy stance is a primary determinant of the financial cycle. As a result, the
current climate has sparked questions as to whether monetary policy should take into account
imbalances in the financial markets. In particular it is argued that given that the current
bond yields are not reflective of “fundamentals”, monetary policy may have to intervene to
avoid excessive buildup of such imbalances, if anything to prevent a sharp correction in case
of monetary tightening (Feroli et al., 2014; Stein, 2014). This could include an international
dimension as argued by Rey (2013, p. 315): “central bankers of systemically important coun-
tries should pay more attention to their collective policy stance and its implications for the
rest of the world”. The IMF’s consensus considers unwarranted the usage of monetary policy
for financial stability purposes, but recognises the eﬀect that it has in the build-up of financial
risks and thus remains open to the possibility in the future (IMF, 2015). Post-Keynesian
economists views about monetary policy tend to see little role for monetary policy as a sta-
biliser of the economy, due to the unreliability of the interest rate transmission channel as well
as its ultimate impact on inflation, and therefore generally tend to advocate simple rules that
prevent shifts in income distribution110. However, there have also been calls to a more active
role for central banks in stabilising financial markets and asset prices in particular , although
not through interest rate changes (Tymoigne, 2010). Whether central banks will actually do
so remains to be seen.
Macro-prudential policies have been the main tool through which policy-makers have been
tried to tackle the problem of financial instability (see e.g. Hanson et al., 2011). While most of
these interventions have focused on banks, it is increasingly clear that institutional investors
must also be taken into account. This could take into account rules to avoid excessive move-
ments across asset classes, as to dampen their volatility. As forcefully argued by Haldane
110See Lavoie (2014, pp. 234-238).
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(2014, p. 13), “this is the next frontier for macro-prudential policy – whether, and if so how
best, to moderate excessive swings in risk premia across financial markets which risk damag-
ing the financial system or wider economy”. More care should be taken in extending Basel
III-type of regulation to institutional investors: in light of the evidence presented in chapter
7, risk-based funding requirements are likely to create further pro-cyclicality.
The third main area of focus is the stability of institutional investors, and pension funds in
particular. Regardless of the relative merits of funded pensions versus pay-as-you-go system,
institutional investors, households in most advanced countries rely on them for retirement
income. Ensuring the stability of their investments is more than just an exercise of financial
stabilisation.
Given the reality of liability-driven investment, a primary concern is the existence of safe
assets that generate suﬃcient returns for investors. Government bonds are the quintessential
safe asset, but at present are not suﬃcient to cover the growth of liabilities. To reduce the
“search for yield” behaviour that is currently guiding institutional investors towards risky
asset classes, safer assets that provide higher returns are needed. One such way could be the
promotion of GDP-linked bonds (Griﬃth-Jones and Sharma, 2006; Borensztein and Mauro,
2004; Kamstra and Shiller, 2009). These bonds can be a a good match for pension liabilities,
which grow more or less in line as nominal GDP. In the present conditions these securities
would yield a higher return, therefore easing the pressure on pension funds. Investments in
public infrastructure could also provide an interesting asset class, although it has so far only
had mixed success111.
8.4 Avenues for future research and concluding remarks
All this suggests two main potential avenues for future research. A first area would be to
expand the macroeconomic implications of this analysis for the context of emerging markets.
The model developed in chapter 7 can be in this sense expanded as to allow for more assets,
including for example equities. In this sense it could show how foreign investors may be one
of the primary source of inflation in the capital markets in line with Toporowski’s theory.
111http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b47e481e-2307-11e5-bd83-71cb60e8f08c.html#axzz41rs98vfD
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Similarly, it will be interesting to deepen the analysis of endogenous money in the context
of emerging markets. It is certainly true that money remains endogenous regardless of the
exchange rate system. However, as discussed in chapter 2, emerging markets may find it
diﬃcult to completely ignore capital flows and set interest rates only on the basis of domestic
considerations. Although this does not change the endogenous nature of money, it may raise
questions about modeling interest rates as exogenous in emerging markets.
A second main area would be expanding the analysis of institutional investors and examine
how the mechanisms explored apply to a more general context. Liability-driven investment
is a general feature of institutional investors’ portfolio choice, that can be expanded beyond
its implications for emerging markets. A key question is to what extent the pro-cyclical
or counter-cyclical nature of institutional investors that follow such a strategy apply to a
growing economy. Another is whether liability-driven investment can be extended beyond
institutional investors, for example to households with long-term savings target. This latter
point is empirically relevant, given that retirement provision is increasingly being shifted onto
individuals. Policy issues will also be assessed, such as the eﬀectiveness of GDP-linked bonds
as a stabiliser for pension investments, and the broader task on how to build a sustainable
pension system.
The current cycle of capital flows to emerging markets, if left to itself, is unlikely to end
in a way much diﬀerent than the previous ones. Institutional investors may have a long-term
horizon, but their ultimate goal is to pay their obligations. They will have little interest in
remaining invested in illiquid currencies, if they can achieve such a goal in a safer way. This
may lead to a new financial bust. The double challenge is to prevent the most vulnerable
countries from taking the biggest blow, and ensure that people’s income is not under the
constant threat of financial instability. The task for the future is to address this challenge.
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